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In the face of growing global competition, unions had common challenges and 
difficulties in retaining their bargaining power. Yet, their responses to market 
restructuring varied within and across countries resulting in a variety of outcomes. 
This dissertation tries to answer the question of why union responses differed and why 
they had varied degrees of success in their attempt to influence the restructuring 
designs. For this, this study examines labor responses to privatization and public 
sector restructuring in Korean telecommunications and railways.   
 The main findings of this dissertation can be summarized as follows: first, the 
changes in the political contingency increased opportunities for the Korean Railway 
Workers’ Union (KRWU) while reducing them for the Korea Telecom Trade Union 
(KTTU). Due to this difference in the extent of political opportunities, KTTU was 
constrained to take a defensive position whereas KRWU escalated its militancy. In the 
Korean institutional context where both unions were deprived of institutional access, 
the increase in political opportunities tended to increase labor militancy for KRWU 
while the reduction of the latter contributed to the restraint of militancy for KTTU. 
Second, the persistent replacement threat of the leftist faction sustained the leadership 
inclination towards militancy at KRWU while the waning of such a threat reduced the 
incentives for militancy for the KTTU leadership. Third, in regards to strategic 
effectiveness, KRWU was more successful in obtaining concessions from 
government/management than KTTU. Such variation can be explained by a greater 
strategic ability of KRWU leadership in mobilizing membership and socio-political 
  
  
resources.  
 Findings contribute to the current debate on national models theories. Unlike the 
expectation that non-coordinated industrial relations polity would be associated with 
market-driven unilateral restructuring, this dissertation argues that there exists a sub-
national variation in restructuring outcomes related to the differences in the strategic 
capability of unions. This led to questioning the uniformity of national models. Instead, 
this dissertation found the central role played by the strategic choices of labor unions 
in creating within-country variations in the restructuring outcomes.       
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CHAPTER ONE  
‘VARIETIES OF UNIONISM’: CONCEPTUALIZING THE VARIATION IN 
THE RESPONSES AND IN THE STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS OF LABOR 
UNIONS TO PUBLIC SECTOR RESTRUCTURING 
 
 
1. Overview of the Study  
 
Research Questions 
The current era of global competition and deregulation brought about drastic changes 
worldwide by promoting market liberalization at an unprecedented pace. Along with 
these developments, public sector restructuring swept up almost every country leading 
to the privatization of public sectors in many cases. As governments sought to roll 
back the state, public sectors were under the banner of change and reform. They were 
considered as barriers to increase competitiveness and were criticized for their 
inefficiency, which brought about a general tendency towards the curtailment of the 
public sector. Thus, public sector restructuring was “at the center of things: as 
protagonist, as scapegoat, as political symbol of change” (Ferner, 1994: 52), and 
privatization became one of the pillars of these reform policies.  
 In this changing environment, labor unions and their members have had 
difficulties retaining their bargaining power and have been faced with new challenges. 
Market liberalization and public sector restructuring have been accompanied with 
large-scale labor restructuring and workforce reduction. The consequences of the latter 
have particularly been severe for labor unions because they had difficulties in 
developing effective strategies to confront the restructuring policies that hurt their 
constituencies and organizations. Thus, debates on the effects of public sector 
restructuring and privatization usually had common assessments of the decline of 
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union power in the face of worsened labor market situations that created massive 
dismissals and eroded established bases of union influences.  
 Yet although unions have had hard times everywhere in their attempt to preserve 
their influence and to defend labor interests, union responses to public sector 
restructuring have not been uniform and have varied both within and across countries. 
Some unions indulged primarily in militancy and they either organized or threatened 
industrial action to impact the pace and the form of restructuring. Yet others restrained 
militancy and complied with governments’ reform policies. The unions that fall in the 
latter category can be subdivided into the unions that actively sought cooperation with 
the government by endorsing government reform policies and the unions that 
defensively acted on the proposed policies and responded in a concessionary manner.  
 Moreover, although the decline in union power has been a general trend in the face 
of similar challenges presented by public sector restructuring, the patterns and the 
shape of restructuring differed within and across countries, and unions had different 
degrees of success in retaining a certain influence over the restructuring processes. In 
some cases, neither militant industrial action nor restraint to government/management-
led restructuring has been effective due to labor unions’ lack of capacity to obtain 
concessions from their counterparts. In these cases, unions subordinated themselves to 
the unilateral process of restructuring and labor’s countervailing power has been 
significantly undermined. In other cases, unions have been more effective in exerting 
some bargaining leverage. Although they could not completely halt the move towards 
privatization and market liberalization, they contributed to the successful negotiation 
of some agreements that prevented fundamental deterioration of employment 
condition. In this way, they could ensure that the restructuring process is being 
mediated by labor. And yet in some other cases, labor unions went further in their 
efforts to obstruct the proposed reform and exerted significant influences on the pace 
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and shape of restructuring to ultimately derail the initial plan.  
 Hence despite the fact that the process of change imposed broadly similar 
challenges to labor unions, their responses to the restructuring differed along diverging 
strategies, and their effectiveness also varied. The purpose of this study is to explain 
the reasons that underlie the variation in union responses and in the differential union 
influence over the outcomes of the restructuring. For this, the research will center 
around two key questions:  
 
1. How and why union responses to the proposed privatization/restructuring plan 
have differed?  
2. To what extent unions have succeeded or failed in affecting the restructuring 
outcomes? What explains unions’ different capacities in obtaining concessions 
from government or management? 
 
 Related to these critical questions, previous studies have also revealed the 
differences in the content and outcomes of restructuring in the industries such as 
telecommunication and automobile. According to their findings, “even in the face of 
common trends toward deregulation and privatization, there is much variation in the 
focus of the restructuring” (Katz, 1997: 2). According to whether labor unions have 
been capable of influencing the nature and extent of deregulation and restructuring, 
country cases can be classified into contrasting categories: ‘market-driven 
restructuring’ versus ‘labor-mediated restructuring, or ‘unilateral restructuring’ versus 
‘negotiated restructuring’. In countries where technological and market pressures 
prevailed without the integration of labor into processes of change, the outcomes of 
restructuring have been marked by cost-cutting strategies, employment reduction and 
substantial decline in union power. By contrast, in countries where unions had 
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significant influence over the pace, the pattern and the outcomes of restructuring, 
market pressures have been modified and mediated by labor (Turner, 1991; Katz, 
1997; Batt & Darbishire, 1997).  
 Unlike the explanation that draws upon the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis1, and in line 
with the above studies, this dissertation will argue that the process of market 
liberalization and public sector restructuring did not result in a uniform curtailment of 
union power. On the contrary, it will draw attention to the variation in labor unions’ 
ability to gain concessions, which in turn, marked the divergence in the shape or pace 
of the restructuring process.  
 
Focus on the Explanation of Subnational Variation 
Past studies mostly focused on explaining cross-national variations by treating 
national institutions of industrial relations as the basic unit of analysis. They often 
relied on the premise of the institutionalist approaches that emphasized the particular 
national institutions for explaining contrasting national outcomes (Turner, 1991; Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2001; Yamamura & Streeck, 2003). By doing this, they 
rejected “the notion that previously diverse economies are all converging on a single 
model of capitalism” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005) and argued for the persistent cross-
national divergences in terms of the forms and speeds of market liberalization. For 
them, the diverse outcomes were the products of different institutional endowments: 
while some countries inherited corporatist institutional arrangements that could 
mediate international pressures for market liberalization, others lacked such 
institutional legacies for labor incorporation. Thus, they commonly focused on macro-
                                            
1 There are numerous works that emphasized downward pressures on wages and working conditions in 
the face of growing market competition. According to these, such tendencies weakened labor’s 
bargaining power, and as a consequence, “a race to the bottom in wages and working conditions has 
been unleashed on a world scale.” (Silver, 2003: 4) 
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institutional features for explaining the distinct national differences.  
 The institutionalist approach helps us understand how labor integration into the 
process of restructuring or its exclusion from the very process has been conditioned by 
different domestic institutions, and how this has resulted in the distinct national 
patterns of outcomes. But when one finds that the outcomes varied not only across 
countries but also within each country, the comparative typologies based on the 
macro-institutional differences seem less relevant. Furthermore, researchers also 
evidenced the fact that the within-country variation has widened in recent decades 
(Katz, 2000). For this reason, researchers over the past have questioned the uniformity 
of national models and have increasingly developed an alternative approach that 
focuses more on ‘micro-level developments’ and ‘the politics of strategic choice’ to 
explain subnational variation (Locke, 1992; Frost, 2000; Murillo, 2001). For them, 
“although national level variables help to understand national-level patterns, they 
cannot explain subnational variation” (Murillo, ibid: 25).  
 This study will extend the claims developed by these alternative approaches by 
examining within-country variation in union responses and in their strategic 
effectiveness. Specifically, this study will examine privatization and public sector 
restructuring in South Korea selecting two representative industry cases that had 
previously been or that have still remained public sectors: telecommunication and 
railway. Privatization of both sectors was initiated, yet only Korea Telecom (KT) was 
fully privatized. By contrast, the privatization plan of the railway industry was 
withdrawn and the operation of the industry that had once been under the direct 
control of the national department (Korean National Railroad, KNR) has now been 
handed over to the public enterprise (Korea Railroad Corporation, KORAIL) while the 
public ownership has been maintained. Furthermore, union influence on the 
government-initiated public sector restructuring and privatization were also different. 
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The role of Korea Telecom Trade Union (KTTU) was marginalized in the restructuring 
process and the union failed to obstruct the government-led radical restructuring 
process. By contrast, The Korean Railway Workers’ Union (KRWU) succeeded in 
forcing the government to withdraw the initial plan and in obtaining concessions. This 
study will examine why such subnational divergence has occurred focusing on the 
variation in union responses and their effects on the proposed 
privatization/restructuring plans.    
 
The Impact of Public Ownership on Union Strategies 
This study will also draw attention to the distinctive logic of action of public 
enterprises and its impact on union strategies. Although commercialization brought 
about drastic changes in public sector industrial relations and tended to push public 
enterprises towards greater market exposure, there have remained significant 
differences between public and private enterprises. In particular, the differences lie in 
the fact that public enterprises operate through the political process and that their 
objectives and strategies are determined by the “political contingency” (Batstone et al., 
1984; Ferner, 1988; Ferner et al., 1997). Political contingency means the forces that 
act on public enterprises that include: 
 
formal rules and targets, ministerial intervention, the policies of political 
parties, public opinion, the demands and investigations of a variety of other 
state bodies, including parliamentary select committees or state committees of 
enquiry, and the pressure and claims of public user bodies and private sector 
interest groups (Ferner, 1988: 10).  
 
It is therefore evident that “public sector labor relations are inherently suffused in 
politics” (Kearney, 1992), and that they are colored by the political interplay between 
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unions, government, state bodies, elected officials and interest groups. Thus it 
becomes important for unions to engage in political bargaining with governments and 
with various state agencies, and to mobilize public support to press governments to 
come to a compromise with organized labor. In other words, the political nature of 
public ownership also affects union strategy. “The resources at the disposal of unions 
are a function of the political contingency as much as of economic power and market 
position” (Batstone et al., 1984: 11).  
 The fact that political resources are central to public sector unions makes it also 
important to consider the changing characteristics of political contingency. State and 
party policies, political alliances, political procedures and targets are not fixed systems 
but all are changeable and contingent upon the changes in political regimes or other 
environmental changes. In this sense, political contingency can either provide or 
constrain opportunities for labor unions, and it is therefore important to look at the 
differences in the timing of the initiation of the restructuring program. The differences 
in timing reflect different political contingencies that involve shifting public policies 
and strategic alliances among different political actors including labor unions, 
government officials, ministries, political parties, public enterprise managers, and 
public service recipients. These factors shape the conditions for union strategies by 
either providing or reducing political resources for them. But the strategic 
effectiveness of labor unions is not solely determined by the political context. 
Differences in union capacities in mobilizing political resources also play an important 
role in producing divergent outcomes. Especially for public sector unions, their ability 
in forming alliances with various actors involved in political and public agencies as 
well as in gaining public support by appealing to public interests will make differences 
in the outcomes.  
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The Politics of Strategic Choice 
To understand different union strategic capabilities in affecting the restructuring 
outcomes, this study will call for the need to analyze the politics of strategic choice. 
And as far as the importance of strategic choice made by labor unions is recognized, 
the alternative framework that combines strategic choice model with dynamics of 
contention model becomes relevant to examine the research questions of the proposed 
study. The strategic choice approach highlights the continuously evolving interactions 
of environmental pressures and organizational responses (Child, 1972, 1997; Kochan, 
Katz & McKersie, 1986). A key premise of the framework is that differences in 
industrial relations outcomes reflect the differences in strategic choices made by 
government, labor and management. Although “the explanatory power of the 
framework has been limited because empirical studies using it have tended to 
downplay the role of labor and other non management actors” (Frost, 2000: 560), the 
model provides an alternative framework to institutional determinism by bringing the 
interactive mechanism between changes in the environment and the choices made by 
the key actors. Thus this study will adopt the strategic choice framework while 
complementing the bias towards employer-dominated strategies.  
 In this respect, this study is in line with recent union strategy literatures that 
recognize the importance of union strategies in creating a variety of outcomes (Frost, 
2000; Turner & Hurd, 2001; Hurd et al., 2003; Turner, 2005; Frege and Kelly, 2003, 
2004a, 2004b). For sure, the strategic response of labor unions is not the single factor 
that explains the divergent outcomes. Rather the outcomes result from the strategic 
interaction among different groups and actors including government, management, 
and labor unions. Yet labor unions constitute one of the key actors and the differences 
in the outcomes may result from different strategic capacities of labor unions. Such 
capacities allow them to exert certain influence over the restructuring process while 
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lack of the latter will marginalize their role. Once one admits that diverse union 
strategies may have different bearings on the outcomes, the combination of a strategic 
choice model with the dynamics of contention model becomes particularly useful as it 
sheds light on the reciprocal interaction between changes in the political opportunity 
structures and the responses of social movement actors to these changes. The social 
movement theory of dynamics of contention pays attention to the changes in the 
political environment that provide certain opportunities or constraints on actors’ 
choice. But it does not understand the environment as a fixed structure that unilaterally 
determines actors’ choice, but as a strategic site in which actors interpret the situation, 
set specific goals accordingly and strategize effective tactics to achieve their goals (Mc 
Adam et al., 2001). When applied to the purpose of this study, the model will highlight 
the process in which changes in the political contingency pose certain opportunities or 
constraints for unions, against which unions prioritize particular goals and strategies 
over others, and develop different patterns of interaction with government or 
employers to better obtain their objectives. Hence, this study will argue that political 
opportunities/constraints will condition labor unions’ strategic choice by either 
increasing or decreasing political resources for them. But political opportunities do not 
automatically determine the outcomes. Whether labor unions succeed in achieving 
their goals will be dependent on their strategic capacities to actually take advantage of 
opportunities. If unions fail to seize the opportunities, the desired goals have less 
chance to be achieved. In this regard, this study draws upon the same basic argument 
presented in recent studies on union strategy that underscores the determining role of 
strategies. In other words, political opportunities are important but they are not 
decisive because labor unions may or may not act on given opportunities, and the role 
of agency becomes more critical (Turner & Cornfield, 2007; Turner, 2009).        
 Moreover, the Korean institutional context makes the strategic choice approach 
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even more important. In Korea, labor unions have been denied institutional access to 
the state and have also been excluded from political participation. The incumbent 
parties have never forged a stable partisan alliance with labor although they had 
accommodated some corporatist arrangements and ad hoc electoral alliance with 
government-sponsored unions. The absence of any stable institutional structure for 
labor incorporation means that the variation in the patterns of union-
government/management interactions and in their outcomes becomes wider than in 
countries where the presence of centralized bargaining and corporatist regulation 
reduce within-country variation by narrowing employers’ discretion. Thus, it is 
noteworthy that “in light of weak institutional structures for stakeholder participation, 
the strategic choices of the companies and unions have played a far stronger role in 
determining the variation of outcomes” (Turner, 1991 cited in Batt & Darbishire, 
1997: 68). Lack of corporatist bargaining arrangements increases power differentials 
among unions, and makes it more likely that the outcomes become more dependent on 
strategic choices made by unions.  
 
2. Key Variables, Hypothesis and Definition 
 
2-1. Key Variables and Hypothesis for Explaining the Variety of Union Responses 
 
This study will analyze the role of labor unions in influencing public sector 
restructuring at KT and KNR by treating union strategies as both dependent and 
independent variables. First, in trying to answer the question of why union responses 
to the proposed privatization/restructuring plan have differed, union strategies will be 
treated as a dependent variable. Here, the focus of analysis will be on the political 
dynamics of public sector restructuring: the changes in the political contingencies and 
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in the internal politics of labor unions.  
 Macro institutional variables will be considered to be insufficient to explain the 
subnational variations in strategy formulation of labor unions. Political institutional 
legacies that conditioned the responses of KTTU and KRWU have been rather similar. 
In the past, both unions have been affiliated to the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(FKTU), which can be characterized by its moderate and cooperative relationship with 
government and management. In Korea, the FKTU unions have long been conceived 
as pro-government unions although they were deprived of stabilized institutional 
access to policy making. Thus, although they had forged ad hoc political alliances with 
the incumbent government in the past, their relationship with government was not 
based on partnership but rather on co-optation. Besides, both unions have undergone 
union democratization: KTTU in June 1994 and KRWU in May 2001. Hence when the 
Kim Dae Jung government announced the restructuring and privatization plan for KT 
and KNR, the union was already democratized (KTTU) or was going through the 
union democratization movement (KRWU). In this situation, the labor relation came to 
be either adversarial or strained, and the political participation of labor was further 
excluded. Yet, within this common national institutional context, the two unions 
diverged in their strategies. Thus, the national institutional variables cannot adequately 
explain why the identical industrial relations institutions led to different responses by 
labor unions.   
 Instead, this study identifies two critical dimensions that condition diverse union 
responses: the nature of political contingency and the internal organizational 
dynamics of labor unions.  
 
The Nature of Political Contingency 
In the first instance, as public enterprises are politically regulated and their labor 
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relations are highly political, the nature of political contingency has significant impact 
on unions’ strategy formulation. As previously discussed, political contingency refers 
to a variety of political factors that include the action of governments, ministries, 
parliaments, political parties and other political groups, their demands, intervention 
and negotiation over the policy generation and implementation as well as the public 
opinion and the pressure of public service recipients. And it is noteworthy that the 
changes in political contingency can occur without the transformation of institutional 
rules that establish a framework within which the labor relations system is regulated. 
In other words, government objectives and political priorities can differ along the 
changes in the administration, and labor unions may either find or lose allies within 
the changing political universe. As for the two cases presented in this study, the nature 
of political contingency changed at the time of restructuring and the two unions faced 
different political opportunities. The privatization of KT was both initiated and 
achieved under the Kim Dae Jung government. By contrast, the privatization of KNR 
was only initiated under the same government and due to the delay of its 
implementation, the task was handed over to the Roh Moo Hyun government. And 
although they can both be categorized as centrist, the Kim Dae Jung Administration 
and the Roh Moo Hyun Administration differed markedly in their approaches towards 
privatization.2. The former government was reluctant to engage in negotiation with 
labor and refused to bargain with KTTU on the issues while the latter government 
took a more cautious attitude towards the privatization of network utilities and opened 
                                            
2 President Kim Dae Jung held office from February 1998 to February 2003. The economic reform 
plans of the Kim Dae Jung Administration had been initiated in the context of the Korean economic 
crisis and had been forced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thus the IMF context has been 
critical in underlying government policies towards market liberalization. Roh Moo Hyun was elected in 
December 2002 and held the presidency from February 2003 to February 2008. Although the two 
presidents came from the same centrist party, the political contingency that characterized the two 
governments were not identical. The privatization plans of KT and KNR had both been initiated under 
the Kim Dae Jung Administration but only the former had been completed during his presidency while 
the task of privatization of the national railway industry had been handed over to Roh Moo Hyun 
government.  
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space for political bargaining with KRWU.  
 Thus this study will pay attention to the changes in political opportunity structures 
for labor unions. The political opportunities will be measured along three dimensions: 
the government openness to the negotiation with organized labor, the presence of 
political allies within and outside the state bodies and the degree of stability of elite 
alignments. It will be assessed that political opportunities increase when government 
is more open to bargain with labor and when there occurs a fissure in elite alignments 
at the same time that there exists an increased presence of labor’s political allies 
within and outside of a polity3. And political opportunities will be considered to 
decrease when political arrangements go to the opposite. These differences in the 
political opportunities will offer an analytical tool to explain divergent union 
responses because they impact on union strategies by increasing or decreasing political 
resources for labor unions  
 Much of past literature linked labor militancy to weak institutionalization of labor 
incorporation (Shorter & Tilly, 1974; Collier, 1982). And it is true that broad national 
patterns support their claims by evidencing the fact that labor militancy is greater in 
countries where organized labor is excluded from political access. Yet the two cases 
presented in this study eschew this explanation because union responses were different 
albeit the fact that they had similar institutional context. Thus militancy is not an 
exclusive pattern of union-government interaction in countries where labor integration 
has not been institutionalized. Rather, it is more relevant to consider that unions are 
more likely to resort to militancy where labor still lacks institutionalized political 
participation but where political opportunities open greater possibilities for labor to 
                                            
3 The dimension of political opportunities presented here partly recapitulates Mc Adam’s definition that 
lists: “1. the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, 2. the stability or 
instability of that broad set of elite alignments, 3. the presence or absence of elite allies and, 4. the 
state’s capacity and propensity for repression” (Mc Adam, 1996: 27 cited in Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 
7).  
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engage actively in a variety of collective action. By contrast, labor unions tend to 
retreat from militancy and to subordinate to concession bargaining when they have to 
confront both the weak institutional arrangements and the contraction of political 
opportunities.  
The above discussion offers the following hypotheses:  
 
1. If the changes in political contingency increase the political opportunities for 
labor unions while they are deprived of institutionalized political access, labor 
unions will be likely to resort to militancy 
2. If, on the contrary, labor unions face both lack of institutionalized political 
access and reduced political opportunities for labor unions, they will be 
constrained to act defensively and to restraint militancy 
 
Micro-organizational Dynamics of Labor Unions 
But the framework of strategic choices for labor unions is not solely shaped by the 
changes in political opportunity structures. The above hypothesis points to a general 
tendency for militancy or restraint. Whether labor unions actually resort to 
confrontation or restraint also depends on the internal political dynamics of labor 
unions. 
 Recent literature has already emphasized the importance of micro-organizational 
dynamics of unions. For example, in her multi-level comparative studies of union 
responses to market liberalization in Latin America, Maria Victoria Murillo argued 
that differences in union behavior result from the internal dynamics of the union and 
the leadership’s search for political survival (Murillo, 2001). According to her, when 
leadership competition grows among rivals associated with different political parties 
and when union leaders believe that their rival leaders are taking advantage of their 
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restraint, they increase militancy in order to avoid being replaced. “Calls for militancy 
are aimed to show their constituencies that they have not sold out” (Murillo, 2001: 16), 
thus “we should expect militancy to increase after leadership competition regardless of 
the effect of such militancy, because it is related to the internal dynamics of the union” 
(ibid: 181). 
 In line with Murillo, this study will assume that increased replacement threat will 
raise the probability of militancy. When the support of union constituencies for the old 
entrenched leadership weakens, not only the old leadership but also the electoral 
opposition groups are likely to increase militancy in order to be responsive to the 
changes in members’ attitude. Moreover, when the constituencies’ discontent grows 
despite the increase in confrontational tactics of the incumbent leadership, the 
opposition groups are likely to win the union election. If such leadership replacement 
occurs as a result of leadership competition, it will bring about transformation in the 
strategic orientation of the unions. The new leadership will make it explicit that they 
depart from the previous leadership and will formulate platforms that serve members’ 
interest in a way different from the past. Consequently, militancy will continue to 
grow for a while after the leadership change.  
 Such was the case for both KRWU and KTTU as they have undergone radical 
transformation of their organizations along with union democratization. The unions 
had a quiescent and cooperative relationship with government/management before 
union democratization, but they both broke from past tradition and turned to more 
militant and confrontational tactics.  
 Yet it is also important to consider the timing of labor unions’ internal change. In 
this respective, it is noteworthy that the risk of replacement was at its peak at KNR at 
the time when government initiated the privatization plan for railways whereas KT 
had already undergone leadership replacement in 1994, hence four years ahead of the 
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launch of a full-scaled privatization plan for telecommunication. Although leadership 
competition among diverse political factions persisted at KT, the replacement threat 
from the candidates of the militant faction (Minju Dongwoo Hoe, Association of 
Democratic Comrades) gradually withered. The Korean labor unions were divided into 
two national confederations, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), which 
had had a cooperative relationship with government/management and the more 
militant Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). The 1994 union election at 
KT marked a breaking point from the past unionism run by the FKTU-affiliated 
leadership, and the militant group could win the election by appealing to militancy. 
Since then the union hasn’t faced a significant replacement threat from the rival 
confederation throughout the restructuring period. Yet KTTU union leadership also 
departed from the first militant leadership. The profile of union leadership altered 
again when a more moderate leadership came to power after being elected in 1997. As 
the result of 1997 election showed, union members’ support for militant leadership 
decreased as militancy turned to be more or less ineffective in the face of adversarial 
government/management strategy. Hence although the union remained affiliated to 
KCTU until recently, KTTU became more moderate. For this reason the leadership 
has been denounced by both militant dissidents within KTTU and activists within 
KCTU for being compliant to management initiatives without defending labor 
interests4. Nevertheless the influence of militant activists substantially waned. 
                                            
4 KTTU withdrew from FKTU to join KCTU in November 1995 after the new militant leadership came 
to power in June 1994. But the union ultimately seceded from KCTU again on July 17th, 2009 after the 
union resolution, which ended up with 94.9% votes for the disaffiliation from KCTU. This was the 
result of the history of gradual moderation of KTTU, which aroused controversies within KCTU that 
reached their peak in 2006 when KTTU expulsed two union activists (Yoo Duck Sang, who had been 
elected president of KTTU in 1994, and Lee Hae Kwan, who was the former vice-president of KTTU) 
from the union organization on the grounds that they disgraced KTTU by attempting to bar KTTU 
representatives from participating in the KCTU annual convention, criticizing KTTU’s compliance to 
management/government policies. This action furthered the debates within KTTU on whether it should 
expel KTTU from KCTU or not. The withdrawal of KTTU from KCTU in 2009 was the ultimate result 
of this fissure. The origin of this moderation can be traced back to 1997 with the replacement of 1994 
militant leadership by a more moderate branch.  
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Although electoral competition persisted at KTTU, the replacement threat from the 
militant opposition group was not strong enough for the leadership to increase the 
incentives for militancy. By contrast, at KRWU, the replacement threat for the old 
leadership escalated in 2000 in the midst of a government push for railway 
privatization, which ended up with the election of an opposition group in 2001 at the 
peak of the second round of union-government conflict. From the late 1990s, 
members’ discontent grew rapidly as they were concerned with the uncertainty of their 
employment condition brought by the launch of privatization/restructuring program. 
This fueled the union democratization movement and heightened leadership 
competition. In this situation, leadership survival increased the incentives for 
militancy in order to eschew replacement. And unlike KTTU, the influence of militant 
faction did not wither but grew steadily during the process of restructuring. The new 
leadership took office in 2001 and similar to KTTU, it disaffiliated from FKTU to join 
KCTU in November 2002. A leadership competition took place thereafter between two 
militant groups, which originated from the union democratization movement: between 
militant leadership and more leftist militant dissidents. The replacement threat of the 
latter group grew during the 2nd round of the restructuring struggle and hence 
increased the incentives for militancy.       
 The above discussion offers the following hypotheses that complement the first 
two hypotheses: 
3. The incentives for militancy increase when the replacement threat for union 
leaders escalates. 
4. The incentives for militancy decrease when the replacement threat for union 
leaders withers.  
Combined together, the hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 can be presented as the figure below: 
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1. Increased political 
  opportunities  
2. Increased replacement 
 
 
Lack of  
Institutional 
Integration of 
Militancy  
 
 1. Reduced political  
  opportunities 
2. Reduced replacement 
Restraint  
 
 
Figure 1.1 The effect of political opportunities and  
internal politics of unions on union behavior 
 
 
2-2. Key Variables and Hypothesis for Explaining the Variation in Strategic 
Effectiveness of Labor Unions 
 
The variation in the outcomes of union strategies constitutes the second central area of 
investigation of the study. This will lead to the attempts to answer the question of ‘why 
do some unions obtain more successful results than others and what explains the 
differences in union capacities?’ When trying to answer the question of why labor 
unions responded differently to the proposed reform, union strategies will be treated as 
a dependent variable. But when the study focuses in turn on the reason why labor 
unions had different abilities to influence the restructuring processes, union strategies 
will be analyzed as an independent variable.  
 In the first place, this study will be based on the premise that militancy per se is 
not directly associated with strategic effectiveness of labor unions. Past studies often 
saw militancy as an equivalent of successful strategies. For example, Kelly argued that 
militant unions that build their organizational power upon greater membership 
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mobilization are more successful than moderate unions (Kelly, 1996). But moderate 
unions can still obtain considerable gains through negotiation if they are able to exert 
pressure on government/management through membership mobilization. Likewise, 
militant unions can fail in achieving the desired goals if their militancy is not built 
upon mobilizing power of its membership and external supporters, and ends up with 
isolated resistance. Thus labor unions’ ability to gain concessions is more related to the 
strength of unions than to labor militancy and there are other factors that affect the 
power of unions. 
 In this respect, this study will draw upon Frost’s identification of two central 
factors to explain the heterogeneity in union responses and in their strategic 
effectiveness: union resources and union capabilities. For her, network embeddedness 
and political vitality are two central resources in creating the conditions necessary for 
successful strategies, and they are linked to four union capabilities- the ability to 
access information, to educate and mobilize the membership, to communicate with 
management and to access decision-making- that play a critical role in union successes 
(Frost, 2000). In line with her argument, this study will also focus on union resources 
and their strategic abilities to explain the divergent outcomes. In the first place, the 
differences in the resources will raise or decrease the probability of successful 
engagement of labor unions in the restructuring process. Yet the effect of union 
resources is not deterministic. Unless union leadership has the ability to take 
advantages of the resources, labor unions will not succeed in countervailing the 
government/management initiatives for privatization and restructuring. The 
hypotheses based on these arguments are summarized in the next section. 
 
Union Resources Shape the Strategic Conditions for Labor Unions 
This study will highlight that two resources are critical for successful outcomes: 
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political resources and membership resources. In the first place, the changes in 
political contingency could either provide more political resources or deprive them 
from labor unions along with the changes in government policy and the shift in 
political alliances. Paul Johnston claimed that public sector workers’ strength rests 
chiefly on political-organizational resources than market power. According to him, 
these political resources include:  
 
first, legal rights, organizational status, and established procedures; second, 
strategic alliances within the shifting political universe of the public agency, 
including clients, constituents, and other participants in that political universe; 
third, forms of voice that can help mobilize new organization, build or prevent 
alliances (Johnston, 1994: 11).  
 
Hence, if the range of political resources was made wider by the changes in political 
contingency, labor unions are in a more advantageous position to leverage the 
bargaining process as they can increase points of engagement and gain more allies 
who could help labor unions pressure their counterpart. If, on the contrary, the range of 
political resources was made narrower by the changes in political contingency, labor 
unions are less likely to increase their bargaining power as the limited resources will 
constrain labor unions to act defensively. 
 Secondly, membership resources are also critical in raising the possibilities of 
successful outcomes. The participation rate of union members in union activities 
indicates the political vitality of labor unions. Such political vitality is essential for 
union leadership in exerting bargaining power. Hence the increase or decrease in 
mobilizing power affects the strategic capacities of labor unions. If membership 
mobilization remains high over the course of negotiation or strike, the possibility of 
successful outcomes will also increase. If, on the contrary, union membership becomes 
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demobilized over the course, labor unions will be less likely to succeed in either their 
negotiation with government/management or in their collective action.  
 Yet for the political and membership resources to be effective, they must be 
mobilized by labor unions. The basic argument of this study is that strategies count. It 
means that resources alone will only increase or reduce the probabilities for either 
success or failure. The increase in the resources raises the probabilities of successful 
union strategies, but it does so only when labor unions actively engage in mobilizing 
these resources and extend broad-based support for their strategic action. If labor 
unions fail to take advantage of political opportunities and lack strategic capacities to 
form alliances with various political groups and organizations, chances for success 
will be slim notwithstanding the favorable political environment. Similarly, 
membership resources can be effective only if union leaders make it possible to use 
the mobilizing power to increase their bargaining power. If, on the contrary, union 
leaders lack responsiveness to the interests of the members and fail to strengthen the 
internal organization despite the increase in membership discontent, they will be 
unable to halt the unilateral restructuring process that will harm the union’s best 
interest. Moreover, the extent of mobilizing resources is not pre-determined but will 
also be dependent on strategic capabilities of unions. Effective strategies can result in 
the increase of mobilizing power while lack of strategic abilities will only undermine 
the latter. For this reason, the role of the strategic capacities of labor unions in creating 
different outcomes will be highlighted.  
 
The Strategic Capabilities of Labor Unions Determine the Variation in the 
Outcomes 
As already argued, although the political and organizational resources increase the 
opportunities for labor, they do not end up with successful union gains unless the 
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unions have abilities to exploit the favorable circumstances. “Particular opportunities 
make activist strategies credible and allow those strategies to gain both leadership and 
grassroots support. Unions, however, may or may not take advantage of opportunities” 
(Turner, 2009: 295). Similarly, labor unions that are constrained by the reduced 
opportunities do not always fail in gaining concessions and are able to negotiate labor 
protective agreements. The strategic capacities of labor unions can compensate 
organizational weakness and can bring fruitful outcomes. For example, Marshall 
Ganz’s studies on United Farm Workers (UFW) found that organizations with little 
internal resources can sometimes devise successful strategies. He contrasted the failure 
of the better-resourced Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) with the 
success of the insurgent UFW in organizing California’s 400,000 farm workers. 
According to him, the differences in strategic capacities can explain why “the newly 
formed, uncertainly funded, and independent United Farm Workers succeeded, while 
the well-established union with which it found itself in competition failed” (Ganz, 
2000: 1004). Hence “resourcefulness” can compensate for lack of resources and new 
organizations can sometimes take advantage of their newness by relying on the 
richness of their strategic capacity while “the abundance of internal resources to which 
well-established groups have access may make it harder to innovate” (Ibid: 1043). 
Drawing upon Ganz’s insights, this study will highlight how union capabilities have 
been developed to different degrees during the process of restructuring. Thus, the way 
this study brings the union resources into consideration differs from the resource 
mobilization model of social movement theories, which claim that strategic 
effectiveness results from organizational resources of well-established professional 
organizations (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). For sure, this study 
shares the view that emphasizes the importance of resource flows and mobilization 
process. Yet it differs from the latter in that it does not consider the availability of 
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resources and the existence of older, established organizations as central components 
of organizational competitiveness. Instead, this study will argue that although labor 
unions that lack the already available institutional or organizational resources will face 
greater constraints than resourceful unions, they may still be strategically efficient by 
complementing their organizational weakness by developing innovative strategies 
over the course of the action. Attention paid to this procedural divergence in the 
development of strategic capacities will help account for the differences in the 
outcomes. Hence this approach emphasizes mobilizing capacity of unions over the 
availability of their preexisting resources.  
 In short, if labor unions fail to develop effective mobilizing strategies, they will be 
marginalized in the process of restructuring and they will gain little or no concessions. 
On the contrary, if labor unions are capable of formulating innovative strategies by 
mobilizing various resources, they can increase their bargaining leverage that can 
ensure that the outcomes of restructuring incorporate some benefits and protections for 
labor. Four union capabilities will be critical in explaining differences in the strategic 
effectives of labor unions: the ability to educate and mobilize union members; the 
ability to balance negotiation and confrontation; the ability to create political channels 
at multiple points; the ability to build broad social coalition and to appeal to public 
interest in order to pressure the government.  
 
i. The ability to educate and mobilize members  
Labor unions should retain and reinforce their organizational integrity in order to 
challenge their counterparts effectively. For this, union leaders should be able to 
educate their constituencies to increase members’ commitment to the proposed 
strategies and they should also possess the capacities to mobilize their members 
through a variety of activities. The use of extensive member education through the 
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union’s communicative channels will enhance both the membership engagement in 
union activities and membership responsiveness to leaders. Hence, it will increase the 
organizational power of the union and will make it more likely for the union to 
achieve its desired goals. By contrast, if labor unions fail to mobilize its organizational 
power, they will be less effective in exerting bargaining leverage and will tend to give 
concessions without equivalent gains or protections.  
 
ii. The ability to balance negotiation and confrontation   
As already argued in the previous section, labor unions can effectively protect their 
members’ interests either through restraint or militancy if they are able to mobilize 
both the grassroots and public support. For such capacity, this study will argue that the 
flexible combination of negotiation and confrontation is better than confining union 
strategies to a single method, either cooperation or militancy. Cooperative approaches 
that neglect active membership mobilization will often end up with concession 
bargaining and will reinforce the dependence on employers. In such cases, the union-
government interaction will be characterized by subordination and co-optation. 
Likewise, militant approaches that intransigently hold to confrontational tactics will 
put labor unions at risk of being isolated unless the unions demonstrate their abilities 
to mobilize broad-based support by actively engaging in the negotiation procedures 
and by using the process to forge alliances with political allies, to voice their appeals 
to public interests and to escalate their political pressures. The neglect of taking 
advantages of various negotiation channels to influence government decisions will bar 
unions from increasing power resources and will make it more likely for the union to 
be retreated into defensive opposition. In such case, militancy will turn out to be 
ineffective. 
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iii. The ability to create political channels at multiple points  
The mobilization of political resources is central to the power of public sector unions. 
Yet those resources are meaningful only when labor unions have the capacities of 
mobilizing them. Such capacities are particularly important when labor unions lack 
institutionalized political access because they can still increase their bargaining power 
by creating political channels to voice their opinion and to use them to gain labor allies 
in order to push the government to accept union demands. Hence the more labor 
unions have abilities to create multiple political channels, the more they have chances 
to counterweight the government in the political bargaining process as the unions get 
more possibilities to find strategic allies who will support their demands. These 
political networks will also help them increase their influence and pressure the 
government more effectively. 
 
iv. The ability to build broad social coalition and to appeal to public interest 
Broad-based social coalition is the key to the success of public sector unions as it 
helps gain public support for them. One of the power sources for public sector unions 
can be drawn from the political and social alliances they build with the constituents of 
various socio-political organizations including the recipients of public services. Thus, 
Johnston emphasized that “forms of voice that can help mobilize new organization, 
build or prevent alliances, and by framing and appealing to the public interest put a 
potent political edge on the workers’ demands” (Johnston, 1994: 11). Drawing upon 
Johnston’s argument, this study will stress the importance of organizing social 
coalition to gain broad public support. Union capacities for framing their claims as 
public needs will be essential to build such strategic alliances. In sum, greater social 
mobilization capacities will raise the likelihood of successful outcomes by providing 
society-wide leverage of labor unions in pressuring government.    
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 To summarize, the hypothesis for strategic capacities of labor unions is:  
5. The difference in union abilities is the key variable that explains the variation in the 
strategic effectiveness of labor unions. Union abilities in four areas are central to 
success and they are: the ability to educate and mobilize union members; the ability to 
balance negotiation and confrontation; the ability to create political channels at 
multiple points; the ability to build broad social coalition and to appeal to public 
interest in order to pressure the government.  
 
 It will be assumed that labor unions are most likely to succeed when they are able 
to employ effective strategies in all of these four areas. By contrast, they are most 
likely to fail when they lack abilities in all of these four areas.  
  The synthesis of hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4 with hypothesis 5 will offer an alternative 
typology that will be substituted for the dichotomy of militancy/restraint. Based on 
whether unions had the ability to mobilize the political and organizational resources or 
not and by linking such strategic capacity with the actual outcomes, I will classify the 
union-government interactions into four categories in their effect in achieving the 
goals: 1. effective militancy (opposition), 2. ineffective militancy (resistance), 3. 
effective restraint (cooperation), 4. ineffective restraint (subordination) (Figure 1.2). 
The proposed typology builds upon Murillo’s classification of four different types of 
union-government interactions.5 
 
 
 
                                            
5 Based on the variation in union reactions to market reforms and on the different degree of success in 
achieving concessions from the government, Murillo distinguished four different categories: opposition 
(successful militancy), resistance (unsuccessful militancy), cooperation (successful restraint), and 
subordination (unsuccessful restraint) (Murillo, 2001: 12). 
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No Concessions 
Concessions 
No Concessions 
Effective Militancy 
Ineffective Militancy 
Effective Restraint 
Ineffective Restraint 
Government Policy 
Union Militancy 
Union Restraint 
    
Figure 1.2 Classification of union-government interactions 
 
 If union opposition builds on the mobilizing power of union constituencies as well 
as on public support, militancy will be associated with strategic effectiveness. If, on 
the contrary, opposition remains defensive and isolated due to the low strategic 
capacity, union militancy will be in vain and ineffective. Likewise, effective restraint 
strategy that takes advantages of both political and membership resources will help the 
union gain concessions. In this case, the union will have a cooperative and 
participatory relationship with the government. But union restraint that results from 
ineffective strategic capacity will end up with a subordinated or co-opted union that 
will fail to prevent unilateral restructuring. Successful strategies, whether based on 
restraint or militancy, will guarantee that the restructuring process is mediated by labor. 
Yet in the opposite cases in which either militancy or restraint turns to be ineffective, 
unions will fail to halt the market-driven restructuring that will deteriorate the terms 
and conditions of employment.    
 Based on this typology, this study will attempt to capture the differences in union 
responses of KTTU and KRWU and in their effect on the government-initiated 
restructuring. The analytical framework is presented in Figure 1.3. The framework 
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categorizes four variations in the strategic effectiveness of labor unions, but as this 
study has only two cases for the object of analysis, the cases will be classified into two 
out of four categories. Drawing upon the framework, this study will try to determine 
into which categories the two unions can be classified.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Analytical framework for explaining the variation in  
union responses and their strategic effectiveness 
 
 
3. A Note on the Research Design 
 
This research aims at explaining the reasons for the subnational variation in union 
responses to privatization and public sector restructuring and in their varied success. 
For this, this study selected two cases within a single country (Korea): KTTU and 
KRWU, which represent workers of KT and KNR respectively. They were chosen to 
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test the hypothesis because the unions have some commonalities that permit to control 
the macro-institutional effects, and hence can provide some supporting evidences for 
the key explanatory variables presented in this study. To begin with, both unions were 
in sectors that have been under public ownership whereby strong state intervention 
ruled over management autonomy. Hence, although technological changes and market 
competition became more acute in the telecommunication sector than in the railway 
sector, restructuring strategies in both sectors did not derive from economic 
considerations alone but were heavily influenced by government decisions. Thus it is 
important to note that employer strategies in these public monopolies have not been 
fully formed out of the changes in technological and market condition but have always 
been mediated by political processes that have been tightly controlled by government 
regulation.  
 The focus on the political processes draws attention to the political variables to 
explain the variation. Yet the differences lie neither in the national-institutional 
framework nor in the industrial relations at the firm level. The institutional framework 
has been identical for the two sectors thereby not allowing institutionalized labor 
integration into polities. Besides, both unions have commonalities in that they broke 
their long tradition of restraint, increased militancy along with the union 
democratization movement and disaffiliated from the moderate national confederation 
FKTU to be affiliated with the more oppositional and militant confederation KCTU. 
Hence, labor relations in both companies became strained at the time of restructuring, 
and the degree of consensus between management and union was rather low.  
 Yet despite these commonalities, the two unions responded differently. To explain 
the variation, two central factors were identified: changing political contingency and 
micro-organizational dynamics. According to this study’s hypothesis, within the same 
institutional setting in which labor is excluded from co-determination or political 
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participation, unions are more likely to resort to militancy when political opportunities 
increase whereas they tend to retreat in defensive restraint when such opportunities 
contract. To test this hypothesis, an attempt was made to measure the political 
opportunities by the openness of government to the negotiation with organized labor, 
the presence of labor’s political allies within and outside the state agencies, and the 
changes in elite alignments. The latter is assessed by paying attention to whether there 
was consensus among elites on restructuring strategy or not. Political opportunities are 
considered to increase when government is more open to negotiations, when labor’s 
political allies expand, and when elite alliance becomes looser through divided 
strategic views among the elites. The evidences are based on the collected data from 
official documents and interviews with government officials as well as with union 
leaders. Then based on the collected data, we can observe how the changes in political 
opportunities affect union behavior and whether they increase militancy or not. Here, 
militancy is measured by the number of strikes, the threats of strikes and other forms 
of protests. 
   Yet this study also presents another independent variable to explain the variation in 
union responses that provides the possibility to test micro-organizational level 
hypotheses. The proposed hypotheses are: the replacement threat for leadership results 
in increased militancy whereas the weakening of such threat reduces the incentives for 
militancy. The replacement threat is measured by both the process and the result of 
union election. The voter turnout for election and the electoral results for rival 
candidates indicate whether the election is contested and whether the replacement 
threat increased or not. For this, this study relies on the official election data of labor 
unions.  
 Meanwhile, this study also examines how changes in political opportunities and in 
internal organizational dynamics affect union responses by increasing or decreasing 
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union resources. The increase in the resources is expected to create a favorable 
environment for union strategies. Political resources are measured by the same 
criterion applied to assess the political opportunities, that is, the increased channels for 
political bargaining with government, and the widened pool of political allies both 
within and outside the government. Membership resources are analyzed by looking at 
the political vitality of the unions, which is measured by the degree of responsiveness 
of union leadership to the interests of its membership and by the broad-based activity 
of its membership drawing upon Frost’s analysis (Frost, 2000). The voter turnout for 
union election, for union-initiated collective action and other union activities are taken 
account for measuring such political vitality.   
 Then this study analyzes whether union leaders actually mobilized the resources to 
enhance the strategic effectiveness of their unions. The hypothesis states that four 
union abilities are key to the success of union: the ability to mobilize the membership, 
the ability to flexibly combine negotiation and confrontation; the ability to create 
multiple political channels; the ability to build broad social coalition. The more unions 
demonstrate their abilities in these areas, the more they are likely to succeed. Based on 
this hypothesis, ratings of (+), 0, (-) for each category of the four areas will be given: 
(-) is rated when the union lacked such capacity (no strategic capacity). (+) is rated 
when the union showed high capacity for the category (full strategic capacity). 0 is 
rated when the union showed some ability but not fully developed such capacity 
(partial strategic capacity). The higher the total rate is, the more the union is 
strategically capable. If the union obtains +4 in total, the union’s strategic capacity is 
highest. If the union gets -4 , the union is considered to be the least strategically 
capable. The closer the rate is to +4 the higher the strategic capacity is, and the closer 
the rate is to -4 the lower the strategic capacity is. Broadly, a union rated from +2 to 
+4 is considered to have high strategic ability, and a union rated from -4 to -2 is 
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considered to have low strategic ability. Unions rated from -1 to +1 are considered to 
have moderate strategic ability with mixed results.  
 Regarding the assessment of strategic effectiveness, it is important to note that this 
study does not use ‘the withdrawal of the privatization plan per se’ as the only 
indicator of union success. Although labor unions can play a critical role in shaping 
the outcomes of restructuring, some areas remain beyond the reach of union 
capabilities. For KT, the gradual restructuring process that started in the late 80s 
preceded the radical reform plan that was launched in the context of economic crisis. 
Thus, given the fact that the privatization of KT was not done in one stroke in the year 
2002, holding the withdrawal of the privatization plan as the criteria for accounting for 
the success or failure of union strategies seems unjust. Yet if one takes different 
criteria to evaluate the strategic effectiveness of labor unions, union strategic 
capabilities still play an important role in shaping different outcomes. Although labor 
unions cannot derail the privatization plan, they can contribute to the pace, to the delay 
or to the obstruction of the restructuring process in order to gain more concessions 
from the government/management. They can also shape the outcomes of the 
restructuring by succeeding or failing in lessening the scale of downsizing and in 
obtaining some protective measures that can prevent a fundamental deterioration in 
employment conditions. This can be achieved by negotiating employment security 
guarantees that help avoid compulsory workforce reduction and by obtaining 
concessions from the government that could protect collective bargaining conditions. 
In sum, however tight the constraints, there still exists a degree of choice for labor 
unions, and depending on how effective the strategies may be, labor unions can either 
succeed or fail in influencing the outcomes of restructuring. In this regard, this study 
highlights the strategic capacities of labor unions in explaining the variation in 
outcomes, which is measured by different degrees in union abilities to obtain 
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concessions from government. In other words, concession means the inclusion of 
union demands into the final design of restructuring plans, and it is assessed by 
comparing the original goals and the final design of reforms. If many of the union 
demands are included into the final design, union strategies are considered to be 
effective. On the contrary, if few or none of the union demands are reflected in the 
final design, their strategies are considered to be ineffective. In sum, concessions are 
measured based on the analysis of the demands of unions with regards to the 
restructuring issues and the number of such demands that are included in the final 
agreements.  
 The empirical findings of this study comes from expert interviews with 
government officials in the Ministry of Labor, managers of KORAIL and KT as well 
as union leaders and activists in KTTU, KRWU, KCTU, Korea Federation of Public 
Services and Transportation Workers’ Union. The unionists include union officers of 
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd democratic leaderships of KTTU, union officers of KRWU 
including former union presidents and officers in the policy making division. The 
managers work or worked in KT’s department of human resources and KRWU’s 
department of human resources and labor relations. As a research strategy this study 
has chosen a matched pair of case studies drawing upon interviews and archival 
sources supplemented with a secondary literature review. The method of case study is 
considered to be appropriate to examine the research questions and objectives of this 
study. Researchers have argued that the method is particularly useful for such a 
research where ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of questions are examined. The reason for this 
is because ‘how’ and ‘why’ types of questions make it necessary to examine the 
process by which events unfold, and to explore causal relationships, especially for 
researching motives, power relations, or processes that involve understanding complex 
social interactions (Yin, 1994; Remenyi et al.,1998; Kang, 2002). The objective of this 
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study is to answer the questions of ‘how and why labor unions responded differently 
to the government-initiated restructuring plans’ and ‘why the strategic effectiveness of 
the unions differed’. Thus it can also be best achieved by the case study method, 
which will conduct an in-depth investigation on the selected cases. For this, the 
strategy of paired comparison is employed. Although multi-case analysis is more apt 
to test the generalizability of the findings, paired comparison “provides an intimacy of 
analysis that is almost never available to large-N analysis” (Tarrow, 2010: 243). And it 
draws on deep background knowledge of the cases being examined while facilitating 
causal-process analysis (Tarrow, ibid). Hence it can complement the weakness of a 
single case study that lacks representativity for generalization while offering a 
descriptive depth of the cases. Yet there is an awareness of the limits of such a strategy 
as paired comparison does not draw upon sufficient cases to test the generalizability of 
the findings and to refine theory. To complement this weakness, this study will 
broaden the cases and conduct a brief comparative study with the Japanese 
telecommunication and railway cases.6 I will also examine the restructuring case of 
the Korean electricity sector to determine whether the argument can be applied to 
broader cases within a single country. Although the multi-level comparison will not be 
systematic, it will still strengthen the argument by providing more evidences.   
 
4. The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation is structured as follows. In the first chapter, an overview is provided 
of the research questions, the hypotheses, and the research strategy of this study. This 
                                            
6 The evidences are collected through interviews with union officers: an interview with union officers 
of the Japan Railway Trade Union Confederation (JRTU) and a round-table discussion with union 
officers of All NTT Workers Union of Japan (NWJ). But the analysis mostly draws upon secondary 
literature that examines the process of privatization of Telecom and Railway in Japan by focusing on 
union responses. 
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study also presented an alternative analytical framework that grounded its argument in 
the context of contemporary debates of political economy and industrial relations 
theory. In Chapter 2, the development and the changes in structural conditions of 
Korean telecommunication and railway industries are described. The greater 
competitive pressures for telecommunications underlies the implementation of a full 
privatization program for KT while the absence of market competition in railways 
made the gradual privatization program the only plausible option for the privatization 
of KNR. Yet these differences are not considered to be a determining factor in 
explaining the differences in the strategic effectiveness of unions. As this study 
focuses its analysis on the variation in union success by comparing the final design of 
restructuring with the original union goals, the differences in strategic condition of the 
industries cannot give an account of the reason for the differences in union abilities in 
obtaining concessions.  
 For this reason, in the next chapters, a case study analysis is used to explain how 
differences in the political dynamics of changes impacted on union responses and how 
union strategic choice played a decisive role in creating differentials in union 
influence that eventually resulted in divergent restructuring outcomes. In Chapter 3, an 
analysis of the patterns of union-government interactions is presented: If KRWU 
continued to escalate militancy, KTTU oscillated between militancy and moderation to 
end up with restraining militancy and subordinating itself to management initiatives. 
In the chapter, this difference is associated with the changes in political contingency 
that increased political opportunities for KRWU while contracting them for KTTU. As 
both unions were institutionally excluded from political participation, such changes 
made it more likely for KRWU to mount aggressive opposition to government 
proposals while they made it more likely for KTTU to be on defensive. In this chapter, 
an analysis of how the internal dynamics of unions consolidate such tendency is 
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provided. The co-occurrence of a union democratization movement with the 
government push for railway privatization contributed to militant mobilization of 
KRWU as opposed to the KTTU case where reduced replacement threat and 
membership demobilization decreased the incentives for militancy. In Chapter 4, I the 
strategic effectiveness of KRWU and KTTU is compared by emphasizing the central 
role of union strategic capacity. KRWU was more effective in mobilizing members 
and in mobilizing political and social resources. The greater strategic capacity enabled 
KRWU to incorporate its demands into the finalized restructuring bills while KTTU 
could not influence the pace and patterns of restructuring. Also, this study extends the 
comparative analysis to the Korean Power Plant Industry Union (PPIU), The British 
water unions, the Japanese telecommunication union and railway unions in Chapter 4. 
The additional cases support the central argument on the centrality of union strategy 
by proving its broad applicability.  
 Taken together, these findings suggest that countervailing power of labor unions 
makes a difference for the shape of restructuring. The fact that there were differentials 
in union influence refutes both convergence theory and traditional theories of national 
models. The findings suggest that restructuring outcomes vary across and within 
countries depending on the differences in labor’s strategic capacity. In the conclusion, 
the findings are summarized and their theoretical implications are examined.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE LAUNCH OF THE PRIVATIZATION 
AND RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM AT KNR AND KT 
 
In the past, KNR and KT maintained their monopolistic position in the industries of 
railway and telecommunication under state ownership. The industries were protected 
from market competition and natural monopolies were considered necessary in 
railways, telecommunication, gas and electricity for their strategic importance in state-
led economic development in the 1960s and 70s. Public ownership remained intact 
throughout the 80s and the industries were less subject to market pressures than to 
political control.  
 Yet from the 1990s a general move towards market liberalization came to create 
greater market pressures for hitherto protected public enterprises. As a result, public 
enterprises went through remarkable transformation coupled with changes in 
government policies that promoted deregulation and privatization of selected public 
enterprises, including KT and KNR. The changes at KT were more fundamental as 
they were boosted by rapid structural changes such as technological advances and 
heightened market competition. But the pressures for the restructuring of the railway 
industry also became intense in the 90s. This chapter will attempt to describe the 
process of changes that occurred in both industries focusing on the contents of 
privatization and restructuring plans adopted in the midst of these changes.   
 
1. The Launch of Privatization and Restructuring Program at KT 
 
1.1 KT as a Government Invested Enterprise  
 
KT was founded in 1981 as a government invested enterprise (GIE). Before 1981, KT 
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was a division of the Ministry of Communication (MOC, now Ministry of Information 
and Communication, MIC) and was under the direct control of the ministry. Thus, it 
was a government department that was actually run by the state, and it was subject to 
the Government Organization Act that tightly regulated the whole operation of the 
enterprise. Under this structure, KT held a monopolistic position in the 
telecommunication industry, the development of which was planned and led by the 
state. The industry at that time can be characterized as a regime of post, telegraph and 
telephone administrations (PTT) in which the MOC commanded the whole 
developmental process of the industry. In the 70s, state-owned enterprises and their 
infrastructural services were considered to be central to the state-led economic 
development strategies of the military government led by Park Chung Hee. As a result 
of this, the government centralized control of KT and focused on building a 
telecommunication infrastructure. By doing this, it aimed to provide universal 
telephone services and maintained the monopolistic supply of telecommunication 
services under state ownership.  
 In 1981, KT was converted from a government enterprise to a GIE. It was no more 
a division of MOC but the government still owned a majority of the shares.7 And little 
had changed in the 80s regarding the centralized political control that characterized the 
past of KT. Direct government intervention and strict regulation by the Government 
Invested Enterprise Regulation Act (GIERA) made little room for management 
autonomy. The Act required that key managerial decisions concerning investment 
strategy, budget plans and personnel management should be approved by the GIE’s 
                                            
7 Government enterprises (GEs) are government departments subject to Government Organization Act 
and the employees at GEs are civil servants. Government invested enterprises (GIEs) are public 
corporations in which the government holds the majority of the shares. These enterprises are regulated 
by the Government Invested Enterprise Regulation Act (GIERA). They can still be distinguished from 
government backed enterprises (GBEs), which are public corporations where the government has less 
than a majority of the shares and which are no longer regulated by the GIERA.   
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governing board, which included government officials from MOC and from the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB).8 Through their influence on the GIEs’ steering 
committees, the government and sponsor ministries not only had the final authority to 
approve the annual budget plans and to evaluate their performances regularly but they 
also set strict quota on the number of employees as well as the number of employees 
in each grade. Hence, the state control on GIEs remained direct and comprehensive. 
 Under this governing structure, the key characteristics of PTT regime (state 
monopoly of post and telecommunication services, centralized state control to carry 
out its industrial policy, the priority on providing universal services) remained intact. 
The President still had formal responsibility to appoint the Chief Executive Officer of 
each GIE and the chairman of each GIE board (hence KT) at the recommendation of 
the supervisory minister. And there was detailed ministerial oversight on the board in 
all management areas including budget plans, pay determination and staffing.  
 While centralized control was being sustained, competition was restrained and KT 
continued to have a monopoly on all telephone services and installation services 
throughout the 80s. From 1981 to 1986, the construction of a basic fixed line network 
was pursued as part of state-led economic development project, and the government-
owned monopoly was viewed necessary by the ministries and government officials to 
complete the construction of the national telephone network. As a result of this, KT 
concentrated on equipment installation and invested more than one billion won every 
year (approximately 100 million US dollars) and installed one million lines each year. 
                                            
8 The Economic Planning Board (EPB) was a super-ministry that set a common set of regulations and 
guidelines for GIEs. The EPB was established by the military government of Park Chung Hee who 
came to power after his coup d’etat in 1961 and it played a vanguard role in implementing Park’s five-
year economic development plans. As GIEs were strategically important for achieving the goals of 
state-led economic development plans, the EPB also intervened in the operation of the GIEs. It required 
them to submit their budget plans to their supervisory ministries, which in turn had to consult with EPB. 
The EPB had the ultimate authority to finalize the plans. It later became the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy after its merger with the Ministry of Finance in 1994. In 2008, the name changed to the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance after being amalgamated into the Ministry of Planning and Budget.      
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By 1987, national telephone automatization was achieved with the supply of ten 
million lines nationwide. At the time, the primary goal of KT as a GIE was to 
construct a nationalized telephone network and to provide universal telephone service 
through the network. Hence, until the late 80s the telecommunication sector in Korea 
had been rather protected from competitive market pressures, and the goal of 
expanding public services had prevailed over the logic of profitability. The latter can 
be proven by KT’s focus on providing public services such as local lines, public 
telephone, 114 directory enquiry services and telegraph. 
 
1-2. Structural Changes in the Korean Telecommunication Market: the Drive for 
Market Liberalization 
 
Throughout the 70s and until the 80s, KT retained a monopoly in the 
telecommunication sector that mainly relied on wire line telephone services. 
Competition had also been repudiated during the same period. Yet rapid technological 
changes radically affected the telecommunication industry, and gave impetus to the 
development of competitive markets. These changes weakened the hitherto protected 
sector and increased competitive pressures on the former monopoly. 
 In the first place, technical innovation made it possible to create new areas of 
services such as wireless and internet. For example, KT sought to develop the mobile 
telephone and pager services market by establishing a subsidiary company (Korea 
Mobile Telecom) in 1984. But it was not until the mid-1990s that the long-standing 
features of PTT regime began to erode. At the time when the government primarily 
focused on accomplishing nationwide telephone automatization, the 
telecommunication market continued to rely on wire-line services and KT had a 
monopoly in all segments of the telephone service market. Yet from the mid-90s, 
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alternative telecommunication services began to proliferate spurred by rapid 
technological advances. The digitalization of switching and transmission systems was 
made possible by technological developments in fiber optic cables and it accelerated 
the growth of new services such as internet, wireless and cable television. For example, 
in the early 90s, wireless technology was still underdeveloped in Korea, but it grew so 
rapidly that after the successful combination of code division multiple access (CDMA) 
technology9 with Korean TDX-10 switching system, Korea Mobile Telecom began 
commercial services using the CDMA method from 1996. Indeed the technological 
development took place in such a relatively compressed period of time that the 
CDMA-based wireless service started five years after the first development of CDMA 
technology and less than ten years after the very beginning of digital technology 
research in Korea (Lee J-K., 2000). In the subsequent years, the wireless commercial 
service expanded rapidly, and subscribers of mobile telephones outpaced those of 
fixed line telephones by 1997. The sharp rise in wireless subscribers, which reached 
approximately 29 million in 2001 (60% of Korean population), reflected the radical 
transformation of the traditional wireline market (KISDI, 2008). In addition to the 
mobile phone services, high-speed internet also emerged as a core telecommunication 
business in the late 90s when KT began its first pilot service in September 1998, and 
which reached 10 million subscribers by 2002 (KISDI, ibid). Altogether, these facts 
demonstrate the remarkably fast pace of network digitalization coupled with the 
                                            
9 CDMA employs a special coding scheme to allow multiple users to send information simultaneously 
over the same physical channel. It can be distinguished from the time division multiple access (TDMA) 
system, which divides access by time. While major companies in advanced countries possessed TDMA 
technology, Korea developed CDMA technology by signing a co-development agreement with 
Qualcomm. At first, MIC contacted other companies such as Motorola that had employed TDMA 
technology. But as they were concerned with the rise in competitive power of Korean companies as a 
result of their technological transfer, they refused to collaborate with the Korean research center that 
was backed by the government and the MIC. Hence the MIC turned to Qualcomm which was more 
willing to transfer its technology and signed a co-development agreement. Qualcomm accepted the 
proposal because it wished to establish CDMA technology as a global standard by transferring the 
technology to as many countries and companies as possible.                          
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proliferation of new telecommunication services that tended to be mobile, high-speed 
and broadband10. It had fundamentally reshaped the traditional service market in that 
the fixed line telephone and telegraph ceased to be the sole and most important means 
of telecommunication and gave way to the diffusion of wireless telephone, high speed 
internet and data services. This tendency resulted in the erosion of the natural 
monopoly. As the demand for new telecommunication services rose sharply along with 
the growth of highly profitable newer telecommunication businesses, the competitive 
pressures also increased as the monopolistic supply of telecommunication services 
came to be considered inefficient to meet the diversifying customer demands. Hence 
technical innovation gave impetus to the formation of a new competitive environment 
in which the goal of telecommunication policy no more resided in ensuring universal 
wireline telephone service but in advancing the network digitalization and in 
diversifying telecommunication services in the related areas.   
 It was in this context that the Korean government decided to introduce competition 
in the telecommunication sector. The reason for this change was to satisfy customer 
demands for the new services as well as to enhance the competitive power of domestic 
telecommunication businesses. The competitive era was signaled in 1991 when the 
government allowed Dacom to enter the international telephone service market and to 
compete with KT. This was soon followed by market liberalization in long distance 
calls where Dacom and Onse Telecom began to provide services in 1996 and in local 
calls where Hanaro Telecom entered the market in 1999. Hence by 1999, competition 
was brought to all areas of wireline telephone services. Similarly, in 1999 Hanaro 
Telecom began its ADSL service and set out in competition with KT and other cable 
companies in the high-speed internet service market. In the mobile telephone service 
                                            
10 As the digital transformation of the network accelerated with the development of satellite 
communication, it also created the possibility to integrate the once separate service areas and bundle 
digital network services altogether.   
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market, competition was introduced in 1996 when SK Telecom started to provide 
services after purchasing Korea Mobile Telecom and when other new private wireless 
telephone service companies also began to offer their commercial services. In sum, the 
former monopoly was replaced by duopolies in all the areas of telecommunication 
services by the mid-90s, which was later opened to full competition (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 The Structural changes in the Korean telecommunication market 
 
Service Type Market Structure 
Number of Service 
Providers 
Local call Monopoly → Duopoly (1997) → Competition (2004) 3 
Long-distance call Monopoly→ Duopoly (1996)→ Competition (1997) 5 
Oversea call Monopoly → Duopoly (1990) → Competition (1996) 5 
Mobile telephone Monopoly → Duopoly (1994) → Competition (1996) 3 
High-speed internet 
Monopoly (1998)→ Duopoly (1999) → Competition 
(2000) 
6 
Source: Ministry of Information and Communication (2005) 
 
 Hence the diversification of telecommunication services brought about radical 
transformation in the market structure. By the early 2000s, the state monopoly had 
given way to a competitive environment in which a number of service providers 
contested to attract more subscribers. At the same time, the rapidly evolving wireless 
and information service market gave incentives for new firms to enter the lucrative 
market and this in turn heightened competition in related service markets. When the 
Kim Dae Jung Administration announced the radical privatization plan of KT in 1998, 
the telecommunication service market had already been fundamentally reshaped and 
had become more and more competitive.  
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1-3. The Privatization and Restructuring Plan for KT 
 
1) Privatization Program before 1998 
 
The privatization plan for KT had been discussed before the market became 
competitive and when the firm still retained a monopoly under state ownership. Indeed, 
the EPB established the Committee for Privatization of Public Corporations in 1987, 
which proposed to privatize KT in the same year. Yet at that time, the market condition 
was not mature enough for the government to push the privatization plan forward. 
Although the rapidly evolving telecommunication industry heightened its strategic 
importance in the economy and fueled the investment in technological development of 
alternative telecommunication means, the competitive market was not yet formed to 
lay the groundwork for the immediate privatization of KT. Hence the privatization 
proposal of 1987 was not seen as a feasible plan and soon withered without any 
significant effort to carry on it.    
 And it was only in 1993 that the privatization plan of KT came to the surface again. 
In 1993, a committee was established to evaluate management efficiency at KT under 
the instructions of President Kim Young Sam11, which asserted the need for 
privatizing the firm. The committee’s final report argued that KT should go
restructuring and privatization process to enhance its efficiency and to adapt to the 
changing telecommunication environment (Committee for the Evaluation of KT 
 through a 
                                            
11 President Kim Young Sam was originally the chairman of the United Democratic Party (UDP). But 
after having failed to be elected as a UDP candidate in 1987 presidential election, he became the 
chairman of the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in 1990. The new party resulted from a merger with 
the Democratic Justice Party, the ruling conservative party, and with another conservative party, the 
New Democratic Republican Party. Kim Young Sam became the presidential candidate of the ruling 
DLP and was elected as President in December 1992. During his five-year reign, he emphasized that the 
new government was a civilian government, but the political orientation was not much different from 
the former government. He was the candidate of the Democratic Liberal Party, which inherited the 
political legacy of the past military governments and which was conservative in nature.   
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Management, 1995). In parallel with the view of the report, the Kim Young Sam 
government pressured KT to remove organizational rigidity and to adopt new policies 
such as flexible staffing and performance-based personnel management. The objective 
of the latter was to direct the firm towards a more market-oriented system that 
emphasized profitability and competitiveness over the provision of basic 
telecommunication services. The privatization plan was at the pillar of this policy 
change, and consequently, the Kim Young Sam government sold 28.8% of its 
government share from 1993 to 1997 (Kim Y-D, 2002). As a result of this, KT became 
a government-backed enterprise (GBE) and ceased to be regulated by the GIERA. 
This meant that the official power to finalize managerial decisions was handed over to 
management from political authorities.12 Yet, it could not be said that KT was exempt 
from political control. Although political regulation was no longer statutorily defined, 
government influence still prevailed through the intervention of sponsor ministries and 
their supervision over the governing board of KT.  
 In sum, an irreversible trajectory toward the privatization of KT was set as a 
political agenda under the Kim Young Sam government. It was pursued as part of the 
more comprehensive public sector reform program that targeted privatizing 58 public 
enterprises. The plan was initiated in 1993 by the Privatization Committee led by the 
vice minister of EPB. Regarding KT, the first step of privatization targeted Korea 
Mobile Telecom, the subsidiary company, and its ownership was transferred to a 
private chaebol13company named SK Telecom in 1994. At the same time, the 
                                            
12 In the past, the President appointed the CEO and the director of the governing board of Korea 
Telecom. Also, the supervisory ministries oversaw every aspect of the firm’s activity from strategic goal 
setting to performance evaluation and imposed detailed regulation on budget, staffing as well as wages 
and compensation. None of the managerial decision could be implemented without the approval of the 
GIE steering committee in which the supervisory ministries held substantial authority to command each 
GIE’s governing board.  
13 ‘chaebol’ refers to a South Korean form of business conglomerates. They are large, family-controlled, 
government-assisted corporate groups that have occupied a central place in South Korean economic 
development. They came to dominate Korean economy since 1960s when the military government of 
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government tried to deconcentrate KT by adopting a professional management system. 
The objective of this was to transform the monopolistic public corporation into a 
market-prone company by making the firm more apt to operate in an increasingly 
competitive environment. The 1997 Privatization Act laid the groundwork for these 
changes to occur. The Act covered four big public enterprises: KT, Korea Tobacco and 
Ginseng (KT&G), Korea Heavy Industry Corporation (KHIC), and Korea Gas 
Corporation (KOGAS)14, and it “envisaged that these four large public enterprises 
would develop into ‘large, commercial, private firms to be run by professional 
managers who strive to maximize the shareholders’ monetary interest” (Nam, 2004: 
111). 
 Yet the original privatization program was not successfully implemented under the 
Kim Young Sam Administration. Apart from nine firms having completed the 
ownership transfer and 10 other firms having partly sold government shares, the 
initially targeted firms were not privatized by 1997. Originally, more than 40 public 
enterprises were subject to privatization by 1994, and large corporations such as Korea 
Gas Corporation (KOGAS) and Korea Heavy Industry Corporation (KHIC) were 
planned to be privatized by 1995. Yet the privatization of most public enterprises was 
delayed and targeted large corporations including KOGAS and KHIC remained public 
corporations.15 As with the latter, the radical restructuring and privatization of KT 
could only start when the Kim Dae Jung Administration launched a far more 
comprehensive public sector restructuring program of an unprecedented scale and  
                                                                                                                             
Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) made state-chaebol alliance to give chaebol firms privileges that allowed 
them to grow and to gain monopolistic market position.  
14 Korea Telecom, along with KOGAS, KHIC and KT&G were classified as public corporations that 
were more market-oriented corporations than others by government officials.   
15 Korea Gas Corporation is still a public enterprise at this time and Korea Heavy Industry Corporation 
was privatized in 2001, when Doosan Heavy Industry Corporation took over the ownership. The 
privatization of the latter was originally proposed to be done by 1995 according to the 1993 government 
proposal.   
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pace.16  
 
2) Privatization Program under the Kim Dae Jung Administration 
 
President Kim Dae Jung took office in February 1998 at the peak of an economic 
crisis, and he immediately pushed ahead with a radical public sector restructuring plan 
in a determined way. On July 3 1998, the Planning and Budget Committee (PBC) of 
the Kim Dae Jung Government17 announced “the First Privatization Plan for Public 
Enterprises”, which comprised 11 enterprises and their 21 affiliates including KT 
(Table 2.2). Privatization and public sector restructuring were driven as part of a 
broader market restructuring plan of the new government amidst a severe economic 
crisis and the IMF bailout of the South Korean economy.18 Under the burden of the 
financial crisis and within the framework of the IMF’s structural reform guidelines, the 
Kim Dae Jung government pursued a far more fundamental restructuring policy than 
the previous government.19 For this, the Kim Dae Jung Administration set to reform 
                                            
16 Kim Dae Jung was elected President as candidate of the Democratic Party in December 18, 1997 and 
took office in February 25, 1998 in the midst of an economic crisis. During the five years of his 
presidential term, he vigorously pushed for an economic restructuring program recommended by the 
International Monetary Fund.    
17 The Planning and Budget Committee was under direct presidental control based on Article 19 of the 
National Government Organization Act. The president of the committee was thus appointed by 
President Kim Dae Jung who established the committee immediately after he took office. The 
committee was in charge of pushing the government’s public sector restructuring program forward 
which aimed at privatizing and reforming the management systems of targeted public corporations. It 
later was merged with the National Budget Administrations and was renamed the Ministry of Planning 
and Budget in May 1999.  
18 The IMF bailout program provided a comprehensive financing package of about US$ 65 billion on 
both multilateral and bilateral bases. In return, the Korean government was required to provide 
containment of inflationary pressure through tight monetary and fiscal policy, fundamental restructuring 
of the financial sector, and reduction of corporations’ excessive reliance on short-debt financing. In 
particular, the IMF requested the Korean government to take steps to improve labor market flexibility 
( Kim & Kim, 2003: 352).  
19 The range of the restructuring program was very extensive so that it covered not only the financial 
sectors but also large firms in both public and private sectors. Moreover, it also targeted promoting 
labor market flexibility and thus brought about statutory reforms that allowed employers to lay off 
redundant workers and use temp agency workers. 
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the public sector in the first place in order to make it an exemplary showcase for the 
rest of the economy. By proceeding with the radical privatization program of large 
public corporations, it paved the way for broad economic restructuring.  
 
Table 2.2 The first privatization plan for public enterprises in 1998  
 
Complete Privatization Gradual privatization 
Pohang Iron and Steel Company (16)* 
Korea Heavy Industry Corporation(3)* 
Korea Chemicals (1)* 
Korea Technology Bank (1)* 
National Textbook Printing and Publishing 
Company 
5 public corporations 
 Korea Telecom 
 Korea Tobacco and Ginseng (KT&G) 
• Korea Electric Power Corporation 
• (KEPCO) 
• Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) 
• Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation 
• Korea District Heating Corporation 
6 public corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Source: the Planning and Budget Committee (PBC) (July 3, 1998) 
    *The number in the parentheses indicates the number of subsidiaries 
 
It was in this context that the privatization of KT entered the implementation stage. 
The Kim Dae Jung government hastened to carry on the proposed plan and 
subsequently released the second privatization plan only a month after the 
announcement of the first plan. The second one was made public on August 4, 1998, 
and extended the targeted group of public corporations from 11 to 19 corporations and 
from 21 to 55 subsidiaries (Table 2.3).  
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Table 2.3 The list of targeted public corporations in the 2nd privatization plan 
 
Korea Telecom (13)                     Korea Electric Power Corp(7)  
Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corp.(1)             Korea Gas Corp.(5) 
Daehan Oil Pipeline Corp. (2)                     Korea District Heating Corp.(3) 
Korea Minting and Security Printing Corp.        Korea Tourism Organization (1) 
Korea Agro-fisheries Trade Corp.(7)              Korea Rural Corp. 
Korea Resources Corp.                          Korea Coal Corp. 
Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency      Korea National Oil Corp.(2) 
Korea National Housing Corp. (6)                Korea Land Corp.(2) 
Korea Expressway Corp. (3)                     Korea Water Resources Corp.(2) 
Korea Appraisal Board (1) 
    Source: PBC (August 4, 1998) 
    *The number in the parentheses indicates the number of subsidiaries 
 
And not only was the number of targeted corporations increased but it also comprised 
detailed restructuring guidelines emphasizing the need for focusing on core businesses 
and for slimming down organization and workforce. The plan clarified three main 
privatization strategies:  
 
1. restructuring the organizations around core businesses by disposing of non 
core businesses and non-related subsidiaries;  
2. establishing a professional management system; promoting competition by 
deregulating the monopolistic market and by transferring the businesses to 
the private sector (PBC, August 4, 1998).  
 
It thus envisaged to transform public monopolies into ‘ready-for-privatization 
companies’ and urged them to adopt new business strategies such as downsizing, 
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outsourcing and organizational restructuring. Moreover, the plan presented outlines of 
the restructuring programs for each corporation and it also specified the number of 
workers to be reduced for each corporation. Regarding the restructuring of KT, the 
plan proposed:  
 
• To become a pivotal service provider in telecommunication market by being 
prepared to deal with intensifying competition and market opening; 
• To maintain 26 businesses including domestic calls and to transfer four businesses 
including public phone calls  
• To outsource or sell satellite telecommunication and telegraph businesses 
• To withdraw from eight businesses including collect call and easy fax20  
 
And according to the plan, each corporation must go through personnel restructuring. 
For KT, it indicated that the parent company should reduce its workforce from 59,491 
to 51,241 which accounted for the reduction of 8,250 employees (13.9%). The 
proposed workforce reduction was the largest among the targeted corporations and 
given that public employees had strong employment security, government guidelines 
for such job cuts heralded drastic changes in public sector employment relations.    
 Hence, it is noteworthy that “this plan differed from previous privatization efforts 
in its ambitious scope and its determination to transfer the control of public enterprises 
to the private sector, instead of stopping at partial sale of government shares” (Lim W., 
2003: 40). And unlike the preceding governments, the Kim Dae Jung Administration 
took actual steps to implement the privatization program. It organized the Committee 
                                            
20 The easy fax service allows customers to send out same fax messages on a large scale 
without being restricted by time and place.  
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for Proceeding Privatization in which the president of the PBC became the president, 
and the vice-ministers of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and of the sponsor 
ministry (MIC for KT) became the vice presidents. And each sponsor ministry had to 
set up a working committee for privatization to decide on the specific method and 
timing of privatization and to map out effective privatization strategies. It was in this 
context that the PBC announced the final privatization plan of KT on August 21, 1998. 
The plan envisaged to sell 5% of its old stocks and 10% of its new stocks (15% in 
total) to international telecommunication operators and to make strategic alliances 
with these foreign investors. It also decided to sell 13% of its shares through the 
issuing of depository receipts (DR). The time for stock listing was not specified by the 
plan, but it said that it will be decided after raising the corporate value through 
strategic alliances with foreign operators and that it will simultaneously go with 
issuing DRs in the international stock market (the PBC, December 14, 1998). Hence it 
is undeniable that Kim Dae Jung’s government was determined to transfer the 
ownership of KT to the private sector and that share sales to overseas investors were 
conceived as a major means to pursue the privatization plan.  
 
3) The Outcomes in Brief 
 
After having announced the privatization plan of KT in July and August 1998, Kim 
Dae Jung’s Administration led the organizational restructuring and massive workforce 
reduction in 1998 and 1999 successively, and in June 2000, it also decided to achieve 
a complete ownership transfer of KT to private investors. In terms of outcomes, it can 
be said that the privatization of KT became more radicalized in its implementation 
process.   
 Originally KT was classified as a public corporation to be gradually privatized, 
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but the government soon changed its plan and decided to fully privatize the 
corporation. This objective was achieved under the Kim Dae Jung government. In 
May 1999, KT shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and London Stock 
Exchange, and as a result of this, government shares were reduced to 58.99% by the 
end of 1999. In December 2001, the government issued DRs in the international 
market for a second time and reduced its shares to 40.15%. In the subsequent years 
2001 and 2002, KT shares were additionally sold to both international and domestic 
private investors, and remaining government shares were completely sold. Hence KT 
was fundamentally transformed from a public corporation with 100% government-
held shares in 1992 to a private firm with 0% of government shares in 2002 (see Table 
2.4). All of this radical change occurred under the Kim Dae Jung government, which 
aggressively pressured the corporation to adopt a comprehensive restructuring 
program and pushed the radical privatization plan forward by selling all the remaining 
government shares. 
 
Table 2.4 The Changes in KT’s Ownership Structure    (%) 
 
 Government Other Domestic Investors Foreign Investors 
Dec. 1992 100.00 — — 
Dec.1998 71.20 23.80 5.00 
Dec.1999 58.99 22.30 18.71 
Dec.2001 40.15 22.65 37.20 
May 2002 — 51.00 49.00 
     Source: Lim, W. (2003:51) 
 
 The final outcome was not only accomplished but even went beyond the original 
goals of the government. In the first place, along with full privatization, KT’s 
ownership was completely transferred to the private sector by May 2002. The overseas 
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sales were also at the heart of privatization process. Consequently foreign investors 
came to be the major shareholders after the privatization of KT21.  
  Besides, the restructuring process was the most radical in terms of corporate 
restructuring and massive employment reduction. The outcomes reflected the 
comprehensive restructuring guidelines set by the government’s second privatization 
plan. The key component of the proposal was to downsize the organization by selling 
or outsourcing non-core businesses and by reducing 13.9% of the workforce (hence 
reducing 8,250 KT employees). KT fully endorsed the government policy and took 
prompt measures to speed up the restructuring process. In December 1999, KT 
management announced an “Acceleration Plan for Management Innovation” in 
response to government initiative. KT’s plan not only recapitulated the restructuring 
plan as proposed by the government but it also radicalized the employment reduction 
plan by amplifying the scale of workforce reduction. Hence the goal was readjusted to 
reduce 15,000 employees (25.2% of the total workforce).  
 In the end, the goals of the proposed government plan were all achieved. KT 
withdrew from eight businesses such as easyfax, CT-2 and CATV transport network 
and transferred eight businesses to its subsidiaries. It also outsourced several 
businesses such as telegraph and 114 directory enquiry services, and reduced or sold 
off its shares in CATV, telecommunication card, etc. Organizational restructuring was 
achieved through merger and abolition of organizations. And in terms of personnel 
                                            
21 When KT’s privatization was completed, government shares were all sold out and the shares of 
foreign investors increased every year. Immediately after privatization, a chaebol company, namely SK 
Telecom (SKT) became the largest shareholder with an equity stake of 11.34%. But when SKT sold out 
its stake in exchange for KT’s divesture from SKT in 2003, Brandes Investment Partners became the 
largest shareholder. In 2004 and 2005, three major foreign investors (Brandes Investment Partners, 
Franklin Templeton International, and Capital Research and Management Company) owned 22.85% 
and 21.73% of shares in total respectively. In 2007, the shares owned by foreign investors accounted for 
45.50% of the total shares while treasury stocks and employee stocks accounted for 26% and 5.6% of 
the shares. “Apparently, the foreign investors had less than 50% of the total shares. Nonetheless, given 
that treasury stocks lacked the voting right, foreign investors could be considered to be the most 
influential shareholder group. In fact, they became the largest shareholders of KT” (Roh, 2008: 70).    
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restructuring, the actual workforce reduction far exceeded the original goal set by the 
government and 15,180 employees were dismissed by June 2001. Apparently, the 
employment reduction was done mainly through voluntary redundancies. But they 
were compulsory in nature as the employees had gone through one-on-one interviews 
with managers who mobilized various threatening methods to force them to resign 
(KTTU, 1999; KDLP Seoul Regional Office, 2005; Personal Interviews). And most of 
these ‘voluntary redundancies’ occurred during the period of 1999-2001 which 
reached the number of 11,895 (see Table 2.6). The number of voluntary redundancies 
in this less-than-three-year period was 20 times more than the number of redundancies 
that had occurred over the 10 years before 1995 (There had been only 509 voluntary 
redundancies in KT from 1986 to 1994. See Table 2.5). 
 
Table 2.5 The number of redundancies in KT from 1986 to early 1994 
 
Year 1986-89 1990 1992 1993 1994 Total 
Number 31 31 54 111 99 509 
Source: Consortium for the Evaluation of KT Management (1994) 
 
 
Table 2.6 The Number of Redundancies in KT from 1995 to 2001 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 total 
Redundancies 5,085 1,521 1,959 3,203 9,335 1,437 1,947 24,487
Voluntary 
Redundancies 
3,068 — — 95 8,968 1,428 1,499 15,058
 Source: KTTU internal data; KT internal data (several years) 
 
 As a result of this, the number of KT employees decreased by 26% from 1997 to 
2001. The total number of KT employees reached 59,278 in 1997 but it dropped to 
43,799 by the year 2001. In sum, the restructuring program for KT was radicalized and 
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precipitated under Kim Dae Jung’s government. It was the combination of 
government’s fast-paced public sector reform program and KT management’s 
enthusiastic embracement of this radical policy that resulted in the achievement of 
government objectives.   
 
2. The Launch of the Privatization and Restructuring Program at KNR 
   
2.1 Korean National Railroad Administration under Government Control 
 
One of the features that mark differences in the starting point for the privatization of 
KT and KNR lies in the fact that KNR remained a state-owned and state-run authority 
at the time when the restructuring plan was proposed by the government. Unlike KT, 
which ceased to be a government enterprise (GE) in 1981 to become a government 
invested enterprise (GIE), KNR continued to be a government organization until 
January 2005 when KNR was divided into the Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL) 
for railway operation and the Korea Rail Network Authority (KR) for infrastructure 
construction. Hence KT had been corporatized before Kim Dae Jung’s government 
pushed the radical privatization program onward while KNR continued to be a GE 
even after President Kim Dae Jung left office. Besides, KT was converted to a GBE in 
October 1997 and was thus no longer regulated by GIERA, which had deprived KT of 
management discretion and had given government officials the authority to directly 
control the governing board of KT (see the previous section of this chapter). After KT 
became a GBE, although the government still exerted political control and 
commanded KT’s restructuring process, its intervention was no more statutorily 
defined. By contrast, the regulatory framework that governed KNR continuously 
ensured government control throughout the presidency of Kim Dae Jung and 
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afterwards. Unlike KT, the intervention of the government and sponsor ministries was 
still enacted by laws such as the Railway Act, the Railway Transport Act and the 
Government Organization Act. Based on these laws, the government could impose a 
number of regulations as follows: 
 
• The Ministry of Construction & Transport (MOCT), as the sponsor ministry of KNR, 
has the power to draft and submit bills, to make national railway policies, to adjust 
railway fare in consultation with the Ministry of Finance & Economy (MOFE), and 
to analyze relevant regulations concerning railway transport. 
• The Ministry of Planning & Budget (MPB) has the exclusive power to draft and 
deliberate KNR’s annual budget, to review KNR’s five-year plan for approval, and 
to finalize reform plans for government organizations.  
• The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) has the 
authority to determine the number of public employees, to adjust their wages, and to 
approve the promotion or penalty for the employees. 
• The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) has the power to control railway 
fare, to approve public borrowing or external funding, to manage national properties 
including railway infrastructure, and to audit and inspect KNR’s accounts (Kang, 
2002: 150).    
 
 Such government regulations had been in place since Park Chung Hee military 
government enacted the Government Organization Act in 1973. The Act defined that it 
was the President who had the exclusive right to command and supervise the heads of 
each government organization. The president of each government organization who 
also held the position of the Chairman of the board of directors was appointed by the 
President, and the board members were appointed by the ministers of supervisory 
ministries. Under Chun Doo Whan’s government, the rest of the board members were 
no longer appointed by the President but the CEO of a GE was still appointed by the 
President. And government officials from supervisory ministries and the EPB directly 
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served as board members. Kim Dae Jung’s government revised the Act and allowed 
the establishment of a CEO recommendation committee composed of non-permanent 
board directors and civil members, but the right to nominate and appoint the CEO was 
still held by the President and the ministers in charge. The same regulation was 
applied to KNR. As the railway bureau within the Ministry of Transport was 
reorganized as a semi-independent government authority named the Korean National 
Railroad Administration (KNRA) in 1963, KNR became subject to the rule of the 
Government Organization Act. And government control had remained thorough and 
extensive since then. Besides, although the Chun Doo Whan and Kim Dae Jung 
governments made minor revisions regarding budget control, little has changed in the 
underlying principle that gave the central government the power to impose a common 
budget planning guideline to each government enterprise. Hence the management 
prerogatives to draft budget plans, to decide the wage rate, and to fix the number of 
employees fell into the hands of the government and ministries. KNR employers could 
not make any independent managerial decisions without the approval of the 
supervisory ministries and their performance was annually evaluated by the ministries. 
In sum, not only did the supervisory ministries held the right to set railway policies, to 
approve investment programs and the overall price increases but they also had 
statutory power to set and impose management guidelines before the board of 
directors drafted its budget and investment plans on its own. In this way, managerial 
strategies at KNR were heavily influenced by government regulations that ensured 
direct political control of the government.   
 
2.2 The Development of Korean Railway  
 
The Korean railway transport first began its operation in 1899 linking the 33.2 
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kilometers (km) distance between Seoul and Incheon. It expanded rapidly during the 
Japanese colonial period to achieve a basic railway network infrastructure in 1942 
with the opening of the central railway line. By the time of liberation from Japanese 
colonial rule in 1945, the railway reached 6,363 km of rail length with 762 stations, 
but after the division of Korea into South and North soon after the liberation, the 
remaining part in South Korea only covered 3,378km of rail length (2,642 km of route 
length) with 300 stations.  
 During the Japanese colonial period, the Korean railway was run by Japanese 
private companies, but after the liberation it was nationalized to form the Korean 
National Railroad (KNR) in 1946, and began to be operated by the Ministry of 
Transport in 1948 after three years of temporary rule by the American military 
government. But it was not long before the Korean railway network was severely 
damaged again during the 1950-1953 Korean Civil War. Thus the Korean government 
strived to rebuild the network after the War and expanded investment for the 
reconstruction. As a result of this, the Korean railway developed considerably thanks 
to increased government investment until the mid-1960s. Yet during the second term 
of the implementation period of the five-year economic development plan (1967-
1971) of Park Chung Hee’s military government, the government investment for road 
transport began to outstrip the investment for railway (Table 2.7). 
 
Table 2.7 Government investment in transport (%) 
 
 1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1982-86 1987-91 1992-96
Railway 60.6 28.7 29.4 21.7 12.1 10.1 12.8 
Road 17.2 52.0 51.6 47.1 46.7 79.6 58.3 
Subway — 3.8 2.7 16.2 30.6 1.1 12.3 
Others 22.2 15.5 16.3 15.0 10.6 9.2 16.6 
Source: KNR (2000a); Kang (2002).  
*Others include air and sea transport and other transport infrastructures. 
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 Since then, the main problem facing the Korean railways was the unrelenting 
growth of road competition. As a result of the disproportionate concentration of 
government investment for road construction, the road transport grew rapidly and 
substituted the railway to become the major means of transport. Thereafter, the share 
of railways in transport steadily declined. In 1965, the railways’ share of passenger 
traffic was 45.7%, but it fell to 24.5% in 1975 and to 21.2% in 1985. By contrast, the 
road’s share of passenger traffic increased from 52.7% in 1965 to 73.8% in 1975. In 
1985, its share was 73%, hence more than triple the railways traffic. The share of 
railway passenger traffic increased slightly to 23.8% in 1995 but it remained well 
below the share of road traffic, which was 58% in the same year (MOCT, 1998).22 In 
sum, low government investment had been characteristic of the Korean railway 
industry since the late 1960s. Faced with reduced government support and increased 
road competition, the railway industry retrograded with its shrinking role in national 
transport. The railway infrastructure and equipment also became obsolete rendering 
the railway performance poorer in terms of both passenger and freight transport. 
Government investment was so centered to construct road infrastructure that it 
neglected to expand and modernize the railway infrastructure. As a result, both the 
extension of new railway lines and railway modernization such as railway 
electrification, automation and double tracking were delayed (KLI, 2007: 104). It was 
not until the 1990s that the government invested more resources in railways and 
launched the high-speed railroad construction23.      
                                            
22 The share of road passenger traffic dropped to 58% in 1995, hence a 15% decrease from 1985. But 
the decrease was not the result of the increase in the share of railway passenger traffic (which only 
increased 2.6% compared to 1985) but derived from the increase in the share of subway passenger 
traffic that jumped from 4.2% in 1985 to 11.8% in 1995. The latter resulted from the construction and 
extension of subway lines in Seoul and surrounding metropolitan areas. Consequently, subways have 
increasingly become an alternative transportation means for commuters living in the metropolitan areas.    
23 The high-speed railway has been under construction since 1992 with the Seoul-Pusan line. Capable 
of running at a maximum speed of 300km/h, it was expected to transport 520,000 passengers per day 
when it started its operation from 2004. For this, the Korea High-Speed Rail Construction Authority 
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 Together, these factors worsened the financial condition of the Korean railway by 
causing chronic deficit. Nevertheless, the Public Service Obligation (PSO) for railway 
remained extremely insufficient24. In Korea, the allocation of PSO grant was 
statutorily defined by the ‘Special Law on the Operation of National Railway’ of 1995. 
According to the law, the government subsidizes KNR for running services that are 
non-profitable but that must be provided for social purposes albeit the deficit in 
revenue. Yet the PSO grant to KNR fell short of the required amount of compensation 
by more than 70% from 1992 to 2000 (Table 2.8).  
 
Table 2.8 The results of PSO compensation by the government 
                                               (Unit: 100 million Won) 
 
Compensated  
Amount 
Non-Compensated  
Amount 
Compensation Rate 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
459 
675 
944 
996 
331 
1,516 
818 
1,214 
1,235 
806 
1,070 
1,154 
2,052 
2,799 
2,426 
0% 
0% 
0% 
36.3% 
38.7% 
45.0% 
32.7% 
10.6% 
38.5% 
Total 4,921 13,574 26.6% 
    Source: KRWU (2002b) 
 
                                                                                                                             
(KHSRCA) was established for the construction of the high-speed railway, as a public enterprise subject 
to direct control of the MOCT and independent of KNRA (Kang, 2002: 149).  
24 The PSO is an arrangement in which the government offers subsidies to the public transport sector, 
and which is one of the oldest regulations of the European Economic Community that dates back to the 
regulation No. 1191/69 of June 26th, 1969. The regulation builds on the special position of state 
subsidies in the public transport services whereby public authorities compensate public service 
operators for costs incurred. It is a requirement to ensure the provision of public transport services to 
meet the general interest.  
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 The low PSO compensation rate further aggravated railway deficit, and while the 
increasing debt became a lasting problem for KNR, the low government investment 
and the resulting low transportation capacity also caused chronic deficit in its 
operation.  
 To conclude, Korean railway had been underdeveloped until the mid-1990s. Thus, 
unlike KT that operated in an environment marked by rapidly evolving technology and 
heightened market pressure, the technological progress in railways was slow and KNR 
operated in an economy of scale that had not undergone structural changes similar to 
telecommunication industry. Hence KNR provided monopolistic provision of railway 
services that stagnated and lagged behind due to lack of government investment for 
their improvement while low the government compensation rate aggravated the 
railway deficit.      
 It was not until the late 90s that the Korean government changed its attitude and 
began to place more weight on railway transport. The imperatives for change came 
from the structured deficit of KNR and the need to solve such problems, but the 
government also saw the growing importance of railway transport as an alternative to 
road transportation that posed severe transportation problems along with the increase 
of traffic congestion. It not only raised the transportation and distribution cost but also 
heightened pollution problems.25 Faced by the rising cost of road transportation, the 
government and the MOCT turned their attention to railway transport and came to 
acknowledge the advantages of the latter in terms of safety, transportation efficiency 
and its environment-friendly characteristics. Hence in 1999, Kim Dae Jung’s 
government drew up a “Plan for Traffic Network Infrastructure” and decided to 
increase government investment for railway transport. According to the plan, the 
                                            
25 According to the MOCT, the average increase rate of traffic congestion cost was 22.40% from 1994 
to 1997, and the average increase rate of distribution cost was 13.40% during the same period (MOCT, 
1999).  
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railway operation would be extended to 3,125km by 2001 and to 4,792km by 2019. 
The plan also envisaged to construct high-speed railway infrastructure and to expand 
double-tracking and railway electrification (MOCT, 1999).  
 But the move towards a more railway-centered policy and the decision to increase 
its infrastructural investment were coupled with a broader restructuring program of 
KNR that ultimately aimed at privatizing the railway monopoly.  
  
2.3. The Privatization and Restructuring Plan of KNR 
 
While KT confronted growing competitive pressures from its private counterparts in 
the telecommunication sector, it did not suffer from chronic deficit. The financial 
condition of KT was relatively stable and the net profit continuously increased until 
the privatization plan was announced26. Hence the rationale for the privatization of KT 
was not grounded in the deficit problem but rather in the greater exposure to market 
competition and intensified pressures for market liberalization. By contrast, a growing 
deficit was at the center of industrial problems for the Korean railway that motivated 
the government to push the privatization of KNR. But initially when the government 
launched the restructuring program in the early 1990s, privatization had not been 
proposed yet. It was not until 1999 that the privatization of KNR was decided by Kim 
Dae Jung’s government as a means to restructure Korean railways.   
 
 
 
                                            
26 The net profit increased from 79,689,900,000 won in 1997 to 258,319,000,000 won in 1998, the year 
when Kim Dae Jung government successively announced the first and second privatization plans of KT. 
The net revenue also increased from 6,996,295,740,000 won in 1996 to 7,785,159,819,000 won in 1997 
to 8,773,912,000,000 won in 1998 (KISDI, 1999: 57).    
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1) The Restructuring Plan before the Kim Dae Jung Government 
 
The restructuring plan of KNR lacked consistency and fluctuated with the changes of 
political regimes. Yet since the late 80s, the governments in power all sought to 
restructure the industry in order to enhance the railway competitiveness. At first, Roh 
Tae Woo’s government proposed the corporatization of KNR by enacting the ‘Railway 
Corporation Act’ in 1989. According to the Act, KNR will still remain a government 
enterprise with 100% government share, but it will become a corporation instead of a 
government authority by 1993.27 By legislating such an Act, the government intended 
to establish a more autonomous management system that would take over corporate 
responsibility and increase commercial activities to enhance business performance. 
But in 1992, Roh Tae Woo’s government postponed the corporatization of KNR 
worrying that the financial burden would excessively increase while the basis for 
management independency would still remain weak (Sam-Il Accounting Corporation 
& MOCT, 2000: 13).   
 When Kim Young Sam’s government took over the reigns, it decided to maintain 
the state-owned railway structure and thus revoked the previous corporatization plan. 
The reason for the annulment of the plan was the same as the reason for its 
postponement. While the debt of KNR increased to 700 billion won by the late 1995, 
an additional 620 billion won would be spent for the severance pay and other labor 
costs if KNR was to be corporatized. Despite this financial overburden, the prospect 
for management improvement was also dim as a deficit of 100 billion won was 
expected to be incurred every year. The possibility of greater labor management 
dispute also prevented the government from implementing the plan as KRWU would 
                                            
27 The corporatization of KNR was initially recommended by International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) in the late 1960s. But it was not until the late 80s that the Korean government 
began to consider the option for actual implementation.  
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obtain the right to collective action with the corporatization of KNR whereas the union 
would be deprived of such right by the Government Organization Act if KNR 
continued to be a state-owned government authority (Sam-Il Accounting Corporation 
& MOCT, ibid; KRWU, 2002b; Kang, 2002). 
 Instead, the Kim Young Sam government enacted the ‘Special Law on the 
Operation of National Railway’ in December 1995 and attempted to expose KNR to 
more profit-oriented businesses. The law clarified government responsibility for PSO 
compensation although the actual compensation rate was insufficient as previously 
discussed. At the same time, the law envisaged to improve management performance 
of KNR. According to Article 7 of the law, the Committee for Improving Railway 
Management would be established for this purpose in which the vice minister of 
MOCT would be the president. By enacting such a law and organizing such committee, 
Kim Young Sam’s government looked for ways to increase efficiency by adopting the 
principle of commercialism within the government enterprise. Article 12 laid the 
groundwork for this to happen since it distinguished the finances of railway operation 
from the construction of its infrastructure and thus the government intended to embark 
on restructuring the operational businesses of KNR while taking responsibility for 
investment in the infrastructural part. Based on this new regulation, the government 
set up a commercialization plan in 1996 titled ‘Master Plan for Management Reform 
of KNR 1997-2001’ (Kang, 2002).  
 In the past, KNR was considered to be a government enterprise that operated on 
the basis of social services as well as of the economic needs. The principle of a ‘social 
railway’ persisted as the railway was seen to be the backbone of public transportation. 
Thus the foremost mission of KNR was to provide public transportation services for 
the general interest of the whole population. Yet with the announcement of the 
commercialization plan, the government pressured KNR to take a more commercial 
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approach that sought to maximize profits. Similar to KT, the new approach made KNR 
take actual measures to cut costs and increase efficiency. Thus, at the same time that 
the government proposed new railway policies such as establishing PSO compensation 
system and increasing government investment, KNR stepped towards a new 
commercialization strategy that sought to abolish or reduce non profitable operations 
and to slim down the organizational structures through mergers of stations and offices 
as well as through workforce downsizing. It also looked for ways to contract out the 
non core operations such as ticketing services, maintenance of railway tracks and 
rolling stocks. 
 In sum, from the early 1990s, the government began to make efforts to raise 
railway competitiveness and urged KNR to go through an organizational restructuring 
process by adopting a more profit-oriented management strategy. Thus, new 
government policies were coupled with the rise of commercialism in railway industry. 
It was in this context that the privatization plan of KNR came to be pursued under 
Kim Dae Jung’s government. 
 
2) The Restructuring and Privatization Plan under Kim Dae Jung’s Government  
 
Under Kim Dae Jung’s government, the railway restructuring program entered a more 
radicalized track. During the first year of Kim Dae Jung’s presidency, the privatization 
of railway sector had not been proposed yet while the privatization plan of other major 
network utilities including gas, electricity and telecoms was announced soon after he 
took office in February 1998. Instead, the government conducted an evaluative 
research on KNR’s management efficiency from October 1998 to February 1999. 
Based on this, the Cabinet decided to privatize KNR while establishing a public 
authority for railway construction at a May 1999 meeting (Commission for Railway 
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Restructuring, 2001b: 1)28. For the ministries of Kim Dae Jung’s government, 
privatization was the most effective means to raise efficiency and service quality of 
railway transport. They argued that unless KNR underwent a fundamental 
restructuring process and established an autonomous management system through 
privatization, it would never get over the chronic deficit that structurally constrained 
KNR (MOCT& KNR, 2000; KNR 2000c; MOCT, 2001a). 
 Thus the Kim Dae Jung government swerved the railway restructuring policy from 
corporatization to privatization and framed the basic design of the privatization 
method, one that is based on the vertical separation of KNR into service operations 
and infrastructure. The model proposed to privatize the former while handing the 
infrastructural division over a public authority that would take responsibility of 
constructing new railway infrastructure including high-speed railways.   
 At the same time, the government conceived of a tight and compressed 
privatization process instead of a slow process that builds on negotiation among the 
interested parties. According to the initial government plan of 1999, the privatization 
would be achieved by January 2002, hence within only one year and half after the first 
announcement of the privatization plan. This plan was modified after a fine-tuning 
process among the ministries and KNR. While there was consensus among the 
ministries (the MPB and the MOCT) and KNR on the restructuring model based on 
the vertical split of the railway industry into operation and infrastructure, there existed 
different opinions over the specific method and time setting for privatization. The 
MPB endorsed the most radical form of privatization by supporting the original 
government plan of achieving the complete privatization of KNR by the late 2001. It 
                                            
28 Based on this decision, the ministries in charge (MOCT and MPB) commissioned a private 
consulting company, Sam-Il Accounting Corporation to develop the most viable method for 
privatization in the same year, the recommendations of which were supposed to be reflected in the final 
government plan of 2001. 
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also argued for the divided ownership of passenger, freight and vehicle maintenance. 
Hence MPB’s model was based on both the vertical separation between operation and 
infrastructure and the horizontal split within the operation company. By contrast, KNR 
supported an integrated privatization model by opposing to dividing the operation 
company. It also proposed to delay the final privatization until 2004 as it expected to 
spend at least two years and seven months for the transfer. The MOCT sided with 
KNR for the time schedule. The modified time horizon for the privatization process 
was presented as such:  
 
• 1st stage (~2002): The separation between service operation and infrastructure 
  -Establishment of the Railroad Construction Authority 
  -Contracting-out some railway lines to private companies 
• 2nd stage (2003-2004): The shift to privatization 
  -Establishment of Railway Operation Co. (2003) 
• 3rd stage (2005-2010): Creation of competitive market 
  -Incremental sale of government shares 
-Building competitive environment by separation of passenger and freight transport 
  -Expanding the participation of private companies in the ownership and                 
management of railway (MOCT, 2000)  
 
 The finalized government plan recapitulated the gradual privatization process of 1. 
the vertical separation of operation and infrastructure→2. the transformation of KNR 
from a government organization to a public corporation with 100% government 
share→3. the ownership transfer of the Korean Railroad Operation Co. to private 
companies and the creation of a competitive market environment by selling 
government shares and by giving private service providers free access to railways 
(MOCT, 2001a). But regarding the horizontal division between passenger and freight 
transport, the finalized plan supported MPB’s opinion and envisaged to separate them 
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by 2006 (MOCT, ibid). The plan also proposed to give the Railroad Construction 
Authority the power to plan, to finance and to supervise the maintenance and repair 
work ultimately. But it also said that the actual maintenance work would be 
temporarily undertaken by the Korean Railroad Operation Co. until the separation 
between freight and passenger would occur (MOCT, ibid). To achieve the goal of 
creating a competitive environment, the plan proposed to induce private companies to 
participate in railway operation businesses by selling or contracting out some railroad 
lines to private companies. According to the plan, both the establishment of the 
Railroad Construction Authority and contracting out some lines to private competitors 
should be accomplished by 2002 without any setbacks (MOCT, ibid; The Commission 
for Railway Restructuring 2001a). The basic scheme of the government plan is 
presented in the Figure 2.1.   
 
Figure 2.1 Railway restructuring model of Kim Dae Jung’s government 
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 Based on this scheme, Kim Dae Jung’s government stipulated the railway 
restructuring plan into two relevant bills in 2001: the Basic Law on the Development 
and Restructuring of Railway Industry in February and the Railroad Infrastructure 
Corporation Act in July. The bills statutorily defined the method of restructuring, one 
that is based on the split between railway infrastructure and operation: while the newly 
established Railroad Construction Authority would remain a government authority that 
takes the responsibility of constructing railroad infrastructure as well as its 
maintenance and repair, the Korean Railroad Operation Co. would be set up to manage 
the railway operation service, one that would be gradually privatized. Thus the Law 
made it clear that competition would be brought to the operation sector based on the 
rules of market economy albeit its status of public corporation for the time being. In 
the end, the law envisaged to completely privatize the operation sector and to hand its 
ownership to private companies. According to Article 18 of the Law, “the state will 
gradually sell its share of Korean Railroad Operation Co. to private parties in view of 
business condition of the latter” (MOCT 2001a: 10). 
 The bills passed the Cabinet council and were then introduced to the National 
Assembly in December 2001. But the deliberation of the bills was delayed at the 
Assembly, and consequently, the bills were not passed until President Kim Dae Jung’s 
term ended in February 2003. The change in leadership of KRWU in May 2001 and 
the mounting opposition of the union to the railway reform bills played a key role in 
postponing the legislation (the responses of KRWU will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapters). Hence the task of railway restructuring and related legislation 
fell in the hands of Roh Moo Hyun’s government, which was inaugurated on February 
25th 2003.   
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3) The Withdrawal of the Privatization Plan and the Re-introduction of the 
Corporatization Plan under Roh Moo Hyun’s Government 
 
The railway restructuring took a new turn when President Roh Moo Hyun came to 
power in 2003. The presidential undertaking committee reviewed the railway 
restructuring policy as Roh Moo Hyun promised to call off the privatization plan 
during his electoral campaign. Eventually, the new government withdrew the latter to 
replace it with a corporatization plan. The fierce opposition of KRWU to privatization 
contributed to this policy change, which came out of union-government agreement of 
April 20, 2003.  
 Straight after reaching the agreement, Roh Moo Hyun’s government introduced 
new railway restructuring bills to the National Assembly in June 2003: The Basic Law 
on the Development of Railway Industry, the Railroad Infrastructure Authority Act 
and the Korean Railroad Corporation Act. The push for such legislation was based on 
the vertical separation between infrastructure and operation. Although the framework 
of vertical separation was the same as Kim Dae Jung’s government plan, the 
difference lay in the fact that the former government statutorily clarified that the 
ownership of the newly established Korean Railroad Operation Co. will ultimately be 
transferred to private service providers along with the gradual sale of government 
shares. By contrast, the new bill deleted the related article and hence officially 
abandoned the railway privatization policy. Still, KRWU went on strike on June 28th to 
resist the passage of the bills on the grounds that the decision to corporatize KNR was 
not built on social consensus. The union called for a longer review period during 
which the method of railway restructuring could be determined by social agreement 
among various interested parties including not only the government and KNR 
management but also labor and civil representatives.  
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 Nonetheless, the Basic Law on the Development of Railway Industry and the 
Railroad Infrastructure Authority Act were legislated after the passage of the bills at 
the National Assembly on June 30th 2003. The Korean Railroad Corporation Act was 
also approved in the Assembly on December 18th 2003. With this, the privatization-
corporatization issue came to a conclusion. KNR was separated into the Korea Rail 
Network Authority (KRNA), which was established in January 2004 to take charge of 
railway infrastructure construction and the Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), 
which took over the railway operation businesses from January 2005.  
 
   4) Outcomes in Brief 
 
Since 1990, government policy for KNR’s restructuring fluctuated with the changes of 
political power: from corporatization→ to the withdrawal of corporatization → to 
privatization → to the withdrawal of privatization→ to corporatzation again. Each 
time a newly elected president took office, the railway policy also changed because 
the new Administration overturned the previous restructuring plan to set up a new one. 
 Besides, in contrast to the restructuring policy for KT, which changed from 
gradual privatization to full privatization, the restructuring plan for KNR was 
temporarily radicalized under Kim Dae Jung’s government with the push for 
privatization, but soon turned into a moderate reform policy. In the end, the 
corporatization of KNR was adopted as a final plan, the one that had been proposed 13 
years ago. Thus the finalized plan for KNR went back to the starting point, which 
demonstrates the delayed process of restructuring. Hence while the Kim Dae Jung 
government successfully implemented the privatization plan of KT, which became a 
private company in 2002, the government failed to carry out the original privatization 
plan of KNR until Kim Dae Jung’s term ended. In the end, KNR was transformed into 
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KORAIL, a public corporation with 100% government share in January 2005. With 
this, the vertical separation between infrastructure and operation was achieved and 
KNR was split into KORAIL, the service operation company and KRNA, the railroad 
construction authority. But the process was slower than the one conceived by Kim Dae 
Jung’s government. According to the original plan, the corporatization was expected to 
be done by 2003, and corporatization was not set as an ultimate destination of the 
restructuring process but as a preparatory stage for full privatization. Hence the 
government plan envisaged to incrementally sell government shares from 2005 in 
order to hand over the ownership to private companies. Yet in the outcomes, the 
corporatization occurred in January 2005, more than one year later than the scheduled 
time. Moreover, corporatization was adopted as a substitute for privatization not as a 
preliminary step to ownership transfer. Thus the article that specified ‘the issue and 
sales of government shares’ was eliminated in the Basic Law on the Development of 
Railway Industry of 2003, and the privatization policy was officially abandoned by the 
government. As a result of this, KORAIL has continued to be a public corporation 
with 100 % government share up to the present time. Altogether, these facts evidence 
the delayed process of KNR restructuring.      
 Moreover, the government made concessions in other restructuring issues. The 
final legislation made by Roh Moo Hyun’s government specified KORAIL’s 
responsibility for infrastructure maintenance work in opposition to Kim Dae Jung’s 
government plan, which proposed to pass it on to KRNA. And the article that laid the 
groundwork for ‘contracting out some lines to private competitors’ was also removed 
in the finalized law. In addition to these legislative modifications that sided with 
labor’s claim, employment security and preventive measures against the deterioration 
of working conditions were also guaranteed by the enacted law. Besides, the scale of 
employment reduction was also very modest compared to KT. Similar to other public 
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sector restructuring cases, the MPB under Kim Dae Jung’s government coupled the 
privatization policy with employment reduction for KNR. In 1999, the ministry 
announced its plan for KNR’s employment cut that set the goal of reducing 4,193 
employees by 2001 (MPB, 1999: 5). As of the result, the total workforce in KNR 
decreased from 31,954 in 1999 to 30,720 in 2001. The number of redundancies was 
1,234, approximately 4% of the total employees, but it was well below the targeted 
number. This contrasted with KT case where the actual redundancies outnumbered the 
original target. Hence, not only was the number of actual redundancies at KNR 2,959 
less than the targeted number, but it was also much smaller than KT in its volume. The 
number of voluntary redundancies at KT reached 11,895 during the period of 1999-
2001, which accounted for almost one quarter of the total workforce and six times 
more than the redundancies of KNR. The opposition of KRWU to employment cut and 
its tenacious demand for hiring new employees played a key role in curving sharp 
employment reduction during the restructuring period. Hence attention must be paid to 
the dynamics of union-government interaction to compare the divergent outcomes, and 
this study will shed more light on this dynamics in the following chapters.   
 
3. Comparative Remarks 
 
This chapter overviews the contents of privatization and restructuring program of 
Korean government for KT and KNR and their outcomes in brief. Before moving on 
to the comparative analysis of the two cases based on the differences of union 
responses and their impacts on the outcomes, it will be necessary to make short 
remarks on the industry differences in their starting points from which restructuring 
proceeded.   
  First of all, when Kim Dae Jung’s government announced its plan, KT had already 
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been converted to a government-backed corporation along with the sale of 28.8% of 
government shares by 1997 whereas KNR was still a government organization. Hence 
the issue of corporatization versus privatization was confined to KNR’s case, and for 
this reason, the ownership transfer to private competitors was not considered as an 
immediately viable option for KNR. By contrast, KT had already done partial sales of 
government shares gradually from 1993 to 1997, and was considered to be more 
prepared for being listed on the stock market.  
 Moreover, the degree of exposure to markets also differed for the two comparative 
cases. While the technological innovation gave birth to an increasingly competitive 
market in new telecommunication service sector, the railway industry was still heavily 
characterized by state monopoly and the economy of scale. Technological 
advancement was sluggish in railways as compared to the telecommunication sector 
that had already been saturated by newly emerging wireless, internet and cable 
services spurred by rapid technological development. Thus, unlike the 
telecommunication sector that already had a competitive basis to induce private 
investors, KNR had to create a competitive environment prior to full privatization. 
 Hence if we focus on whether Kim Dae Jung’s government privatization policy 
had met the goal, we can conclude that is had succeeded with KT while it had failed 
with KNR. But given that KT had an advantageous market condition for ownership 
transfer, it would be irrelevant to make a parallel comparison between the two cases 
focusing on whether full privatization has been achieved or not. For sure, KTTU 
would have little chance to obstruct privatization itself as the telecommunication 
sector had undergone structural changes that pushed it toward market liberalization. 
On the contrary, as gradual privatization was the only feasible option for KNR, full 
privatization would have not been adopted as a prompt measure regardless of 
KRWU’s strategic choices.   
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 Yet although greater competitive pressures in the telecommunication sector sped 
up the process of full privatization for the latter, there still existed considerable room 
for unions to make differences in the outcomes. Even though KTTU could not make 
the government withdraw the privatization plan, it could still exert a certain degree of 
influence on the pace and the patterns of privatization process by getting labor’s 
demands reflected in the final outcomes. Obtaining concessions for the maintenance of 
employment and working conditions as well as negotiating a labor-protective 
agreement would have prevented the unilateral restructuring process. Such was not the 
case for KT, where the government succeeded in implementing a fast-paced radical 
privatization program, and where KTTU had to subordinate to the unilateral 
enforcement of the plan. By contrast, KRWU succeeded in delaying the 
implementation of the original restructuring plan and in making the government 
modify its privatization policy. It was also capable of pressuring the government to 
include union demands in the final legislation and restructuring plan.  
 Besides, the differences in the conditions of the industry are insufficient to answer 
the question of why Kim Dae Jung’s government granted concessions in railways and 
not in the telecommunication sector. The expansive character of the 
telecommunication industry may have been favorable for the union and KTTU could 
have been effective in achieving concessions while the retrograding railway industry 
was saddled with a chronic deficit problem that may have constrained the union to 
concessionary bargaining. Such was not the case and the actual process went in the 
opposite direction. For sure, the economic crisis significantly impacted the process as 
the government hastened to implement the IMF-mandated restructuring program. This 
has in turn limited the strategic choices of labor even in the expanding industries. Yet 
the national economic context did not directly impinge on the outcomes. Although the 
economic condition improved when Kim Dae Jung’s government launched its railway 
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restructuring in 1999, the recessionary period had not finished yet, and government 
officials still heavily resorted to the rhetoric of economic crisis to force labor to make 
more concessions. Added to this, the deficit of the railway industry could increase 
labor restraint and damage its strategic effectiveness. But the union was rather 
successful in attaining its objectives albeit in this unfavorable economic and industry 
situation. For this reason, this study will turn its attention to the variation in the 
government-union strategic interactions to explain the differences in the outcomes.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL CONTINGENCY AND IN THE 
MICRO-ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF KTTU AND KRWU 
 
Government enterprises primarily operate through a political process whereby the 
policies of government officials, ministries and political parties play a key role in 
setting the objectives and the rules of operation for the enterprises. In this context, the 
political negotiation between government and organized labor becomes particularly 
important as it can provide political resources and increase bargaining leverage for 
public sector unions. On the contrary, if labor’s participation in political bargaining is 
foreclosed by government, the power resources for public sector unions will be 
reduced and the unions will have less opportunity to mobilize various means to 
pressure the government. For this reason, this study will highlight the changes in the 
political contingency and the way they increase or reduce political opportunities for 
labor unions. They will be dealt as one of the important variables to understand 
differences in the patterns of union responses. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that 
the political contingency was not the same at the time when the government pushed 
for the privatization of KT and KNR and provided different sets of political 
opportunities for KTTU and KRWU. This chapter will thus examine how the changing 
characteristics of the political contingency conditioned the two unions differently.  
 Yet union responses do not automatically derive from the changes in the political 
contingency but also result from the internal dynamics of the unions. For this reason, 
this chapter will also examine the timing of the union democratization movement in 
KTTU and KWRU and its impact on the leadership competition. The replacement 
threat associated with the leadership competition will be considered as one of the key 
variables that explain the variation in the pattern of union-government interaction 
because the increased replacement threat provided the incentives for greater militancy 
 77
for union leadership.  
 
1. The Changes in the Political Contingency in the Restructuring Process of KT 
 
As previously discussed, the privatization and restructuring program for KT stepped 
into a fast-paced and radicalized track under Kim Dae Jung’s government. The 
privatization of KT became an immediate goal for government, which announced the 
first and second privatization plans for public enterprises in July and August 1998 
(including KT).  
 In the first place, it is noteworthy that President Kim Dae Jung took office in 
December 1997 at the peak of the Korean financial crisis. In the following year, the 
IMF bailout program was introduced, and by signing on the memorandum, Kim Dae 
Jung’s Administration had to comply with IMF-mandated market liberalization policy 
in exchange for the provision of 65 billion US dollars. Hence increased external 
pressures compelled the Kim Dae Jung government to speed up the restructuring 
process in four major areas (labor and public sector reforms along with finance and 
corporate restructuring) as recommended by the IMF. As extended loans from foreign 
banks and increased investment from foreign investors were considered to be essential 
to revive the Korean economy, it was hard for Kim Dae Jung’s government to refuse 
to accept IMF policies. For this reason, “the IMF intervention in economic 
restructuring was closer to mandates than simple advices” (Lim S-H et al., 2004: 33). 
Moreover, the IMF had the formal authority to review the restructuring process once 
for two weeks in early 1998 and once a quarter later on until 2001. It was under the 
inspection of the IMF that the government also promised to immediately privatize five 
public corporations including their 21 subsidiaries and six other public enterprises by 
2002 (Lim S-H et al., ibid: 35). Hence, the 1998 announcement of the privatization 
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plan was made in a situation where the Korean government had to consult with the 
IMF on the scope and the pace of restructuring, and where the IMF regularly checked 
the process and requested to carry out prompt reformatory measures for market 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation. 
 Yet although the Korean government had to submit to IMF recommendations and 
to adhere to its market restructuring policies, it was also its own strategic choice that 
led to the radical privatization and restructuring of KT. Kim Dae Jung’s government’s 
top priority was to overcome the national economic crisis by the earliest possible time 
and it thus stressed that such a goal could only be achieved by pushing large-scale 
market reform forward. Hence, the economic hardship was promptly translated into 
political decisions to take radical measures for market restructuring. For this, Kim Dae 
Jung’s government set up the Planning and Budget Committee (PBC) under the 
President’s direct control in February 1998 immediately after the new President came 
to power, and the PBC took charge of commanding the whole process of public sector 
restructuring. The establishment of such a committee gave it power that differed from 
the responsibility taken by each individual ministry. Not only did it take charge of 
state budget planning but it also had the task of leading comprehensive public sector 
reform that went beyond the boundary of individual ministries and covered the whole 
public sector. In response to this government initiative, the PBC brought a large group 
of consultants, treasurers, lawyers and researchers from the private sector to create a 
new principle for public sector restructuring, the principle that promoted market-
oriented restructuring and that ultimately aimed at large-scale employment reduction 
and privatization for targeted public corporations. Its objective was to achieve a far 
more comprehensive public sector restructuring that differed from the past 
restructuring strategy that had remained partial and fragmented.  
 Such a process gave opportunities for economic bureaucrats to seize the political 
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initiatives and to take control over the restructuring process.29 Although the political 
orientation of President Kim Dae Jung differed from those of right-wing governments 
of the past and advocated centrist principles, he appointed economic bureaucrats who 
had been key policy makers in past governments to the posts of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MFE) and of the PBC.30 Paradoxically, right wing neo-
liberalist economic bureaucrats were brought to power by the so-called left to center 
President. Kim Dae Jung felt growing pressures for fast and effective crisis 
management, which made him adopt “the technocratic political style of restructuring” 
(Lim & Han, 2003: 203) rather than the more sluggish, consensus-building approach 
that involved consultation with various social groups. As the priority was put to 
overcome the economic crisis at the fastest pace, Kim Dae Jung’s government chose to 
overtly embrace IMF policy and appointed the economic bureaucrats who could 
promptly translate the IMF- mandated programs into their actual implementation. This 
resulted in the weakening of power of centrist reformists whom President Kim Dae 
Jung originally relied on to pursue government policies. The reformists who centered 
around presidential secretary Kim Tae Dong intended to formulate key economic 
                                            
29 From Park Chung Hee’s military government, economic bureaucrats exerted strong control on 
economic policy by commanding the state-led economic development and overseeing the whole 
national economic activities. They dominated the EPB, which was a super-ministry that not only took 
responsibility for drawing budget plans and setting national economic policies, but that also exerted 
overwhelming power over the policies and directions of the individual ministries as well as over the 
operations of industrial sectors in general. The EPB merged with the Ministry of Finance to form the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE) in 1994. In 1998, the MFE’s budget planning task was 
handed over to the Planning and Budget Committee (PBC), which became the Ministry of Planning and 
Budget in May 1999 after the merger with the National Budget Administration. In 2008, the MSF 
merged with the MPB to form the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. The MSF took responsibility for 
everything related to the national economy from budget planning to economic policymaking.  
30 For example, he appointed Lee Kyu Sung who was the minister of Ministry of Finance in the 
previous government as the minister of MFE. And as the president of PBC, he appointed Jin Nyum who 
had held a series of government posts in Park Chung Hee’s and Chun Doo Whan’s military 
governments as well as in Roh Tae Woo’s and Kim Young Sam’s governments. Jin Nyum started his 
career in EPB under Park Chung Hee’s military government to become the chief of the ministry’s Office 
of EPB during Park’s reign. He was successively appointed to the chief of the ministry’s Office of 
Finance in 1990, as minister of the Ministry of Energy and Industry in 1991 and ase minister of the 
Ministry of Labor in 1995. In 2000, he was appointed as minister of the MFE by President Kim Dae 
Jung (cf. “There are no Progressives without economic bureaucrats” Media Today October 21st 2007).  
 80
policy grounded on the principle of ‘democratic market economy’ emphasizing 
distributional justice and equity. Yet the neo-liberal structural adjustment program 
under the IMF trusteeship created an environment in which the reformist principle 
gave place to a fast-paced, sweeping restructuring strategy.31 By occupying top 
ministerial and governmental positions, economic bureaucrats seized hegemonic 
power in designing and implementing restructuring policies and thus made the centrist 
reformists retreat from central bureaucratic machinery. As a result, the reformists 
resigned from their positions and the Kim Dae Jung government became entirely 
dependent on the conservative economic bureaucrats for guiding key restructuring 
policies in its early period. In this context, neo-liberal market reform came to be 
accepted as a panacea to cope with economic crisis, and pressures for public sector 
restructuring intensified to reach the point where targeted public corporations were 
compelled to adopt a radical reform program that aimed at downsizing and privatizing 
the former public monopolies. 
 Moreover, the economic stringency gave little room for dissidents to make 
political objection to this neo-liberal drive. While the imperatives for market 
liberalization became the top political priorities for the nascent government, the 
political basis of the new government was weak as it was the first time for a centrist 
politician from an opposition party to be elected as president after decades of militarist 
or conservative reigns. Despite this weak institutional ground, the challenge of 
overcoming the severe economic crisis became an immediate task for Kim Dae Jung’s 
government. Hence the government sought to push the radical restructuring plan 
forward in order to get through the trials as rapid as possible. It was in this context that 
Kim Dae Jung’s government established the PBC and granted it the exclusive power to 
                                            
31 The analysis of changes in the political contingency related to the declining power of reformists 
draws upon newspaper articles, notably the article in Media Today: “There are no Progressives without 
economic bureaucrats” Media Today October 21, 2007. 
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lead the restructuring program. This was followed by the announcement of the first 
and second privatization plans, in which KT became one of the primary targets of 
privatization. All of this happened within six months of the inauguration of the new 
government, which demonstrates how strongly the government was committed to 
public sector restructuring.  
 In its pursuit of privatization plans, the government bypassed KTTU and other 
related public sector unions by refusing to negotiate with KTTU on the matter of 
privatization and restructuring of KT. At the national level, the Kim Dae Jung 
government established a Tripartite Commission, which appeared to accommodate a 
corporatist arrangement to reach social agreement. In fact, the government had a 
contradictory tendency between its centralist policy orientation towards labor 
integration and its immediate political objectives that aimed at rapidly recovering from 
the economic crisis based on IMF-mandated neo-liberal restructuring strategy. Hence, 
while it pushed radical restructuring forward, it simultaneously set up a Tripartite 
Commission in January 1998 to negotiate a peak-level social pact among 
representatives of government, business and organized labor.32 The Commission 
particularly focused on dealing with the economic crisis and sought to gain labor’s 
approval for the government’s restructuring plans. Although the three parties reached a 
social agreement a month after the establishment of the Commission, the relationship 
among the parties was very fragile and labor was far from being incorporated into the 
social partnership.33 Indeed, there was persistent tension and conflict among the 
                                            
32 The Commission was composed of 11 members with the ministers of finance and labor, 
representatives of four political parties, two representatives from the employer associations 
(representatives of Korea Employers Federation (KEF), Federation of Korean Industries(FKI)) and two 
representatives from the national confederations of labor unions (representatives of FKTU and KTTU).  
33 The three parties reached an agreement called the “social agreement to overcome the economic 
crisis” in February 1998. Yet the agreement was controversial in the sense that it brought about severe 
criticism from rank and file delegates within KCTU accusing their leaders of giving consent to the 
legalization of redundancy layoffs and to the establishment of temporary employment agencies for the 
flexible utilization of labor. In return, labor unions were granted legalization of teachers’ unions, the 
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parties that ultimately resulted in the boycott and withdrawal of KCTU from the 
Commission in 1999 (Tripartite Commission, 1999). The same was true for the 
‘Special Committee on Public Sector Restructuring (SCPSR)’, a machinery of 
consultation and negotiation within the Tripartite Commission that took charge of fine-
tuning different views regarding public sector restructuring34. Yet at odds with this 
consultative principle, the government and the PBC announced the privatization plans 
without the agreement of the tripartite committee and without the appropriate process 
of consultation and negotiation within the SCPSR. The negotiation itself proceeded 
with difficulties in reconciling conflicting opinions, and the government made it clear 
from the beginning that the negotiation would be limited to reaching consensus on the 
general direction of public sector restructuring and that the subjects regarding the 
method and the content of restructuring are non-negotiable. Above all, the most 
serious problem that hurt the core principle of social agreement was the arbitrary 
decision made by the PBC that circumvented the very process of negotiation and that 
made labor representatives repeatedly recede from the SCPSR (Tripartite Commission, 
1998, 1999). For example, the government announcements of the first and second 
privatization plans were made without the agreement of the SCPSR members. Actually, 
the first announcement was done a day after the SCPSR proposed the core principles 
for public sector restructuring, which emphasized the need for preservation of public 
interests, for transparency of the decision-making process that ensured participation of 
employees, for efforts to avoid layoffs and to guarantee job security.35 Yet the PBC 
                                                                                                                             
removal of the ban on unions’ political activity and unionization of public servants. The agreement was 
disapproved by the KCTU delegates who called for a general strike to oppose to it.    
34 The committee was made up of two labor representatives from the two national confederations, 
KCTU and FKTU, two business representatives from the national employer associations FKI and KEF, 
three government representatives from related ministries (PBC, Ministry of Finance and Economy, 
Ministry of Labor), representatives from three political parties and three other labor relation experts 
who represented public interests.   
35 It also claimed the promotion of corporate accountability as well as the need for distributing a 
certain portion of disposed shares to the public or allocating employee owned stocks first when public 
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went on publicizing government privatization plans without consulting the committee 
members. This PBC-led restructuring plan immediately evoked contestation from the 
members of the SCPSR, and labor representatives decided to boycott the committee to 
protest against this unilateral process (Tripartite Commission, 1998).36 Yet the same 
non-negotiated process was being repeated on August 4th 1998, when the government 
announced its second privatization plan. Two days before the announcement, the 
SCPSR members demanded to reflect the key principles that they proposed a month 
ago. It also recommended that the government participate in faithful bargaining with 
labor unions of targeted public corporations. In doing this, it emphasized that the 
timing and the scale of employment cuts as well as the changes in terms and condition 
of employment should be negotiated with labor and be based on labor-management 
agreement. At this time, labor representatives also got back to the committee and 
asked the government to stop unilateral restructuring and to proceed with deliberate 
consultation with labor. But the PBC pressed on and announced the second 
privatization plan without reflecting these demands, circumventing negotiation among 
the parties (Tripartite Commission, ibid). In fact, the government and the PBC 
impaired the consultative mechanism of the tripartite committee and neglected 
negotiating a social agreement. The role of labor was restricted to ex post facto 
consent to the PBC’s unidirectional push for neo-liberal restructuring.  
 Hence the political opportunities for labor unions shrank when the government 
launched the privatization and restructuring of KT and other targeted public 
corporations. The imperatives for economic recovery made Kim Dae Jung’s 
                                                                                                                             
corporations will be sold. 
36 The two representatives from the national union confederations decided to boycott the Tripartite 
Commission on July 10th 1998 in opposition of the July 3rd announcement of the 1st privatization plan. 
They did not attend the meetings from the 6th to 8th of the Special Committee for Public Sector 
Restructuring demanding an official apology from the government for pushing a one-sided restructuring 
program without appropriate negotiation (Tripartite Commission, 1998).       
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government take radical measures for market reform, including privatization and 
restructuring of the public sector. This situation contracted political space for labor 
unions and labor-friendly politicians while providing overwhelming power to the neo-
liberal economic bureaucrats who were in key ministerial positions in the MFE and the 
PBC. The communicative channels were also closed for KTTU and other related 
public sector unions as the government refused to engage in political exchanges with 
them and to allow them to participate in decision-making. In fact, the government 
handed the task of political negotiation over to the Tripartite Commission, but the 
principle of the social pact got lost in the government’s recurring breach of its 
promises to reach agreements via tripartite consultation. The PBC bypassed such 
consultation and went on announcing and implementing government plans without 
going through the tripartite negotiation. This caused KCTU’s withdrawal from the 
Tripartite Commission and ended up with non-negotiated, unilateral policy 
implementation.  
 
2. The Changes in the Political Contingency in the Restructuring Process of KNR 
 
KNR encountered different political opportunity structures as the timing for its 
privatization was set for a later date than KT. In its early days, the Kim Dae Jung 
government had an uncompromising attitude towards public sector reform and was 
determined to accomplish privatization of targeted corporations (including KT) as a 
showcase to prove government commitment to IMF-mandated neo-liberal 
restructuring strategies. At the time, the privatization of KNR was not considered as an 
immediate option because the state monopoly still heavily dominated the railway 
industry. In contrast to KT, which was set as a target for privatization instantly after 
President Kim Dae Jung took power, KNR was not included in the list of targeted 
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public enterprises for privatization as announced in the first and second privatization 
plans37. The government targeted public corporations that had already been more 
market-prone than others for objects of immediate privatization. For the less 
marketized enterprises for which it was not plausible to adopt an early privatization 
program, the government envisaged to introduce an intensive restructuring program to 
be implemented on an annual basis in order to transform the enterprises from state 
monopolies into market-oriented business organization (the PBC, June 27, 1998). 
Such was the case for KNR for which the creation of a competitive environment was 
needed prior to the implementation of immediate privatization. Hence while the 
privatization of KT was announced in July 1998, it was almost a year later that the 
privatization of KNR was decided by the Kim Dae Jung Administration. Yet although 
the decision was made in a May 1999 cabinet meeting, the privatization plan was not 
given concrete shape and made slow progress until the government finalized the plan 
in early 2000. 
 This gap meant more than just a difference in time schedule as it involved changes 
in the political contingency. Firstly, the political constraints imposed by economic 
stringency came to be loosened. After two years of crisis, President Kim Dae Jung 
declared that the economy has recovered from economic crisis on the ground that the 
macroeconomic data proved that Korea’s economic growth ranked top among the 29 
members of OECD in 1999.38 Thus the economic urgency that had been associated 
with tight political decisions changed. In the early days, Kim Dae Jung’s government 
                                            
37 KT was listed on the targeted public corporations for gradual privatization on July 3rd 1998, but it 
then was included in the targeted corporations for full privatization in the announcement of 2nd 
privatization plan on August 4th 1998. Hence, within only a month, the privatization plan for KT 
became even more radicalized.  
38 President Kim Dae Jung invited 130 participants of the “International Forum: For 2 Years of IMF” to 
the Blue House on December 2nd 1999 and declared that the Korean government had already overcome 
the financial crisis. Cf. “Retrospection on Korean Economy: The Restoration of Korean Economy”, 
Yeonhap News December 11, 1999.   
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was determined to push the proposed reform at an unprecedented pace and had an 
uncompromising attitude for this purpose. Thus it was difficult for labor to find 
political space to raise objection to the government’s unidirectional push for market 
restructuring notwithstanding the presence of Tripartite Commission, because the 
latter was rendered ineffective by the unilateral decision made by the PBC. Yet such 
political tightness decreased as the government began to be relieved of economic 
exigency. Thus when the Cabinet decided to privatize KNR, Kim Dae Jung’s 
government was less pressured by the immediate need for crisis management and had 
more political leeway than in its early stage.  
 This change in the political climate increased possibilities for labor-sided policy 
contenders to voice their opposition to the PBC-led restructuring process. For sure, the 
PBC’s unilateral push for the first and second privatization plans and for the other 
proposed public sector restructuring did not stop, which heightened labor’s 
contestations within the Tripartite Commission. Indeed, the recurring conflicts 
between labor unions and government resulted in the breakdown of the social 
agreement when KCTU officially decided to withdraw from the Tripartite 
Commission at its meeting of union representatives on February 24th 1999 (Tripartite 
Commission, 1999). Yet despite the continuation of government’s avoidance of labor 
integration at the peak-level negotiation, political opportunities increased for KRWU 
to engage in political exchanges with the government. In early 2000 when the 
government finalized its railway privatization plan, the government resorted to the 
negotiation in the tripartite committee (SCPSR) for fine-tuning oppositional 
approaches to railway restructuring. Within this consultative framework, there was 
more room for compromise. In contrast to KT’s case in which the PBC took the sole 
lead by bypassing the SCPSR, the government representatives engaged more faithfully 
in the negotiation with labor for railway restructuring. Hence, the SCPSR had 
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substantial discussions about the restructuring issues, notably regarding the 
employment cuts and the introduction of a single-driver system, and tried to come to 
an agreement with union representatives. From November 1999 to December 2000, 
the SCPSR held six meetings on railway restructuring and eventually reached an 
agreement (Tripartite Commission, 2002).39 The agreement can be summarized as 
such: 
 
1. Employment cuts 
1) Regarding the proposed cuts for 1999 
-The contracting out of shunting drivers and women train crews needs further 
examination. 
-The reduction will be made in the managerial and supportive positions. 
2) Regarding the planned cuts for 2000 
- The single driver system for passenger trains will be gradually implemented after 
supplementing the safety facilities. 
- The single driver system for freight trains will be delayed. 
2. Railway Privatization 
- The claim of KNR: given that privatization requires minimum time for 
administrative arrangements, KNR will consult related ministries in order to get 
sufficiently prepared for privatization. 
- The claim of KRWU: the increase in the competitive power of railway- through the             
expansion of infrastructure facilities and the operation of high-speed railways- is a 
prerequisite for the railway privatization (Tripartite Commission, 2002: 1678-1679). 
 
 The contents of the agreement could not satisfy the KRWU members since it could 
not prevent the employment cut planned for 2000. Nor could it make KNR withdraw 
the introduction of a single driver system. But it nonetheless proved that KRWU was 
                                            
39 Yet the agreement was disapproved by union members. Prior to the agreement, the rank and file 
members voted on the strike against railway privatization, and 81% of membership supported the strike 
action. When the strike was cancelled after the agreement was made, the opposition group within the 
union organized a ballot on the agreement in which 9,036 members participated, and 85% of them 
rejected the agreement (Kang, 2002: 246).   
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able to persuade KNR to rein back the precipitated drive for railway privatization by 
reaching consensus on the need for sufficient time for preparation. And in turn, this 
provided more room for KRWU to increase political pressures on the government and 
KNR.    
 The tension between the MPB (which was created out of the merger between the 
PBC and the National Budget Administration), the MOCT and KNR also contributed 
to increase the political opportunities for KRWU as it put a brake on the PBC’s 
unilateral decision-making process. Unlike the pursuit of the KT restructuring program, 
which was overwhelmingly dominated by the PBC’s guidelines, the method of railway 
restructuring constituted a more contested political sphere that undermined the 
hegemonic authority of the PBC. As discussed in the previous chapter, contrary to the 
KT case where objection could hardly be made against the PBC-led restructuring 
policy implementation, there were conflicting views among the political authorities on 
the timing and method of railway restructuring that had been subject to negotiation 
before the government finalized its plan (MOCT, 2000). While MPB pushed for a fast-
paced privatization plan, KNR proposed to delay the process in order to be sufficiently 
prepared for privatization (KNR, 2000b; MOCT, 2000). It contrasted with the KT case 
where management subordinated itself to the lead taken by the PBC. KT management 
not only adhered to the policy of the PBC and actively cooperated in its 
implementation, but it also went beyond the proposed plan by carrying out drastic 
workforce reduction that actually exceeded the number of reductions proposed by the 
government. Similarly, other restructuring strategies were put into practice with the 
active support of KT management. This was not the case of KNR, in which 
management did not fully embrace the MPB-initiated restructuring strategies, and 
rather objected to the hastened policy implementation of the latter. In the end, the 
MOCT tried to mediate between the two conflicting views and sided with KNR in 
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acknowledging the need to go through a preliminary stage that will create competition 
and lay groundwork for privatization (MOCT, ibid). In consequence, while the 
economic bureaucrats within the PBC and later in the MPB exerted irresistible power 
over the process of KT’s privatization and restructuring, the coherence of its political 
control had weakened during KNR’s restructuring process. The fragmentation of 
political authority among the ministries and KNR required the negotiation of 
contending views, and hence opened possibilities for KRWU to forge a tacit alliance 
with KNR management within the public agency (Personal interview). The latter 
contributed to the obstruction of the MPB-led restructuring process. 
 Yet the most distinctive change in the political contingency occurred when the 
political environment altered again with the 2002 presidential election and when 
President Roh Moo Hyun took office after winning the election. First, the electoral 
campaign widened the political space in which KRWU could take advantage to 
publicize union claims and to try to get support from various political and social 
constituencies including the presidential candidates and political parties. Such a 
process was made possible because in the electoral context, chances are greater that 
the political parties and their candidates become more responsive to the demands of 
various social groups (including labor unions) as the competing candidates strive to 
win the election by expanding their electoral base. Indeed KRWU sent a questionnaire 
to all the presidential candidates asking them to disclose their key railway 
restructuring policies, and in return, three candidates responded to the inquiry. The 
candidate of the Democratic Party, Roh Moo Hyun claimed that privatization of 
network utilities including the railway should be entirely reconsidered. He also said 
that ‘KNR should recognize KRWU as a bargaining partner and engage in faithful 
negotiation with the union’ (KRWU, 2003b: 8-9). The candidate of the Korean 
Democratic Labor Party (KDLP), Kwon Young-ghil supported all the major demands 
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of KRWU and promised that the party would fight with the union to achieve union 
objectives40. He also opposed the privatization of KNR and argued for the need to 
preserve and expand public services (ibid, 10-14). Even Lee Hoi-Chang, the candidate 
of the conservative right-wing party (the Grand National Party) stated that the party 
opposed the privatization of KNR and promised to pursue the railway restructuring 
policy in a cautious way, giving priority to building social consensus based on the 
consideration of public interest. He also made it clear that the party would not review 
the privatization bill during the regular session of the National Assembly (ibid: 15-17). 
In sum, let alone the pro-labor KDLP, which had always supported KRWU’s demands 
even before the presidential campaign, the two major parties came out on the side of 
KRWU by criticizing Kim Dae Jung’s government’s railway restructuring policy and 
both parties called for the revision of railway privatization. Apart from the candidate 
of the KDLP, the candidates of the two major parties avoided directly responding to 
the eight major demands of KRWU and only vaguely stated their principles for 
railway restructuring. Nonetheless, they agreed to revoke the proposed government 
plan and to readdress the railway restructuring issues from the starting point. Above all, 
they both claimed that they would revise the privatization plan and that they would go 
through public hearings and other social consultation process to decide a reliable 
railway restructuring program. Thus the presidential election made it possible for 
KRWU to use the electoral campaign to advance its claims and to gain political 
support from the candidates of major parties. As far as the candidates tried to gain the 
railway workers’ votes, the electoral space also multiplied channels for KRWU to 
                                            
40 The demands were: to withdraw the damage suit and provisional seizure of salary and union funds; 
to stop disciplinary punishment of union members for their strike and union activities; to file a petition 
for union members who had been indicted or punished for their union activities; to introduce a special 
employment plan for 25 laid off employees; to implement an allowance pay program; to call off the 
plan for the single-driver system; to recruit new employees for the shortage of staff quotas; to call off 
contracting out and to stop expanding non standard workers.       
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escalate political pressures. Moreover, as all the candidates acknowledged themselves 
the need to incorporate the union into the decision making process, KRWU had greater 
possibilities to ensure its participation in the latter and to disrupt the unilateral 
restructuring process. Together, the presidential election created a more favorable 
political environment that KRWU could use to mobilize political support against the 
proposed privatization plan. In the end, such a process helped delay the 
implementation of KNR’s privatization plan as well as block the passage of the related 
privatization bill in the National Assembly.     
 The political opportunities continued to expand when Roh Moo Hyun was elected 
President in December 2002. As he promised to withhold the steps towards 
privatization and to revise the planned schedule on the basis of social agreement, 
KRWU was in an advantageous position to put pressure on the new government to 
keep the public pledge41. Actually, right after his election, Roh Moo Hyun suggested 
on January 17th 2003 in a speech made to foreign businessmen in Korea that he will 
modify the privatization plan for network utilities. In several other occasions later, in 
press conferences and during broadcast TV debates, he recapitulated his intention to 
revoke the railway privatization plan.42 It was no doubt that such a policy switch 
threw more weight behind KRWU’s campaign to halt the hastened move to railway 
privatization. In line with the President’s turn to a more cautious approach to 
privatization of railway and other network utilities, the presidential undertaking 
committee also announced that the new Administration will discard the railway 
                                            
41 In his policy booklet, Roh Moo Hyun stated that “he will completely postpone the schedule for 
privatization of the key national industries such as electricity, gas, railway and water resources” and that 
“he will revise the reform policies based on social agreement.” Cf. Roh Moo Hyun’s Campaign (2002), 
Policy Booklet for 2002 Presidential Election.    
42 The statements aroused criticism from not only the domestic press but also from the Financial Times, 
which expressed concerns about the delay or postponement of privatization of gas and railway. Other 
domestic newspapers also denounced the president’s decision to halt the privatization policy and urged 
him to implement the original privatization policy without modifying it (cf. The Korea Economic Daily 
January 12, 2006; Pressian January 20, 2003).  
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privatization plan of the previous government and that it would reflect the opinions of 
not only related ministries but also experts and civic groups to draw up an effective 
railway restructuring plan43. This process of policy revision created an environment 
whereby KRWU saw the increased possibilities to push its demands more aggressively 
and to expand the scope of its demands.   
 Such increase in political opportunities also allowed the union to make headway 
on political bargaining with the government. Kim Dae Jung’s government had also 
recognized KRWU as the official bargaining partner and had negotiated with the union 
on the matter of railway privatization and restructuring. Officially, the government 
argued that its privatization policy could not be the object of union-government 
bargaining. But at the actual level, the government accepted the request of the union to 
bargain on the privatization and restructuring issues and reached an agreement with 
the union on February 27th 2002, which stated that ‘both union and management will 
make cooperative efforts for public development of railway industry’ (KRWU, 2003a: 
188). Such an agreement demonstrates the presence of political bargaining between 
the government and KRWU at the time.44 Moreover, the political bargaining took 
another step forward and made progress in negotiating union-government agreement 
under Roh Moo Hyun’s government. As the new president promised to revise the 
railway privatization policy and to incorporate labor’s opinion into decision making 
during the electoral campaign, KRWU was in an advantageous position to pressure the 
new government to fully engage in political bargaining with the union once Roh Moo 
                                            
43 The president of the undertaking committee, Lim Chae-Jung said on January 15th 2003 that 
“privatization of railway and electricity should be approached very cautiously and should be decided 
after gathering broad public opinion”, because “the privatization of network utilities could hurt public 
interests and could raise several problems such as private monopoly and rising service fees (Korean 
Economic Daily January 15, 2003; Hankook Ilbo January 15, 2003).” 
44 By contrast, Kim Dae Jung’s government refused to bargain with KTTU and only allowed the peak-
level negotiation through the Tripartite Commission. And as the consultative machinery was bypassed 
by the PBC’s unilateral implementation of privatization policy, the union-government negotiation was 
actually foreclosed at KT. 
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Hyun was elected. The new government continued to negotiate with KRWU on 
railway privatization and restructuring. As a result of this, the union-government 
negotiations ended up with the agreement of the two parties on the withdrawal of the 
privatization policy. The agreement would not have been possible if union-government 
political bargaining had not made progress in the early period of Roh Moo Hyun’s 
presidency.  
 In sum, the changes in political contingency provided different political 
opportunities for KTTU and KRWU. While they had been both institutionally 
excluded from central political decision making in the past, the political opportunities 
increased when KRWU began to campaign against the government proposal of 
railway privatization whereas they diminished when KTTU was faced with the 
announcement of the KT privatization plan. At the time of KT’s restructuring, the 
hegemonic power of neo-liberal economic bureaucrats was overwhelming to the point 
that they unilaterally decided the pace and method of KT’s privatization and 
restructuring by bypassing social consultation and by excluding the labor union from 
the decision making process. But at the time when the government began to push for 
railway privatization, the coherence of political control of the economic bureaucrats 
weakened as there existed contending views among the public authority and ministries. 
It thus increased possibilities for political negotiation, which opened a space for 
KRWU to escalate political pressures on the government. Moreover, the electoral 
context and the successive governmental change increased various political channels 
through which the union could voice its opinion and find allies within the political 
sphere. Hence, there were differences in government attitudes towards organized labor. 
Kim Dae Jung’s government had an uncompromising attitude towards public sector 
reform and was determined to make the restructuring of KT a showcase to prove the 
government’s commitment to IMF-mandated restructuring. Thus the government 
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refused to engage in political bargaining with KTTU on the matter of privatization and 
restructuring. By contrast, Roh Moo Hyun’s government involved KRWU in the 
political negotiation over the railway restructuring by accepting to bargain with the 
union. This increased access points for the union to put pressure on the government 
albeit the latter had not been firmly institutionalized and had rather been unstable and 
transitory.  
 Thus it is undeniable that the differences in political opportunities conditioned the 
two unions differently by putting KTTU in a more defensive position than KRWU. Yet 
the differences in political opportunities do not impinge on the outcomes in a 
deterministic way. They only increase or decrease the probability of successful 
collective action of labor unions. If KRWU failed to seize the opportunities by 
neglecting to mobilize political resources, it would not have been successful in 
negotiating the agreements with government as it did. Similarly, there was still a room 
for KTTU to exert pressures on the government despite the economic stringency and 
the resulting political contraction.  
 Moreover, the political opportunities alone do not explain the difference in the 
patterns of union responses to the proposed privatization and restructuring plans. The 
strategic choices of labor unions were not only made by their perceived differences of 
macro political resources but also by their assessment of internal organizational 
resources. For this reason, this study will focus on the differences in the micro-
political changes brought on by union democratization of the two unions to explain the 
divergent patterns of union responses. Especially, the differences in the timing of 
union democratization will be highlighted as they each involved distinctive 
organizational dynamics.    
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3. The Changes in the Internal Political Dynamics of KTTU 
 
KTTU underwent a fundamental leadership replacement on May 30th 1994 when the 
militant dissidents took power. The new leadership was supported by a coalition group 
called ‘Minjupa’ (which means democratic faction)’ that had united against the old 
leadership. The result put an end to the decade long labor-management relationship at 
KT that was characterized by union subordination to employer and government. In 
fact, labor relations at KT had been based on cooperative relationship since the 
formation of KTTU in January 1982. The decade of peaceful labor relation was made 
possible by the sustained collaboration of union leadership to the 
government/employer initiatives, but it also facilitated the emergence of union 
democratization movement led by militant activists who were frustrated by the 
absence of labor protection under the passive quiescence of union leadership to 
management prerogatives. The opposition group considered the labor-
government/management collusion as one of the major causes that worsened wages 
and work conditions and strove for the formation of an independent union that would 
break out of traditional labor relations at KT (Personal interview). Besides, public 
sector labor regulation aggravated workers’ discontents as it controlled every aspect of 
employment condition by imposing wage guideline and staffing quota while strictly 
banning collective action of public sector employees. The tight state regulation 
coupled with the deprivation of collective rights stirred KT workers to secede from 
union leadership as they considered their leaders to be ineffective in defending their 
interests. Such decrease in member commitment was expressed in the electoral results 
of May 1994. The oppositional militant candidate gained more than double the votes 
of the candidate of the past leadership. Yoo Duck Sang, who was the candidate of the 
coalition for union democratization won the election with 66% of the total votes while 
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the rival candidate got only 27% of the votes (KTTU, 1995a: 63).  
 The leadership change radically transformed labor relations at KT as well as the 
nature of union-government relationship. The new leadership broke out of its 
cooperative past and substantially altered union activities by turning to militant tactics. 
Right after the launch of the new leadership, KTTU began to organize contract 
struggles by setting confrontational goals that primarily focused on removing the 
government-imposed wage guideline, the wage-freeze policy that had long been 
sustained in public sector. It also aimed at establishing an autonomous labor-
management collective bargaining system that ruled out government intervention 
characteristic to GIEs and at opposing the early privatization policy as proposed by the 
government-sponsored committee. Along with the changes in the objectives, KTTU 
also adopted a new repertoire of tactics that included large demonstrations and sit-in 
protests. For the first time in KTTU history, the union held a mass demonstration on 
April 2nd 1995 at Boramae Park in Seoul where over 30,000 KTTU members and their 
family members (41,508 according the union report and 30,000 according to media 
report) gathered to advance their claims. They also marched in the streets and declared 
that they would immediately go on strike if the police tried to arrest the union leaders. 
By relying on such disruptive tactics, KTTU leaders tried to obtain 80,000 won 
increases in base pay (KTTU, 1995b; KTTU, 1995c). In fact, the disputes around the 
wage contract at KT drew the national spotlight as it challenged Kim Young Sam’s 
government’s wage freeze policy, which had been one of the top issues for labor-
government conflicts. Besides, KTTU’s union democratization was considered as a 
significant political threat to the government as it was a large public union with 
approximately 50,000 members and as the outcomes of its contract bargaining had 
symbolic influence for the entire public sector. The April 2nd demonstration further 
alerted the government and heightened tension between the government and KTTU.  
 97
 For fear of KTTU’s spillover effect into other public sector unions, the government 
took an extremely hard-line approach towards the union. The bargaining was already 
deadlocked in a stalemate after four rounds of negotiations as KT employers held 
tenaciously to the government wage guideline of 5.7% and refused to yield to any of 
union demands. To add to this, President Kim Young Sam intervened himself and 
denounced the union for being “a state subversive force” when KTTU did nothing 
more than organize rallies in order to pressure KT employers to negotiate in good faith 
with KTTU and in order to protest against its disciplinary action (Han, 1996: 115). 
The President’s speech was made even before KTTU resolved to strike and signaled 
hostile measures taken against KTTU leaders.45 After the President’s speech that 
heralded tough countermeasures against KTTU, the government intensified union 
suppression which included issuing arrest warrants for union staffs, closing down 
union offices and their website, sending police troops into Myeongdong Cathedral (a 
Catholic church in central Seoul) and Jogyesa (a Buddhist temple in Central Seoul) to 
break up the sit-in protests that had been staged by union leaders.46 Such massive 
disciplinary action and repressive measures exacerbated antagonism between KTTU 
and government and it was detrimental for the nascent Yoo Duck Sang leadership. The 
oppression happened right after the launch of new leadership that only had a very 
weak institutional basis. There had not been sufficient time to build a stabilized union 
                                            
45 On May 19th 1995, President Kim Young Sam had a luncheon meeting with board members of the 
International Press Institute (IPI) and said that KTTU had the intention of overthrowing the state. In line 
with the President’s speech, the public prosecutor general also stated that the disputes at KT should be 
dealt with as a national security problem rather than a mere labor dispute at an individual enterprise. 
These hard-line approaches were soon followed by actual oppressive measures. Cf. Dong-A Ilbo May 
20, 1995, Daily Maeil Business Newpaper May 20, 1995, Kyunghyang Ilbo May 20, 1995. 
46 In the first place, KT employers provoked KTTU by dismissing and taking disciplinary action 
against 63 union staffs on May 16th in the middle of wage bargaining. After this breakdown of labor-
management negotiation, union officers staged sit-in protests in Myeongdong Cathedral and Jogyesa, 
but Kim Young Sam’s government cracked down on the protests by sending in police troops. As a result 
of this, 38 union officers were either wanted by the police or arrested, which demonstrated how massive 
the government suppression was (KTTU, 1995b, 1995c).   
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internal organization for the new leadership yet, and it was still deprived of 
institutional resources to confront the government hard-line policy, which precisely 
aimed at demolishing the organizational groundwork for the burgeoning militant 
leadership. Kim Young Sam government’s violent suppression of KTTU taken in this 
context actually hurt the leadership as 13 union officers were arrested after the break-
up of sit-in protests in Myeongdong Cathedral and Jogyesa. Besides, Yoo Duck Sang, 
the president of KTTU, also turned himself in to the police on July 30th 1995 and was 
imprisoned until October 9th 1995 (KTTU, 1995b; KTTU, 1995c), which further 
limited the leadership ability for the newborn militant union. In sum, a series of drastic 
punishments substantially damaged the leadership which already had difficulties in 
strengthening union internal organization due to a lack of institutional basis.    
 Moreover, the membership resources also shrunk to further erode the leadership. 
At first, union members’ discontents towards the old entrenched leadership resulted in 
leadership replacement that fueled militancy. The growing concern for job insecurity 
also increased the mobilizing power of union membership as they were ready to 
counteract government policy for employment reduction that could be derived from 
privatization and the restructuring of KT. The high rate of turnout (95% turnout vote 
that accounted for 46,939 voters out of 49,155 members) for the 1994 union election 
and the support for the new leadership (66% votes for the candidate of the union 
democratization coalition versus 27% for the candidate coming from the old 
leadership) proved the high mobilization capacity of union constituencies for 
collective action (cf. KTTU 1995a for voter turnout and results). Such mobilizing 
potency reached its peak when approximately 30,000 union members staged a rally at 
Boramae Park. Yet the sparks for the first contract struggle under the new leadership 
soon dampened without any organizational gains. Originally, KTTU announced that it 
would go on strike if KT employers refused to grant concessions, but on July 28th, it 
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cancelled the plan and yielded to the arbitration made by the National Labor Relations 
Commission (NLRC) that was disadvantageous for labor. While the decision ruled out 
labor-management negotiation on privatization and on the reform of human resource 
management, it attempted to debilitate the union by enforcing a 55% reduction of full-
time union staffs and the abandonment of the union shop clause. The wage bargaining, 
which had been the biggest issue in the negotiations at the time, also ended with 
labor’s defeat as the increase was made within the limit set by the government’s wage 
guideline (Kim Y-D, 2002). KTTU leaders organized disruptive tactics such as sit-in 
protests and mass rallies but they were not successful as union leaders’ discretion was 
restricted by the arrest warrants and as they subordinated to the NLRC arbitration that 
was detrimental to labor. Strong internal mobilization and coalition-building were the 
only means for KTTU to obtain some of their objectives in the face of increasing 
government hostility, but the union leadership was not able to overcome the 
institutional weakness and confined itself to isolated protests. Such strategic 
limitations ended up with the union leaders’ surrender to the police, which created a 
leadership vacuum for the union and undermined the mobilizing power of the 
membership. Union members continued to be demobilized throughout the 1995-1996 
and started to doubt the effectiveness of confrontational strategies formulated by the 
Yoo Duck Sang Administration.  
 As a result of this detachment of union constituencies from the incumbent 
leadership, KTTU leadership came to be replaced again by a more moderate 
leadership. The newly elected Kim Ho Sun and his staffs were also part of Minjupa, 
the union democratization coalition, but they deviated from Yoo Duck Sang’s 
leadership and opposed the latter by criticizing its intransigent policy. For them, the 
previous leadership failed to build their militancy on members’ support and “only 
organized struggles for struggles that left nothing behind except a sense of defeat” 
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(KTTU, 1999: 71). Hence in the December 1996 union election, leadership 
competition mainly occurred among factions within Minjupa, and not between rivals 
of different confederations. As the old leadership ceased to be a strong candidate, the 
incentives to increase militancy for fear of leadership replacement diminished, but 
they did not completely disappear because the competition remained intense between 
the political factions. As the electoral result indicates, the new president Kim Ho Sun 
won the runoff election by just a handful of votes (with a 2%-margin between the 
second candidate). In the first round of elections, he even fell behind the candidate 
backed by the former Yoo Duck Sang Administration who won 48% of the votes (Kim 
Y-D, 2002: 72). 
 As a consequence of this election, Kim Ho Sun came to office on January 1st 1997. 
The new leadership was established in the midst of the economic crisis that also 
severely struck KT employees as massive employment cuts were heralded along with 
the privatization plan for KT. In this context, KTTU members were very anxious about 
their employment security and strongly wished for their leaders to exert effective 
countervailing power against the government/management initiated restructuring plans 
(KTTU, 1997).47 Yet by winning the election by a slim margin, the new a
had only a weak standing for exerting its leadership. To expand membership sup
it had to be responsive to members’ interests that forced it to sustain militancy but a
to depart from the strategies of the former leadership that were ineffective in achievi
union objectives. This constrained the new leadership to oscillate between militancy 
and restraint without being capable of developing effective strategies, and ultimately 
dministration 
port, 
lso 
ng 
                                            
47 According to a union membership survey, 71.1%of respondents expected that the shift of KT from a 
GIE into GBE would aggravate employment security. Besides 41.8% of the respondents replied that 
they would mostly participate in union-initiated collective action while 31.8% of them said that they 
wouldl always participate in such collective action, and 25.2% said that they would decide depending 
on the situation. Only 1.2% of the respondents said that they would not participate in such action 
(KTTU, 1997). 
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contributed to further erosion of members’ mobilizing power. While the massive 
employment cuts were introduced in 1998 and 1999 resulting in 12,538 redundancie
(including 9,063 voluntary redundancies that were compulsory in nature), Kim Ho 
Sun’s Administration responded by threatening to strike and called them off soon afte
without any tangible gains. KTTU held the strike vote from June 15th to June 17th 
1998 in which 70% of union members participated and 76% voted in favor of the 
walkout. Accordingly, the union staged a two-day warning strike on July 15th and 16th 
and planned to go on strike again unless KT employers granted concessions, 
leadership suddenly called off the strike on July 23rd and returned to the bargaining 
table in order to negotiate some labor-protective agreements. In the end, the union’s 
restraint strategy was not successful as KTTU faced a bitter backlash including arrest 
warrants issued for 10 union staffs and 349 disciplinary actions against the strike
participants (KTTU, 1999). The massive union oppression destabilized KTTU
brought again a power vacuum during the imprisonment of union leaders. And 
although KTTU leadership made the employer withdraw the disciplinary action e
six dismissals on May 22nd 1999, it could not prevent KT employers from violating t
1998 agreement that contained the promise to not introduce compulsory employm
reduction and to consult the union prior to job transfers. Seemingly on April 26th 19
the union deferred its original strike decision against unilateral imposition of the 
restructuring plan and reached a contract agreement on May 22nd that stated th
restructuring issues would be discussed in the Special Labor-Management Committee 
on Restructuring. But KT bypassed the Committee and kept on enforcing compu
redundancies without consulting the union (KTTU, ibid).  
 The recurrent labor
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at 
lsory 
’s retreat resulting from the withdrawals of strike decisions 
itful 
intensified the internal division between the incumbent union executives and the 
former union leaders who continuously appealed to militancy. Frustrated by unfru
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compromises marked by concessionary bargaining, militant activists affiliated with the 
former union leadership denounced Kim Ho Sun’s Administration for calling off the 
strikes in vain. Such an internal split increased leadership competition between the 
militant branch and the more moderate one within Minjupa, which ended up with th
narrow victory of Lee Dong Gul who had 53.2% of the votes while the rival candidate
gained 43.5% of the votes (cf. Korea Daily Labor News, December 16, 1999). The 
winning candidate came from the moderate faction and was reluctant to mobilize 
militant collective action. While KT’s restructuring plan based on the “1999 
Acceleration plan for Management Innovation” -one that not only complied t
government proposal but also radicalized the latter by increasing the number of 
redundancies- was introduced at full rate, KTTU’s new leader who started its term
January 1st 2000 abandoned the confrontational goals and restrained militancy. The 
only exception was made on December 17th 2000 when KTTU went on a five-day 
general strike to halt an additional 3,000 employee cuts that employers tried to 
implement through the re-introduction of the voluntary redundancy package in 
November 1999. Yet the strike was not actively organized by Lee Dong Gul’s 
leadership. Rather, the leadership was compelled to take such action by the dem
of outraged union constituencies who insisted on mobilizing an instant collective 
action against management attempts (Seoul Regional Office of KTTU, 2001). In t
end, KTTU could lessen the redundancies to approximately 1,400 through the genera
strike, but it was also faced with management’s disciplinary action against 424 union 
members that further undermined the organizational power of the union (KTTU, 2001
Seoul Regional Office of KTTU, ibid). Indeed, the 2000 general strike marked the end 
of KTTU’s militancy, which was followed by a rapid drop in the mobilization capacity 
of its membership that showed a downward curve from this point of time. Since then 
KTTU kept on restraining militancy and remained quiescent until the full privatization 
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of KT was achieved in May 2002.  
 For this reason, militant activists linked to Yoo Duck Sang’s leadership 
ip and 
ce 
weak 
ic 
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continuously denounced the cooperative attitudes of the incumbent leadersh
argued for the need to reform the central union administration (Seoul Regional Offi
of KTTU, 2001). Yet they also were unable to mobilize union members and to get 
support from them. The membership became gradually detached from militant 
activists as they were frustrated by their strategic ineffectiveness linked to their 
leadership capacity. Their militant strategies had disrupted labor relations at KT but 
had failed to obtain concessions from either the government or management. Hence 
the militant branch (Minju-Dongwoo-hue, which means the Association of Democrat
Comrades) degenerated into a minority group in the union and lost its influence on 
membership. As a result of this, they stopped to be a threatening force for leadership
replacement, which then reduced the incentives for militancy. Consequently Lee Dong
Gul’s leadership was no more concerned with the replacement threat of its militant 
rivals and did not feel any pressure for increasing militancy for fear of being 
replaced48. Thus it contented itself with restraining opposition and mostly 
subordinated itself to the government/management initiatives. Although it p
against the unilateral implementation of privatization and restructuring plans, it neve
mobilized mass collective action against them. Seemingly, it did not organize any 
effective contestation to push KT employers to abide by the union-management 
 
48 The diminution of the replacement threat of the militant rival can be seen in the electoral results of 
December 2002. The votes of the winning moderate candidate Ji Jae Sik (64.47%) almost doubled the 
votes of its rival candidate (33.54%) cf. Chosun Ilbo “14 years of cohabitation with 17 years of internal 
disputes” July 20, 2009. The result was considered to derive from tenacious employer intervention in 
union internal affairs based on the stick and carrot strategy. While it took an adversarial approach 
towards the militant activists associated with Yoo Duck Sang’s leadership and oppressed them with a 
hard-line policy, it tried to foster a cooperative leadership by supporting the moderate candidate. Hence 
the electoral result arouse controversy and bitter criticism within labor movement that the new 
leadership was manipulated by the employer and that there was an election fraud in which the employer 
exerted unfair pressures and methods in order to establish the subordinate pro-employer leadership 
(KDLP Seoul Regional Office, 2005). 
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agreement when the latter broke the agreement and excluded the union from deci
making on privatization and outsourcing. Originally, such issues were deemed to be 
discussed at the Special Labor-management Committee on Restructuring. But the 
union’s voice was completely ignored by management which enforced its decision
without any significant interference of the union.  
 In sum, the political dynamics of KTTU change
sion-
 
d along the restructuring and 
ent. 
 as 
r 
. The Changes in the Internal Political Dynamics of KRWU 
he political dynamics of KRWU differed from KTTU although the union 
adership 
 
TTU, KRWU had a long history of labor peace under cooperative 
esult 
privatization process. The groundbreaking leadership replacement by the militant 
group of union activists in 1994 radically broke the tradition of labor peace at KT, 
which resulted in the heightened tension between KTTU and government/managem
But militant labor contestation became attenuated with the successive leadership 
moderation. In the end, KTTU shed all the imprints of militancy and resorted to 
restraint. All this happened while the political vitality of the union also decreased
union members were demobilized over the course of restructuring. The continual labo
defeats associated with concessionary bargaining persistently reduced the mobilization 
capacity of membership.  
 
4
 
T
democratization movement marked a breakpoint from the past entrenched le
in both of them. The distinctive divergence can be derived from the different timing of
union democratization that disparately colored the political dynamics of the two 
unions.  
 Like K
leadership. Same as at KT, the absence of industrial disputes at KNR did not r
from a participatory labor relations system that integrated union into managerial 
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decision-making. Rather it derived from labor subordination to KNR managemen
which was sustained by co-opted union officials who sought to secure their position
within the organization by reinforcing their allegiance to management and by 
controlling rank-and-file members for this purpose. Based on leadership loyalt
circumvented collective bargaining and replaced the latter with a labor-management 
council. Yet the council was characterized by union compliance to management 
initiatives and the exclusion of key employment issues that directly affected unio
members from union-management dialogue. While the subjects of discussion were 
limited to less contentious issues such as minor terms of employment (issues regard
work relocation, promotion and retirement), adjustment of allowances such as holiday 
working allowance or fieldwork incentive allowance, and improvement of welfare and 
fringe benefits, the most controversial issues regarding employment reduction, 
outsourcing and work flexibilization were hardly covered by the council meetin
(Kang, 2002: 184). Moreover, the agreement made at the council could not be 
enforced by law and could be easily ignored by management. Hence the consul
was far from guaranteeing union participation in key managerial decision. It was 
rather established to bypass collective agreement and to implement employer strat
through taming union leaders and subordinating them to managerial decisions that 
were precisely assured by such consultative machinery. Ultimately it undermined th
independent power of KRWU and rendered the docile pro-employer union leaders less
and less responsive to membership interests.    
 Politically, the leadership was also conservati
t, 
 
y, KNR 
n 
ing 
gs 
tation 
egy 
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ve and did not stage any oppositional 
                                           
action against government policy. In fact, KRWU was established in 1947 as a sector 
branch of the Daehan National Federation of Trade Unions, which was led by right-
wing unionists.49 Then in 1961, after the temporary disbandment of the union in the 
 
49 Before 1947, railway workers were divided into left-wing activists affiliated with Kyungsung 
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aftermath of Park Chung Hee’s coup d’etat, it was re-established by Park’s military 
government. Since then and throughout the 70s and 80s, the union leadership had lon
sustained its pro-government inclination and supported the military governments of 
Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Whan by endorsing key policies of their dictatorship
(Korean Democracy Railroad Labor, 2001b). Indeed “given this ideological and 
political trajectory, the KRWU had been characterized as a very docile and pro-
government union based on anti-communist ideology” (Kang, 2002: 174).  
 Such conservative leadership had not been significantly challenged until 
g 
 
the mid-
 
 
rs 
92, 
the 
ze 
 
coalition with the Subway Workers’ Union and organized a joint strike with the latter 
        
1990s although a union democratization movement began to burgeon after the very 
first wild-cat strike led by locomotive drivers on July 26th 1988 which demanded the
improvement of working condition. The KRWU leadership did not support the strike 
and remained quiescent when the government suppressed the strike and arrested 1,653
strikers (11 of them were imprisoned after the arrest) (KRWU, 1997; KDRL, 2001b). 
Yet although the strike failed, it prompted the locomotive drivers to organize an 
independent organization, namely the National Association of Locomotive Drive
(NALD, Jeonkihyeop) and to begin to challenge the incumbent leadership. From 19
the NALD continuously demanded change in the union constitution to adopt a direct 
voting system, and came into conflict with the union officers at every annual 
convention of union delegates. At the same time, the NALD became aware of 
limits of confining itself to this sort of occupational association and tried to organi
ticket collectors from 1994 to expand their membership basis. It also sought to build a
                                                                                                                     
Factory Alliance, the branch of Jeonpyeong (Korea National Council of Trade Unions), and right wing 
groups who were organized by the regional council of transportation sector of Daehan National 
Federation of Trade Unions. The leftists organized a general strike in 1946 ‘for rice’ and also a one-day 
political strike in 1947 opposing a separate South Korean government. Yet in the following months, the 
predecessor of KRWU, the Transportation Workers Council of Daehan National Federation of Trade 
Unions was established as a unitary organization for railway workers while the leftist organization had 
been dismantled after the unsuccessful strikes (KRWU, 1997).   
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in June 1994 to demand an eight-hour day. The strike was soon broken by police 
troops and 30 NALD staffs were imprisoned in addition to approximately 1,000 
disciplinary actions taken against the strikers including 140 involuntary job transf
(KDRL, ibid). As a result of this, the NALD was dissolved but the leaders and 
members of former NALD reorganized themselves into the Committee for Pushing 
Railway Democratization, which continued to be an engine for the union 
democratization movement.        
 Yet while opposition to union leadership continued to grow in the mid
was not until the late 90s that union lea
ers 
-1990s, it 
ders actually felt growing pressure for change. 
 
vey 
 
 
ected 
 
 Supreme Court on January 14th 2000 concerning KRWU’s 
ns 
First of all, the railway restructuring and commercialization that had been initiated in
the mid-1990s culminated in the 1999 decision of Kim Dae Jung’s government to 
privatize KNR. From this point on, railway workers’ fear for losing their status as 
public servants and of facing drastic employment cuts mounted. According to a sur
conducted by KRWU, 21,181 members (79%) responded that they were opposed to
privatization, while only 3,676 (13.7%) were in favor of the latter. And 81.1% chose 
employment insecurity as the first and foremost reason for opposing railway 
privatization (KRWU, 1999). While union members felt a growing sense of worry for
employment insecurity, they were frustrated by the passive leadership and exp
their union to act as an effective counterweight to government policy. This gave 
further momentum for the union democratization movement, for which rank-and-file
support grew fast.  
 Another critical event that helped the union dissidents leap forward was the 
decision made by the
‘three-tier representation and election system’. The decision made it invalid by 
recognizing that the system ran counter to the spirit of Trade Union Labor Relatio
Adjustment Act, according to which the election of union officers should be made by a 
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direct, secret and unsigned ballot.50 Boosted by such judicial decision, the opposition
group within the KRWU reorganized themselves into the Korean Democracy Railroad 
Labor (KDRL, Gongtubon) to push union democratization forward. The KDRL called 
for the need for leadership replacement and continued to attack the existing leadership 
for neglecting to mobilize membership opposition to government-initiated railway 
restructuring. Such challenges to the leadership became substantial as rank-and-file 
members gave more support to the opposition group, and as the legal decision open
the possibility for actual leadership replacement (KDRL ibid; Kang, 2002, Personal 
interview).         
 Faced with both the threat of KDRL and the increasing discontents of union 
members, the union lea
 
ed 
dership had to change their strategy in tackling the government 
nion 
he 
 
                                           
initiative for railway restructuring. As the internal disputes became intense, the 
incumbent leadership became more and more afraid of being replaced. It thus took a 
more oppositional approach towards government policy and began to mobilize u
members51. The leadership first set up an ‘Emergency Committee to Cope with 
Privatization’ to carry on a campaign against privatization in September 1999 and 
began to organize a series of collective protests against government proposals. T
leadership had never mobilized its members nor organized mass rallies before, but 
from late 1999 it started to organize such collective action. Although such moves did
 
50 The Act stipulated that “the election and the dismissal of union officers shall require resolutions 
made at union general meeting…and shall be made by a direct, secret, and unsigned ballot. (Article 
16)” 
51 Initially the union leadership denounced the KDRL for undermining union solidarity and for 
hindering the leadership from carrying out the anti-privatization campaign. Such hostility towards 
KDRL was evidenced by its conspiratorial assent to management disciplinary action taken against 
KDRL members, which included 84 expulsions from union membership, 11 dismissals, four 
suspensions, 21 wage reductions, 54 transfers to other locations, and 32 official warnings (Kang, 2002: 
179). But in the face of the increasing leadership replacement threat, the union leaders had to be more 
responsive to members’ interests that ultimately made them turn to a more cooperative attitude towards 
KDRL in order to co-organize an effective campaign against privatization. Hence in the end, they 
revoked the disciplinary actions and allowed KDRL to take a more active role in organizing the 
campaign.    
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not fundamentally transform the strategic orientation of the union, it nonetheless 
showed the way union leaders felt obliged to change their tactics in order to avoid 
leadership replacement. The campaign culminated in the declaration of a joint stri
with the Korea National Electricity Workers Union (KNEWU) against public secto
restructuring and privatization in November 2000. The union ballot for the strike 
resulted in a 81-percent vote in favor of strike with a 94-percent turnout, which 
demonstrated the widespread membership discontent towards government policies
(Kang, 2002: 245-246). The extremely high percentage of voter turnout and supp
for the strike evidenced that members’ determination to take part in collective action
as well as their expectation for their leaders to take strong measures against railway 
privatization were at their highest peak. Yet, the union leadership cancelled the first-
time planned strike after the agreement on railway restructuring was made at the 
Tripartite Commission on December 10th 2000 as seen in the previous section. 
Although the agreement contained the need to postpone the original privatization 
in order to be sufficiently prepared, union members were dissatisfied with leade
decision and considered the cancellation of the strike unjustifiable. They considered 
the agreement was far from union goals and were frustrated that the leadership gave 
consent to the implementation of targeted employment cuts for 2000. Such defiance 
for leadership was confirmed when the KDRL harshly criticized the leadership for 
accepting KNR’s plan for employment cuts and organized an independent ballot on 
the agreement, where 9,036 members participated and 85 percent of them voted in 
opposition to the agreement (Kang, ibid: 246).       
 Eventually, the opposition group within the union defeated the old leadership in
the May 2001 election and took control of KRWU. The
ke 
r 
 
ort 
 
plan 
rship’s 
 
 leadership change 
 
 with the 
fundamentally altered labor relations at KNR as it brought an end to the decade-long
labor quiescence. Above all, the timing of leadership replacement coincided
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escalating discontent of union members who were worried about the detrimental 
damages that would be caused by railway privatization and restructuring. They were 
already disgruntled by the agreement made between the government and the form
union leadership and expected the new union leadership would organize strong 
opposition to the proposed restructuring plan. The electoral result was proof of such a
sentiment as the voter turnout was 97.1 percent (24,125 out of 24,863 electorates
the KDRL candidate, Kim Jae Kil had 61.6 percent of the total votes (14,924 votes) 
while the candidate from the old leadership obtained 36.3 percent of the total votes 
(8,753 votes) (Source: KRWU website http://krwu.nodong.net). The extremely high 
percentage of voter turnout and the victory of the new leadership reflected members
strong aspiration for change.  
 In response to this, the new leadership radically broke out of its cooperative past 
and built on militant tactics to c
er 
 
) and 
’ 
onfront government policies. And it is noteworthy that 
 
f 
 
 go on 
ers 
such dramatic change occurred right after Kim Dae Jung’s government started to push
the railway privatization plan forward by drafting the Basic Law on the Development 
and Restructuring of Railway Industry in February 2001. It was at this time that the 
political vitality of KRWU peaked higher with the ascendance of new leadership that 
was determined to mount militant collective action in order to obstruct the passage o
the bills. The strike of February 25th 2002 was the crystallization of such fierce 
opposition to railway restructuring. KRWU and other public sector unions held a strike
vote in late November 2001(November 28th -29th for KRWU) and threatened to
a joint strike if the bills for railway and gas privatization were submitted for legislation 
at the National Assembly. KRWU members had a 92.06% voter turnout, which 
demonstrated the high level of political vitality within the union. As for the results, 
15,624 out of 21,631 voters (72.23%) were in favor of the strike while 5,672 vot
(26.22%) were against the strike (KRWU, 2002a: 435). Although the strike was 
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supported by an overwhelming majority of the membership, KRWU had the lowest 
vote in favor of striking compared to the other public unions that had planned the
strike together.
 joint 
es 
n 
ed 
 
hat 
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pment of railway’, which built up momentum for KRWU to further 
ued to 
ip 
hough 
n 
y 
52 Even compared to KRWU’s own strike vote of 2000, the rate of vot
for approval dropped from 81% to 72%. The decline in support for the strike action 
albeit the increase in membership discontent over government-initiated privatizatio
policy was probably linked to the 2000 experience when the former leadership caus
the distrust of membership by arbitrarily calling off the strike. Nevertheless, the
mobilizing capacity of membership remained strong enough to stage the walkout t
resulted in the special collective bargaining agreement of February 27th 2002.  
 Although the agreement did not clearly stipulate the withdrawal of railway 
privatization, it stated that ‘both management and union will jointly put efforts for th
public develo
pressure the government to revise the privatization policy. Thus the union contin
escalate the campaign against privatization and pushed KNR management to keep to 
the 2.27 agreement. For sure, the agreement also created internal tension among 
different factions within the militant unionists when more leftist activists criticized the 
union leadership for accepting the agreement without obtaining the complete 
withdrawal of the government privatization plan. Nevertheless, the union leadersh
regained the authority when the agreement was ratified by union constituencies by 
70.3% approval on 89.18% voter turnout (KRWU, 2002a: 533). Moreover, alt
KRWU also faced the same mass disciplinary action from government/management i
the aftermath of 2.27 strikes as KTTU53, KRWU could retain organizational integrit
                                            
52 The Gas Corporation Union had the astonishing result of 95.5% votes in favor of strike, the highest 
among the public sector unions involved in the joint strike. Next were the District Heating Corp. Union 
nt 
suits against 57 union members, 24 dismissals and 1.6 billion won claim 
and the Electric Technology Union that had 89.3% and 85.8% of strike support respectively. The High 
Speed Rail Union and the Social Insurance Union followed next with 77.0% and 73.2% in favor of 
strike (Kang, 2002: 249).  
53 The disciplinary action resulted in the imprisonment of eight union officers including the preside
of KRWU, Kim Jae-Kil, law
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by holding a by-election to fill the leadership vacuum. In early-July 2002, 
approximately a month after his release from prison, the president of KRWU officially
resigned from his office. In his view, his leadership had been undermined d
imprisonment while it was a critical moment for the union to force the management to 
implement the agreement. Hence he called for the establishment of new union staffs t
reconstruct the internal-organization and to effectively mobilize membership against 
management’s offensive. Consequently, the union had a by-election during August 5th-
7th 2002 to fill the vacancy, from which the 2nd democratic leadership was established
with the election of Chun Hwan-Kyu who gained 56.1% of the total votes (KRWU, 
2004b).  
 The 2nd democratic union leadership continued to resort to militant tactics by 
organizing
 
uring his 
o 
 
 mass demonstrations and protests and declared an all-out war to obstruct 
e 
nge 
ership to 
  
the implementation of railway privatization plans. It is noteworthy that the leadership 
competition persisted with the changes in the configuration of the rivalry although th
replacement threat of the old leadership withered. The candidate supported by the old 
leadership only had 18.44% of the total votes, hence far less than the votes that their 
candidate obtained in the previous election, which had recorded 36.4% of the votes 
(source: http://krwu.nodong.net). But while membership support for the past 
cooperative leadership plummeted, the leadership competition among different 
factions of the union democratization group intensified.54 Such competition 
contributed to increase the leadership inclination to militancy because the challe
from the more leftist faction grew substantially to force the newly elected lead
                                                                                                                           
,186 out of 19,025 votes (79.85%), 
 
for loss and damage caused by the strike (KRWU, 2002a: 533).  
54 The sum of the total votes of the two KDRL candidates was 15
therefore more than triple the votes of the conservative candidate. Both of them originated form the 
union democratization group (KDRL), but a more militant, leftist group ran a separate candidate, Kim
Hyung Kyun, who obtained 23.84% of the total votes while the other candidate Chun Hwan Kyu won 
the election by getting 56.01% of the votes (source: http://krwu.nodong.net).  
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enhance its militant opposition to railway privatization and restructuring policy. Face
with both the expectation of union members and the challenge of leftist activists, the 
2nd democratic leadership mounted the anti-privatization campaign and threatened to 
strike unless the government granted concessions to union demands. The campaign 
reached its peak with the strike resolution that resulted from the strike vote held from 
February 17th to February 19th 2003 with 51.62% of the votes in favor of strike on 
89.9% of membership participation (KRWU, 2003a: 106). Apparently, the 
membership support for the strike noticeably diminished compared to 2000 as shown
in the Table 3.1.  
 
d 
 
Table 3.1 The results of KRWU’s strike votes from 2000 to 2003 
 
  Source: Kang (20 RWU (2002a, 3a, 2004a). 
 
This e mobilizing po f KRWU skyrocketed near the end of the old 
a  the latter to turn to 
y 
 
f 
membership support for the leftist internal contenders prompted the leadership to 
Voting Date Participation Rate (approx. %) In favor of Strike Action (approx. %)
November 2000 94% 81% 
N 1 
02); K  200
implies that th wer o
ovember 200 92% 72% 
February 2003 90% 52% 
le dership’s term when union members rapidly receded from
militant activists in their search for an alternative leadership. Then after the leadership 
replacement, membership responsiveness to leadership’s appeal to strike graduall
waned. Yet such a decrease did not mean the demise of the political vitality of the 
union. The steady and high participation rate in strike votes proved that membership
engagement in union activities remained active. Besides, despite the decrease in 
membership support for the strike action, the leadership increased its militancy and 
mounted pressures on government to make concessions. The substantial growth o
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heighten union opposition based on confrontational tactics. For the 2nd democratic 
leadership, the increase in members’ support for a more militant faction in contrast t
the sharp decrease in their support for past conservative leadership meant that unio
constituencies still had strong expectations for their leaders to take aggressive 
measures to countervail government initiatives. The replacement threat of the leftist 
group was later evidenced by the results of the final union ballot of 2004 in which the
leftist candidate lost the election by a narrow margin
o 
n 
 
U’s 
 
icy 
, the agreement was ratified by 83.1% of membership approval on 88% of 
 
g 
 low membership support for strike action. Militancy 
 be 
                                           
55. This contrasted to KTT
case, in which union leadership could not find any incentive to increase militancy in 
their bids for members, because membership support for militant activists substantially
diminished at the time when the government began to push the full privatization pol
for KT.  
 It was in this context that KRWU threatened to strike in April 2003 and obtained 
substantial concessions by reaching a union-government agreement on April 20th 2003. 
And again
voter turnout, which consolidated the leadership position within the union (KRWU, 
2004a). And such sustained leadership authority helped to promptly mobilize union 
constituencies into the strike action of June 28th 2003 when the government attempted
to legislate the railway restructuring bills without spending sufficient time on buildin
social consensus on the issues.  
 In the end, KRWU’s strike threat was effective enough to gain considerable 
concessions from government as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
This was so despite the relatively
alone cannot account for such outcomes. The relative success of KRWU can only
 
55 In 2004 union ballot, Kim Young Hoon who had the same political orientation as the 2nd democratic 
leadership won the runoff election by obtaining 51.90% of the votes on 95.82% voter turnout. The more 
leftist militant rival, Lee Chang Whan, won the first ballot by getting 38.55% of the votes while Kim 
Young Hoon had 36.3% of the votes. Yet Lee Chang Whan lost the final ballot by a narrow margin by 
obtaining 44.19% of the votes (source: http://krwu.nodong.net).   
 115
explained by its strategic capability which combined various means of mobilization 
and political pressures. For this reason, this study will analyze the strategic 
effectiveness of the two unions focusing on the differences in their formulations of 
strategies and tactics.   
 
5. Comparative Remarks 
 
This chapter analyzes factors that affect the different responses of KTTU and KRWU 
rivatization and restructuring plans. Although both unions 
went through union democratization and broke out of conservatism, they displayed 
 
idents came to power, they 
of 
s the 
e 
to the government-initiated p
different patterns of union-government interactions.  
 As can be seen in the Table 3.2, KTTU moved from militancy to restraint despite 
the fact that the government privatization policy for KT was getting more radicalized
along with the passage of the time. When militant diss
fundamentally altered past cooperative practices and confronted hostile government 
suppression by escalating their militancy. Yet KTTU’s confrontational tactics often 
ended up with fruitless union concessions to government/management decisions. The 
resolutions of strike actions were nullified by KTTU’s leadership although union-
management agreements did not incorporate union demands at all. Such recurrence 
ineffective militancy undermined leadership’s authority over union members who 
became increasingly frustrated by the disappointing bargaining outcomes. As far a
union leadership failed to wield counterbalancing bargaining leverage, union members 
continued to be demobilized over the course of the restructuring process despite th
fact that government/management was set to implement its drastic employment 
reduction plan. Indeed, union militancy decreased during the 2nd democratic leadership 
although it organized some protests in opposition to government/management 
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restructuring plans. Still, they were confined to sit-in protests or hunger strikes b
union officers and were rarely based on massive membership mobilization. During the 
term of the 3rd democratic leadership, militancy further withered. Kim Dae Jun
government stepped towards the full privatization of KT, but KTTU’s leadership 
remained defensive and did not actively mobilize union members to obstruct the 
process. The only exception was the December 2000 strike, which rather resulted f
rank-and-file pressure on the leadership to prevent the additional enforcement of 
compulsory redundancies. But apart from this, KTTU’s leadership hardly mobiliz
collective action against the implementation of the restructuring/privatization plans. It 
became moderate over the process of restructuring. 
 This pattern contrasted with KRWU’s case where militancy was sparked by the 
government decision on privatization of KNR and had been sustained throughout the 
restructuring process (see Table 3.3). Same as KTTU
quiescent and had avoided militancy until railway privatization was heralded by Kim
Dae Jung’s government in 1999. Yet unlike KTTU, union militancy did not decline 
along with the transition to the 2nd democratic leadership. On the contrary, union 
leadership continued to mobilize its membership and organized mass protests and 
strike actions to oppose government policy. The sustained membership mobilization
was critical for this to happen.  
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.2 Timeline of change at KTTU from 06.1994 to 12.2002     
 
 
 
KTTU 
Leadership 
Change 
06.1994-12.1996 
 
1st Democratic Leadership. 
Radical shift to militant 
leadership. 
 
 
01.1997-12.1999 
 
2nd Democratic Leadership. 
More moderate than 
previous leadership. 
01. 2000-12.2002 
 
3rd Democratic Leadership. 
Moderate. 
 
Government 
Initiatives 
Kim Young Sam 
government 
 
 
-Hard-line union  
 suppression 
- Sale of 28.8% of 
 government share from 
 1993-1997 
 
 
 
Radicalized restructuring  
policy under Kim Dae 
Jung’s government 
 
-July 1998: Announcement 
of 1st privatization plan 
-August 1998: 2nd  
privatization plan 
-May 1999: 1st stock listing in 
the international stock market
 
Full Privatization of KT 
under Kim Dae Jung’s 
government 
-June 2000: Government 
 decision for full privatization 
 of  KT 
-December 2001~May 
 2002: Additional stock sales  
 in both domestic and 
 international markets 
-May 2002: Complete 
 privatization 
Union Responses 
-Adoption of confrontational 
tactics 
-Escalating militancy 
-Union resolution to strike 
 (82.2% in favor of strike,  
  7.22. 1995) 
-Cancellation of planned 
 strike (7.30.1995) 
- Moderation                  
- Recurrent cancellations of  
planned strikes by the 
leadership:  
1) July 23rd 1998: 
 cancellation of planned   
 strike 
2) April 26th 1999:  
 2nd cancellation of planned  
 strike 
-December 17th 2000:  
 five-day general strike to  
 halt additional redundancies.
-Moderation and restraint of 
 militancy until the full 
 achievement of KT 
 privatization in May 2002. 
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Table 3.3 Timeline of Change at KRWU from 07.1999 to 03.2004 
 
 
 
 
KRWU 
Leadership 
Change  
07.1999 -05.2001 
 
Last conservative leadership.   
Moderate but increasing 
militancy to avoid 
replacement. 
05.2001 - 08..2002 
 
1st Democratic Leadership.   
Shift to militant leadership. 
08. 2002 - 03.2004 
 
2nd Democratic Leadership.   
Inherited militancy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government 
Initiatives 
Kim Dae Jung   government
 
-Decision to privatize KNR at 
 Cabinet meeting.  
-Delayed implementation of  
 privatization policy.     
-Negotiation at Tripartite  
 Commission on the issues of 
 employment cuts and   
 railway privatization. 
Kim Dae Jung government 
 
- 2001: finalization of railway 
  restructuring plan             
- December 2001:  
Introduction of railway  
restructuring bills to the  
National Assembly/  
Delayed deliberation of the 
bills     
Roh Moo Hyun government 
(02.2003) 
 
 -Shift from privatization to  
 corporatization               
 -June 30th 2003:  Passage of 
  Railway Restructuring bills   
 -December 18th 2003:  
Passage of Korean Railroad 
Corporation Act  
 
 
Union 
Responses 
-Before 1999: restraint   
-Since 1999: Traditional  
 bargaining + confrontational   
 tactics  
-December 2000:   
 Cancellation of joint strike  
 with KNEWU  
- Escalating militancy after the 
  leadership change            
- Feb 25th 2002 strike           
- 2. 27 Agreement (2002)   
 
-Sustained militancy  
-April 2003: threatened to  
 strike             
-Negotiated agreement  
 (4.20.2003)    
- 6.28.2003 strike  
  
 In this chapter, the divergence in the patterns of union-government interactions 
was explained by the changes in the political contingency and in the internal dynamics 
of the unions that lay between two different timings. Firstly, there were salient changes 
in the political contingency. KTTU experienced contracting political opportunities as 
opposed to KRWU, which encountered a politically-favorable environment although 
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both unions had been institutionally excluded from political decision-making. Above 
all, the political space for direct bargaining between KRWU and the government was 
contingently opened after 1999 whereas such possibility was foreclosed for KTTU as 
economic stringency overshadowed the political environment and gave little room for 
the dissidents to contend the unilateral policy implementation. Moreover, the 2002 
presidential election increased the political opportunities for KRWU, and made it 
possible for the union to find allies within the political sphere and to mount pressures 
on the government through the ad-hoc coalition. Such was not the case for KTTU, 
which had little chance to gain political allies in the context of the Korean financial 
crisis where conservative economic bureaucrats had overwhelming power over 
political decisions including the public sector restructuring. 
 Such differences in the political contingency were associated with distinctive 
patterns of union behavior for the two unions: from restraint to militancy for KRWU 
as opposed to militancy to restraint for KTTU. Hence, the KTTU case runs counter to 
the belief that lack of institutionalized arrangements for labor incorporation always 
increases labor militancy. On the contrary, the shrinking political opportunities tended 
to constrain KTTU to take a defensive approach and restrain militancy whereas the 
expanding political opportunities heightened the possibility for increased militancy for 
KRWU.  
 Yet such tendencies can only be confirmed when internal organizational dynamics 
of unions contribute to consolidate the established patterns of union behavior, either 
militancy or restraint. In this respect, it is noteworthy that union democratization 
occurred at different moments for KTTU and KRWU, involving different dynamics 
for each. KTTU had never staged confrontational collective action before the militant 
Yoo Duck Sang leadership took power in 1994. Union militancy skyrocketed with the 
advent of democratic leadership but it was not sustained throughout the restructuring 
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process along the transition to the second and third democratic leadership, which were 
more moderate than the first one. Therefore the radical change to democratic 
leadership occurred before Kim Dae Jung’s government launched a radical public 
sector restructuring program, and the dynamics of leadership competition also altered 
when the government began to implement the full blown privatization policy along 
with the drastic employment reduction plan for KT. Above all, the incentives for 
militancy decreased over time as the replacement threat from oppositional groups 
diminished when the militant activists affiliated with the previous Yoo Duck Sang 
leadership had substantially lost membership support and had become marginalized 
within the union. This resulted in the seizure of power by a more moderate leadership. 
Although the latter came out of the union democratization coalition group, it competed 
with the candidates of the more militant leftist faction which lost both the 1996 and 
1999 elections. Besides, the mobilization power of union members had been 
undermined by the recurrent failures of union strategies that ended with labor’s 
consent to government restructuring policies although KTTU leadership officially 
opposed it. 
 By contrast, the replacement threat by militant dissidents of KDRL to KRWU 
leadership reached its peak when Kim Dae Jung’s government began to push its 
railway restructuring and privatization policy. This increased pressure on the former 
conservative leaders who turned to militancy for fear of being replaced, but they could 
not avoid replacement. Eventually, the new democratic leadership came to power in 
May 2001 at the time when the government finalized the railway restructuring and 
privatization plan and tried to draft relevant bills. Hence there was a synergic effect for 
militancy as membership expectations grew higher for the new militant leadership to 
take strong measures against government initiatives. And unlike KTTU, the incentives 
for militancy had not decreased over the process of restructuring. For sure, the 
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governmental change to Roh Moo Hyun’s Administration provided greater political 
opportunities that KWRU used to escalate political pressures through militant tactics. 
To add to this, the internal dynamics of the leadership competition also promoted 
union militancy as the leadership competition persisted throughout the first and second 
terms of democratic leadership. Although the old conservative leadership ceased to be 
a threat, the challenge came at this time from the more militant faction. Lastly, unlike 
KTTU, KRWU’s mobilization capacity had been sustained throughout the 
restructuring process. This was proven by the high rate of voter turnout for strikes 
(94% for December 2000, 92% for February 2002 and 90% for April 2003) as well as 
by the relatively high rate of approval for leadership initiated ballots on the union-
government agreement of February 27th 2003 (70.93% of approval on 89.18% of voter 
turnout) and the agreement of April 20th 2003 (83.1% of approval on 88% of voter 
turnout) that contributed to consolidate leadership’s authority over members (KRWU, 
2002a; KRWU, 2003a; KRWU, 2004a).     
 Altogether, these findings support the hypotheses outlined in the first chapter. The 
participatory pattern of union-government was not plausible for both unions due to the 
lack of institutional incorporation of labor. Yet the increased political opportunities 
provided KRWU with multiple access points to put pressure on the government. 
Hence there were greater possibilities for KRWU to actively engage in collective 
action in order to gain concessions through such political pressures. On the contrary, 
the shrinking political opportunities had a tendency to decrease union militancy for 
KTTU. The situation tended to constrain the union to be on the defensive and restrain 
militancy. 
 The internal union dynamics of the unions intensified such tendencies. Within the 
politically unfavorable environment, KTTU oscillated between sporadic protests and 
passive quiescence to government initiatives, which only contributed to demobilize 
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union members. In the long run, this resulted in moderation of union demands. The 
gradual decrease in the replacement threat of the oppositional faction furthered such a 
process as it diminished the incentives for militancy. By contrast, the internal 
dynamics of KRWU contributed to sustain militancy. Not only had membership 
mobilization capacity remained high, but the challenge of the more militant leftist 
activists grew substantially to increase the incentives for militancy. Hence KRWU 
leadership built on militant tactics and membership mobilization to confront 
government initiatives. By doing this, it aimed both at gaining government 
concessions and at sustaining leadership authority over its membership.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON THE STRATEGIC 
EFFECTIVENESS OF KTTU AND KRWU 
 
In the previous chapter, the changes in the KTTU and KRWU’s interaction with 
government were classified into two distinctive patterns: from militancy to restraint 
for KTTU and escalating militancy for KRWU. The changes in the political 
contingency and in the internal union politics were understood as creating such 
difference. Yet although the two political factors are considered central in explaining 
divergent union responses, they do not account for the differences in the strategic 
effectiveness of the two unions. In short, they could explain ‘why KRWU’s leadership 
continued to resort to militancy while KTTU’s gradually restrained militancy’ but they 
could not provide answers to the question of ‘why KRWU was more successful in 
gaining concessions than KTTU’.  
 Hence this chapter will try to answer the second question by focusing on the 
factors that explain the differences in the degree of union success. For this, this study 
will highlight the determinant role played by the strategic capacity of the two unions. 
In the previous chapter, divergent union responses were generalized into the categories 
of militancy or restraint. Yet the strategic formulation of unions cannot fall into the 
dichotomy of either militancy or restraint. In fact, union strategies refer to a wider 
array of tactics that combine a repertoire of collective action and a variety of 
bargaining tactics that go beyond the two categories. Besides, militancy cannot be 
understood as the equivalent of union success. Effective strategies do not result from 
militancy per se but from the strategic capacity of unions to increase bargaining power. 
And as argued in the first chapter, the capacity of mobilizing public support and 
building coalition with various political and social groups will be crucial for public 
sector unions to gain bargaining leverage. From this point of view, this chapter will 
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analyze how KTTU and KRWU differed in their strategic responses to the government 
and how the latter affected the outcomes.     
  
1. The Strategic Effectiveness of KTTU against Restructuring and Privatization 
of KT 
 
The previous chapter paid attention to the changes in the political contingency and in 
the micro-politics of unions. Especially, it shed light on the extent of political and 
membership resources that change along the alteration of macro-political and intra-
organizational conditions. The evidence showed that both the political and 
membership resources decreased for KTTU when Kim Dae Jung’s government started 
to push the privatization policy for KT. Yet it was still viable for KTTU to compensate 
these limits by strengthening its strategic capacity.  
 In the first place, KTTU had to cope with the IMF-mandated restructuring program 
that tightened political opportunities for labor as seen in the previous chapter. Yet 
although the IMF pressured Kim Dae Jung’s government to follow its policy 
recommendations, the government had some degree of discretion to command the 
restructuring of the national economy. “Hence the possibilities were low that [the] 
IMF would have prevented the government from negotiating agreements with labor 
unions on the principle and the method of public sector restructuring and from 
modifying the latter based on the agreement” (Lim S-H et al., 2004: 137). Moreover, 
the framework of union-government negotiation was in place as the Tripartite 
Commission was set up to push the restructuring process on the ground of social 
consensus although its function was debilitated by the PBC’s unilateral decision on the 
restructuring. It meant that the political space was not completely foreclosed for 
KTTU to influence the restructuring process and that its strategic capacity was all the 
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more important to make difference in the outcomes.  
 The same is true for membership resources, because they are not fixed entities but 
are variable according to the strategic abilities of leadership. Effective strategies can 
contribute to increase membership mobilization capacity whereas lack of such 
strategic ability can only result in the membership demobilization. And it is not always 
true that abundant organizational resources automatically lead to successful outcomes. 
As seen in chapter 1, organizations with little internal resources can sometimes devise 
successful strategies (Ganz, 2000).56 As the UFW case proved, innovative union 
strategies may not only enable the insurgent independent union to overcome the weak 
internal resources but they also make the union capable of achieving its goals. The 
same principle can be applied to KTTU. It is true that KTTU suffered from a lack of 
internal resources as the newly formed democratic leadership didn’t have sufficient 
time to build a strong organizational basis. Yet it could still compensate for the 
organizational weakness and confront government policy more successfully if it could 
develop effective strategies.  
 
1-1. The Strategic Responses of KTTU  
 
The government initiative for KT’s privatization covered a relatively long period from 
the late 1980s to the early 2000s. Yet the privatization policy before Kim Dae Jung’s 
government was partial and non-continuous. It became an immediate task to be 
implemented after 1998 with the announcement of the first and second privatization 
plans for targeted public enterprises. Hence this chapter will limit the analysis of union 
                                            
56 Ganz argued that “resourcefulness” can compensate for lack of resources and new organizations can 
sometimes take advantage of their newness by relying on richness of their strategic capacity while “the 
abundance of internal resources to which well-established groups have access may make it harder to 
innovate” (Ganz, 2000: 1043). 
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strategies to those of the second democratic leadership (1997-1999, union president-
Kim Ho Sun) and third democratic leadership (2000-2002, union president-Lee Dong 
Gul) for they had to face the actual implementation of the privatization policy. 
 
1) 1998-1999 Union Strategies under Kim Ho Sun Leadership   
 
First, under the presidency of Kim Ho Sun, union strategies oscillated between 
confrontational collective action and restraint as the leadership had to appeal to 
militancy in order to be responsive to members’ growing discontent toward 
government policy at the same time that it had to depart from the ineffective strategies 
of the previous militant Yoo Duck Sang leadership. When Kim Dae Jung’s 
government launched on its fast-paced restructuring program in 1998, the leadership 
attempted to stage mass protests to drive the government privatization policy away. 
Hence it organized an outdoor general meeting on June 14th in which approximately 
2,500 KTTU members participated and resolved to take strong action against the 
government to obstruct the unilateral push for KT’s restructuring. This was followed 
by a three-day strike vote that resulted in 75.93% of support for strike action (KTTU, 
1999: 201). Drawing upon this resolution, the leadership organized a two-day warning 
strike on June 16th to gain five major objectives that were: 1. to impede the unilateral 
implementation of the restructuring plan 2. to negotiate employment security 
guarantees 3. to convert the cost of telephone equipment to government-issued stocks 
4. to allocate 20% of the preferred dividend to employee-owned stocks and 5. to 
maintain public services that KT planned to eliminate. According to the KTTU report, 
approximately 5,000 union members joined the strike rally held at Myeongdong 
Cathedral in the morning and 7,000 KTTU members participated in the evening rally 
organized by KCTU on June 15th (KTTU, ibid). Thus apparently, KTTU resorted to 
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mass demonstrations and strike to obtain government concessions regarding their 
major five goals.  
 Yet it did not engage in direct political bargaining with Kim Dae Jung’s 
government nor have influence on the existing communicative channels such as 
Tripartite Commission and SCPSR prior to the July 3rd announcement of the first 
privatization plan. It is undeniable that the refusal of the government to talk with 
KTTU created a severe obstacle for the union to bargain with the government. But the 
established framework for peak-level negotiation still permitted a space in which the 
union could try to access although the tripartite relationship was very fragile and 
contested. Same was true for the political bargaining with government. The political 
tightness surely constrained KTTU, but these limits were not insurmountable if the 
union actively sought to forge alliances with various political actors or groups and use 
this political coalition to force the government to accept to bargain with the union. 
Similarly, coalition-building with other forces in civil society could have made it 
possible for KTTU to put pressure on the government. Indeed, coalition building is a 
central component of strategic capacity for unions with few resources as it helps them 
gain broader public support and increase their bargaining leverage built upon the latter. 
It is all the more important for public sector unions as their bargaining power is 
determined not so much by their market position as by their political-organizational 
resources. For this reason, public sector unions have to build strategic alliances with 
various constituents of civil society by framing their claims as ‘public needs’ 
(Johnston, 1994). KTTU also appealed to the need to preserve public services and to 
retain public interest in the course of KT’s privatization by requesting the government 
to adopt the People’s Share Program.57 Yet the union was rather passive in organizing 
                                            
57 KTTU claimed that the government should return the cost of telephone equipment to subscribers by 
issuing government stocks. The so-called People’s Share Program was invented to prevent the 
government from selling government shares to chaebols and foreign investors and to retain public 
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coalitions on behalf of these public goals. For sure, the effort for building labor 
alliances was not completely missing as KTTU participated in the mass rallies co-
organized by five public sector unions and in the KCTU-led solidarity protests. Still, 
the inter-union alliance remained symbolic and was not connected to a broader social 
coalition (Personal interview).    
 Lack of a mobilizing capacity for public support led to the failure of the June 16th-
17th warning strikes. Instead of gaining concessions by threatening to organize a 
general strike, KTTU leadership was placed on the defensive by massive disciplinary 
actions and arrests after the two-day strike. KTTU later reported, “We opposed the 
government initiative by organizing the first time strike in 110 years of KTTU history. 
But due to the organizational limit, the strike did not succeed (KTTU, 1999: 150).” In 
this situation, KTTU leaders called off the general strike on July 23rd and reached an 
agreement with KT management on July 26th. The agreement reflected union 
concessions to the wage freeze (the freezing of 1998 wages to the wage level of 1997; 
100% return of 1998 special bonus) and its tacit consent to the privatization of KT as 
well as to the adoption of the sales of KT to overseas investors as a viable 
privatization method. The agreement stated that “union and management will pool 
cooperative efforts in order that the sales of KT to overseas investors contribute to the 
growth of the corporation and to the increase of national competitiveness (KTTU, ibid: 
696).” This statement was at odds with KTTU’s original claim that emphasized the 
need to prevent the sales of KT to chaebols or to foreign investors and to issue 
government owned stocks to the general public in order to preserve public interests. 
By making such an agreement, KTTU admitted that it was not opposed to the 
privatization of KT. This signaled the recession of KTTU from the rest of the allied 
public sector unions. Rather, KTTU considered privatization inevitable and focused on 
                                                                                                                             
interest in the course of privatization (KTTU, 1999).      
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guaranteeing minimal protection in the course of privatization. Hence the top priority 
was given to employment security, which was partly incorporated into the agreement. 
According to the agreement, “the company will not make compulsory employment 
reduction and will consult the union prior to the job transfer related to business 
outsourcing (KTTU, ibid: 696).” The agreement also had additional provisions that 
included some of the union’s demands such as ‘minimizing legal penalties against 
strikers’, ‘union-management consultation on the matter of business restructuring’, 
and ‘reinstatement of laid off workers by July 31st ’.  
 In sum, the agreement made on July 26th demonstrated that KTTU abandoned the 
cause for public interest and began to pursue practical interests, notably by putting 
employment security at the forefront of its demands. Yet the biggest problem arose 
when KT employers violated the agreement and enforced a massive employment 
reduction program by circumventing union-management consultation. As seen in the 
previous chapter, KT employers first betrayed the agreement by initiating massive 
disciplinary action and legal accusations. Then KT management began to implement 
the compulsory employment reduction plan (under the name of ‘honorary 
resignation’) and outsourcing of non-profitable businesses along with the 
announcement of the “Acceleration Plan for Management Innovation” on December 
17th 1998. And the implementation of this plan went on without any consultation with 
union.  
 If KT employers began the year of 1999 by breaching the union-management 
agreement and by launching their radical restructuring plan, KTTU’s strategic 
response to the latter placed more weight on reaching union-management compromise 
through collective bargaining. Yet due to the erosion of organizational power after 
severe disciplinary actions taken against the leadership, KTTU lacked 
counterweighing bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the employer. To complement this 
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weakness, KTTU had to maximize its strategic ability in a variety of ways. Firstly, it 
had to reorganize lay members and increase their support for union campaigns. Hence 
during January 1999, union leadership organized membership education as well as 
union president site visits to local offices, but it was rather a one-off event and did not 
bring about the increase in mobilizing power for the union (KTTU, 1999). In fact, on 
February 1999, KTTU held a provisional general meeting of union representatives, 
which only provoked heated contestation of militant activists against the leadership. 
The intensifying internal division hindered KTTU from strengthening the internal 
organizational power (Personal interview). In the end, the leadership retreated into a 
defensive position and decided not to mobilize membership-based strike action, 
considering the weak organizational resources. For this reason, KTTU leadership 
cancelled the general strike that was planned to go into effect on April 26th 1999, 
which heightened the internal disputes and further undermined membership 
mobilization capacity. Later, the leadership assessed that “the February 28th general 
meeting had negative effects on organizing effective struggles by only aggravating 
internal division. As the employment reduction plan began to be implemented, union 
members had common awareness of the need to struggle. But the organizational split 
hindered mobilization of rank and file members…The cancellation of the general 
strike resulted from the failure of organizing the strike from the b[ottom] (KTTU, ibid: 
151).” In fact, instead of focusing on rebuilding the organizational basis of unions, the 
leadership often replaced membership mobilization by lead struggles of union leaders 
(hunger strikes by the union president on December 24th 1998 and on March 18th 
1999; a series of sit-in protests and lead struggles of central union executives in June 
1999  (KTTU, ibid)). But the lead struggles by union officers were insufficient for 
increasing KTTU’s bargaining power.  
 Secondly, the leadership had to clearly articulate its strategic vision in order to 
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mobilize union constituencies. Yet it failed to do so and continued to waiver between 
the confrontational tactics based on lead struggles by union officers and practical 
bargaining approaches aimed at reaching compromise through restraint. Constrained 
by internally weak organizational power, the leadership chose in the end to avoid 
organizing membership opposition to management actions and relied on union-
management negotiation. According to union evaluation, the union “had no option but 
to rely on bargaining tactics because the organizational limits made it impossible to 
stage an all-out struggle (KTTU, 1999).” Yet it lacked coherent bargaining tactics 
apart from formulating sporadic lead struggles by union executives. In fact, KTTU 
reached an agreement with management on May 22nd 1999 after its cancellation of the 
general strike. In the agreement KTTU accepted the decrease in fringe benefits (the 
increase of the interest rate on housing loans from 2% to 7.5% and the reduction of 
benefits in other areas such as funding employees’ children who attend universities, 
support for private pension, etc.) and the reduction of the length of service for the 
eligibility for voluntary redundancy of non-positional employees to 15 years 
(reduction of 40%)58  (KTTU, ibid: 726). Yet the agreement also specified that it 
would guarantee that “the restructuring issues will be discussed at the ‘Special 
Committee for Restructuring’ (KTTU, ibid: 727)”, the committee that was constituted 
of an equal number of union and management representatives. Hence apparently 
KTTU seemed to ensure that all the restructuring-related issues, including outsourcing 
and employment reduction among others, should not be decided unilaterally by 
                                            
58 KT employees were classified into ‘positional’ jobs and ‘non-positional’ jobs. Positional jobs 
included white-collar works such as clerical works, administrative works, data-processing works and 
they were based on an internal labor market system with a clear career ladder. ‘Non-positional’ jobs are 
related to installation, maintenance and repair of networks and other technical jobs that lacked a career 
ladder. The non-positional technicians constituted a large portion of the union membership. By agreeing 
to reduce the length of service for the eligibility for voluntary redundancies, the leadership could not 
protect the non-positional workers from being the main target of compulsory redundancy as the 
employment reduction plan targeted them first. The final outcome of employment reduction from 1997-
2001 showed that the reduction in non positional jobs (8,944 cuts in total) was far greater than the 
reduction in positional jobs (4,826 cuts in total) (Kwon in Cho et al., 2009: 310-311).    
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management unless the union gave consent. But once again, the agreement became 
null and void by the reiterative management breach of the latter. Indeed KT employers 
went in the opposite direction from the agreement and announced the unilateral 
implementation of voluntary redundancy and ‘honorary resignation’ plans on June 11th, 
doing so less than one month after the agreement had been reached. Despite this 
employer offensive, KTTU did not mobilize any mass protest apart from resorting to 
isolated lead struggles by union officers (sit-in protests, hungers strikes of union 
president and central union staffs). In sum, KTTU leadership chose to focus on 
negotiating labor-management compromise, but it did not deploy effective bargaining 
tactics to force KT employer to stick to the agreement. The repetitive employer 
violations of union-management agreements reflected weak union bargaining leverage 
linked to the lack of mobilization strategy.  
 Lastly, KTTU also remained passive in building political and social coalitions. 
Same as in 1998, its coalition building efforts with other forces in civil society 
remained weak. Officially, KTTU participated in the labor alliance against unilateral 
push for privatization and restructuring. As a central organization of the Korean 
Federation of Public Sector Unions, it also played a role in forming the Korean 
Federation of Public and Social Service Unions (KPSU) on March 14th 1999, 
amalgamating with two other federations of public service unions, namely the Korea 
Federation of Social Service Workers Unions and the Korean Democratic Federation 
of Railway and Subway Workers Unions (KTTU, 1999: 499).59 Yet KTTU’s coalition 
with the KPSU-affiliated unions remained symbolic. Even before the 1998 agreement, 
KTTU acknowledged that the privatization of KT was inevitable. According to the 
PBC’s document on the Tripartite Commission meeting, the demands of the KTTU 
                                            
59 None of them were industrial unions although they sought to build a single industrial union to 
include all KCTU-affiliated public service unions in the long run. At the time, these federations were 
loose coalitional federations that sought to defend the common interests of public sector unions.   
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representative in SCPSR on July 2nd 1998 could be summarized as “giving consent to 
privatization, opposing sales to overseas investors, and demanding for preferred 
dividend to employee-owned stocks (PBC, July 10, 1998). And the 1998 agreement 
went further by abandoning its official opposition to the sales of KT to foreign 
investors. Given this, KTTU became remoter and remoter from the alliance as the 
labor-coalition within the KPSU aimed at defending public interests by co-organizing 
an anti-privatization campaign. Instead KTTU turned toward protecting its own 
interest by negotiating the union-management agreement. Hence KTTU became less 
active in campaigning for the defense of universal telecommunication services or for 
claiming for the need to adopt a people’s share program.  
 
2) January 2000-May 2002 Union Strategies under Lee Dong Gul Leadership  
 
KTTU strategies under Lee Dong Gul leadership became more moderate, and 
militancy further ebbed. One last exception was the December 2000 strike. The strike 
was phenomenal in two aspects. First, it was the first and last militant collective action 
staged by KTTU. Since then, the strike has disappeared from the scene of union-
management interaction at KT. Second, it was the first time that KTTU exerted an 
actual influence on the outcomes in a sense that it decreased the scale of voluntary 
redundancies targeted for 2000. The strike was prompted by KT employer’s 
announcement of the implementation of 3,000 additional voluntary redundancies 
although it promised “not to compulsorily reduce employment during the 
restructuring” both verbally on May 29th 2000 and by signing on a contract agreement 
on October 18th 2000 (KTTU, 2001: 18). Indeed, the strike was an expression of anger 
by union membership towards recurrent employer violations of union-management 
agreement. Hence after the resolution for the strike on December 5th and 6th, KTTU 
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held a five-day walkout from December 18th to December 22nd (KTTU, ibid: 19-20). 
Yet it is noteworthy that the strike was not orchestrated by the leadership but rather 
propelled by union members who forced their leader to take strong action to defend 
their interests (Seoul Regional Office of KTTU, 2001: 43; Personal interviews). 
Membership discontent outbursts towards both the employer’s recurrent breaches of 
agreements and the lukewarm measures of leadership, gave the real impetus for such a 
strike action. Another conspicuous element of the strike was that it brought the 
Ministry of the Planning and Budget (MPB) and the MIC to the bargaining table 
(KTTU Seoul Regional Office, ibid: 57). Before the strike, government representatives 
or ministries did not engage in bargaining with KTTU, but during the strike, they were 
pressured to intervene. The mobilizing power of KTTU forced them to mediate the 
disputes. Although this was made to prevent the employer from giving concessions, 
the intervention by the ministries made the final agreement an outcome of union-
government bargaining60. It thus gave the union a point of possible engagement 
whereby it could exert political pressure when the agreement was not properly 
enforced.  
 Eventually, the agreement was made on December 22nd, which contained 
management concessions in some of key issues as presented below. 
 
1. The honorary resignation and voluntary redundancies planned for this time will 
be put on a halt without extension. And they will not be compulsorily enforced 
in the future. 
2. The privatization of KT will be carried out through the establishment and 
operation of Special Labor-Management Committee. 
3. In case of outsourcing businesses (114 inquiry service, the network 
                                            
60 In fact, on December 20th management and union were about to sign on the agreement when the 
MPB intervened and brought a breakdown of the agreement. The agreement was only made two days 
later after minor revisions were made and after the ministry sanctioned the management to sign on the 
agreement (KTTU, 2001; Seoul Regional Office of KTTU, 2001).  
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maintenance and repair), KT management will deliberately consult the Special 
Labor-Management Committee on Restructuring (KTTU, 2001: 20).  
 
As the agreement shows, the agreement reflected the relative success of the December 
strike. Accordingly, KT management could not carry out the targeted 3,000 
redundancies and had to be content with 1,400 redundancies including 1,100 who had 
applied for voluntary redundancies before the strike (Roh, 2008: 81). Membership 
mobilization was key to this partial success, which also proved that union’s strategic 
action could make a difference in the outcome by obstructing the unilateral 
implementation of restructuring policy.  
 The agreement provided a platform from which union leadership could build their 
strategic abilities to guarantee its participation in the decision-making process 
regarding the privatization and restructuring of KT through the Special Labor-
Management Committee. It could also build on its membership mobilizing power to 
force the employer to keep the agreement. Yet, KTTU leadership failed to do so by 
being helplessly hit by a severe employer backlash that ended up with the 
imprisonment of the union president, 425 disciplinary actions against the strikers, 
which included six layoffs (KTTU, 2003b). In spite of this adversarial union 
oppression that betrayed the participatory principle of the union-management 
agreement, union leadership could not effectively confront the employer offensive. 
The result was the erosion of organizational power with the increase in internal 
division and rapid membership demobilization. For this reason, the leadership was 
also unable to resist management when the latter bypassed the special union-
management committee and carried out the outsourcing of 114 directory inquiry 
services and the services related to the arrears of telephone bills in 2001. Although KT 
management announced the outsourcing of the services on May 3rd 2001, KTTU 
leadership did not mobilize any opposition to this (KTTU, 2003b). The employees of 
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the targeted services immediately organized a sit-in protest at KT headquarter, but the 
protest came to be isolated without leadership support.61 In the end, KT outsourced th
services, which resulted in the contract cancellation of 2,907 direct-hire contingent 
employees and the ‘voluntary’ redundancies of approximately 1,000 employees (Roh, 
2008: 81-82).
e 
                                           
62    
 Regarding the privatization policy, Lee Dong Gul’s leadership drew up four 
demands for government and eight demands for KT employers (Table 4.1). As can be 
seen in their demands, KTTU opposed the sales of KT to chaebols and foreign 
investors, and advocated for the need to sustain the provision of universal services. At 
the same time, it claimed that the government push for KT privatization was too hasty 
without taking broader public opinions into consideration. Hence it argued for the 
need to adjust the speed of privatization in order to build social consensus and to 
incorporate the interests of labor and civil society into the restructuring designs 
(KTTU, 2002). Yet KTTU’s claims remained merely rhetoric as the union was totally 
marginalized in the process of KT restructuring and privatization. Firstly, it was still 
deprived of political leverage to compel the government to accept to directly bargain 
with KTTU. Hence the four union demands on government fell on deaf ears and did 
not affect government decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
61 In fact, the incumbent leadership induced the service employees to stop their protest, which aroused 
conflict between the leadership on one side and the service employees and activists of rival groups on 
the other side. This only aggravated the internal division and hurt the organizational power of the union 
(Personal Interview). 
62 Again, the ‘voluntary redundancies’ were compulsorily implemented. The involuntary nature of such 
redundancies can be evidenced by the sit-in strike of the related service employees who refused and 
resisted against management initiative.  
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Table 4.1 Union demands regarding privatization of KT (2002) 
 
Demands on government Demands on employer 
1. KTTU cannot accept the take over of 
ownership by chaebols and foreign capital 
 
2. Take measures to continue to preserve 
public interests in telecommunication 
services 
 
3. Establish institutions for employment 
security 
 
4. Postpone privatization until these 
conditions are fulfilled 
 
1. Establish an institutional safeguard for 
guaranteeing employment security 
2. Take measures to prevent the deterioration 
of working conditions 
3. Make efforts to defend the right to 
manage the company (acquisition of 
treasury stocks, limit of shares of same 
person) 
4. Make efforts to keep on providing 
universal services 
5. Propose a business diversification plan for 
the post-privatization era 
6. Establish a plan for improving labor 
management relations 
7. Take measures for a five-day work week 
8. Improve the voluntary redundancy plan 
Source: KTTU (2002) 
 
 Secondly, KTTU organized some press interviews with other civil organizations to 
appeal to public opinion but its efforts for coalition-building markedly lessened during 
the term of Lee Dong Gul’s leadership. In early 2000, KTTU was part of the “Alliance 
of Public Sector Unions” in which both KCTU and FKTU-affiliated unions 
participated to co-organize anti-privatization campaigns. And it also decided to launch 
on a joint struggle with KNEWU as the Korea Electric Power Corporation was also 
targeted for privatization by Kim Dae Jung’s government. The joint struggle was 
proposed by the newly elected KNEWU president, and KTTU held a series of joint 
 138
actions with KNEWU in September and October 200063. But during 2001-2002, 
KTTU retreated from this labor alliance as well as from the civil coalition. It did not 
participate in the inter-union alliance when six unions- including KRWU, the Power 
Plant Industry Union (PPIU)64 and Korea Gas Corporation Union (KGCU) - formed 
the “Joint Alliance of Public Sector Unions for Blocking Privatization of National Key 
Industries” on October 31st 2001. Neither did it seek to sustain its strategic alliances 
with civil organizations when they built a nationwide coalition (National Joint 
Committee for Opposing Privatization and Overseas Sales of Public Industries) in 
support of labor’s joint action. By withdrawing itself from the coalition, KT aimed at 
achieving practical gains through negotiation. Yet the lack of coalition deprived KTTU 
of political and social resources that were indispensable to increasing bargaining 
leverage. Hence, KTTU had no means to exert pressure on employers when union-
management bargaining came to a deadlock. Even when it succeeded to negotiate an 
agreement, it could not coerce KT employers to abide by the agreement. It could do 
nothing but comply with the managerial decisions although the employer breached the 
agreement and unilaterally implemented the privatization and restructuring plan.  
 
1.2. Assessing the Strategic Effectiveness of KTTU 
 
As for the final outcomes, KTTU could not prevent the government from achieving 
full privatization of KT. But the strategic effectiveness of KTTU cannot be evaluated 
on the criteria of whether the union derailed the privatization plan or not. While full 
                                            
63 Cf. KTTU leaflets for membership education “Opposition to privatization of KT!” September 2000.  
64 The PPIU was newly established in mid-2001 to represent workers at five Korean power plants. 
These power plants became subsidiaries of the Korea Electric Power Corporation in April 2001 as a 
result of the legislation of the electricity privatization law in December 2000, which aimed at selling 
power plants one after another from mid-2002. The newly established PPIU fought hard to prevent the 
sales of power plants along with the advent of democratic leadership. It also disaffiliated from FKTU-
affiliated KNEWU and joined the KCTU in mid 2001.   
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privatization was not plausible for the railway industry where the state monopoly 
remained solid, the gradual sales of government shares and the increase of competitive 
market pressures made privatization an immediate option for the telecommunication 
industry. Hence, as has already been argued in chapter one, a parallel comparison 
between KTTU and KRWU seems to be irrelevant for assessing the strategic 
effectiveness of the two unions. Yet union strategic choices could still make 
differences on the outcomes. For the telecommunication industry, privatization was a 
general trend across countries, but unions had different impacts on the pace and 
method of privatization. Similarly unions in different countries had different degrees 
of success in preventing the deterioration of working conditions. Hence one can 
evaluate the strategic effectiveness of unions by asking ‘whether unions could delay or 
obstruct the original privatization plan and could modify the latter to better serve 
public interests’ and ‘whether they could negotiate protective agreements to defend 
their members’ interests’. The relative success or failures of KTTU will be assessed 
according to these criteria. For this, attention should be brought to union demands on 
government/management and the extent to which these objectives were reflected in the 
final outcomes. As KTTU’s actual goals were focused on slowing down unilateral 
implementation of the privatization policy and on ensuring management adopt union 
interests, a comparison between union demands and the concessions of 
government/management to the latter will indicate the degree of union success. 
 In this respect, it is noteworthy that KTTU recurrently failed in enforcing the 
union-management agreement. Although KT management promised not to implement 
compulsory redundancies and to consult the union on the restructuring issues, it did 
not observe the union-management accords. The agreements were made in 1998, 1999 
and 2000, but ironically they were all ignored by KT employers without any limitation 
put on its abusive power. Hence management action repeatedly betrayed the union-
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management agreement while KTTU was unable to correct this. For this reason, the 
written forms of the union-management agreements cannot prove union achievements 
as they became null and void through employer violations. Therefore, this study will 
instead compare the contents of the union/management agreements and whether they 
were actually incorporated into the restructuring process by management.   
    
Table 4.2 Comparison of 1998/1999 Agreements with actual outcomes 
 
Concessions made by management in 
the written agreement 
The Actual Outcomes 
1. There will be no more compulsory 
employment reduction and KT 
management will consult KTTU prior   
to business restructuring (1998) 
2. All the restructuring issues will be 
discussed at the Special Labor- 
Management Committee on     
Restructuring (1999) 
3. KT management will minimize legal 
penalties against strike participants     
(1998) 
1. 9,063 redundancies through  
compulsory processes between 1998- 
1999 
2. Business restructuring* without union 
consent and without sufficient  
consultation with the union (1999) 
3. Arrest warrants for 10 union staffs and 
349 disciplinary actions against the  
strike participants (1998)** 
      Source: KTTU (1999); KTTU (2000a) 
      *withdrawal from several businesses such as Easyfax, Yeoido Information Business,    
      Airport Wireless Services and outsourcing of several services such as telegraph,  
      maintenance of CT-2, the operation of SLMOS, catering, building maintenance…etc. 
      ** The disciplinary action was withdrawn in 1999 but this was done after debilitating  
      the organizational power of the union caused by the imprisonment of the union  
      president and its officers 
 
 In this regard, the gap between the 1998 and 1999 agreements and the actual 
outcomes of restructuring during 1998-1999 was strikingly wide as shown in Table 4.2. 
In the written agreements, KT management acknowledged the union’s right to voice 
its opinion on the restructuring design and promised not to enforce compulsory 
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employment cuts. But KT management did not hesitate in breaking the agreement and 
went on unilaterally implementing its own restructuring plan by circumventing union-
management negotiation. The consultative function of the Special Labor-Management 
Committee was denied by unreciprocated management action until the full 
privatization of KT was completed in 2002. Overall, KTTU failed in forcing 
management to include union demands in the final outcome of restructuring. The 
major demands of KTTU were: 1. stop the compulsory employment reduction and 
guarantee employment security, 2. guarantee union participation in the decision-
making, 3.slow down the unilateral implementation of privatization policy and adopt 
the People’s Share Program, 4. not to sell KT to chaebols and to foreign investors and 
give priority to employee-owned stocks. KTTU also asked the government to bargain 
with the union to deliberately discuss these matters. The outcomes can be summarized 
as below:   
1. preventing the compulsory redundancies & guaranteeing employment security  
  ► failure in preventing approx. 12,000 ‘voluntary’ redundancies between 1998-  
     2001  
  ► partial success in lessening the scale of redundancies in 2000                              
  ► failure in negotiating employment security clause  
2. guaranteeing union participation in decision-making   
  ► failure in preventing management from bypassing union-management committee           
3. influencing the pace and method of privatization  
  ► failure in slowing down the process  
    (government changed its gradual privatization policy to full privatization policy  
    & shortened the timeline for privatization)  
► failure in persuading government to reflect public opinion on the restructuring      
 design and to build privatization policy on social consensus  
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 ► failure in making government adopt the People’s Share program  
4. preventing the sales of KT to chaebols and foreign investors 
 ► failure in preventing SK Telecom from being the largest shareholder                         
 ► failure in preventing foreign investors from being among the largest shareholders 
 ► success in obtaining approx. 6% of employee-owned stocks   
 
 Firstly, in terms of employment security, which was KTTU’s top concern, KTTU 
could not halt massive employment reduction (the reduction of approx. 15,000 
employees from 1997 to 2001). Although most reductions were made through the 
‘honorary resignation plan’ (approx. 12,000 redundancies through the plan from 1997 
to 2001), KT management exerted constant pressure for targeted employees to accept 
the plan against their will. Yet KTTU could not obstruct such management action. As a 
consequence of this, the number of redundancies even exceeded the targeted number 
proposed by the government (the reduction of 9,625 employees by 2000), which 
proves KTTU’s strategic ineffectiveness in terms of preventing compulsory 
redundancies and guaranteeing employment security over the privatization process.  
 Secondly, this was linked to KTTU’s failure in ensuring union participation in the 
restructuring design. The Special Labor-Management Committee was set up to 
promote the principle of co-determination on restructuring issues. Yet in spite of 
recurrent employer bypasses of union-management consultation, KTTU could not 
curb management excesses. Overall, KT management could implement their decisions 
without being significantly challenged by union.    
 Thirdly, while it was not plausible for KTTU to block the privatization of KT, 
there was a room for the union to have an impact on the pace and the shape of 
privatization in order to defend public interests. Indeed many countries adopted 
Golden Share programs in the transition of telecom monopolies to stock-companies. 
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They were introduced to control shareholder power that could curtail non-profitable 
public services. By giving government the right of decisive vote, this share aimed at 
preserving public interests in government companies undergoing the process of 
privatization. Similarly, KTTU suggested an alternative to the government-proposed 
radical privatization plan; one that appealed to the need to convert the cost of 
telephone equipment to government-issued stocks and to allocate them to general 
public. But in the end, KTTU’s claims were completely ignored and none of their 
demands were taken into consideration at the bargaining table. It was the same for the 
pace of privatization as KTTU was ineffective in slowing down the privatization 
process. On the contrary, the government changed the privatization policy for KT from 
gradual privatization to full and immediate privatization, which speeded up the whole 
process and shortened the schedule. When Kim Dae Jung’s Administration launched 
the privatization of KT, the government had 59% of its total shares, but the remaining 
government shares were all sold out and dropped to 0% in less than four years. Lack 
of coalition-building efforts contributed to the failure of putting the brakes on such a 
precipitated process of privatization as they deprived KTTU of social resources to 
pressure the government not to hasten the process and to consult broader public 
opinion. Lastly, KTTU argued for the need to prevent chaebols and foreign investors 
from becoming the largest shareholders. As for the outcome, KTTU could not prevent 
SK Telecom (SKT) and Brandes Investment Partners from becoming the largest 
shareholders in 2002 (KT, 2003; KISDI, 2005). And when SKT exchanged its KT 
shares with KT’s SKT shares immediately after the privatization of KT, Brandes 
Investment Partners became the largest shareholder (KISDI, ibid). Yet it could still 
obtain concessions regarding the employee stock ownership program (ESOP). In 
accordance with the union-management agreement, KT allocated approximately 5.7% 
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of its shares for employee-owned stocks in May 2002 at the time of privatization.65                
 In sum, apart from obtaining a substantial portion of employee-owned stocks, 
KTTU did not succeed in achieving their major demands. The process of 
restructuring/privatization was characterized by recurrent employer breaches of union-
management agreements as well as by continuous government ignorance of union 
demands. Yet KTTU was not able to change such attitudes nor was it capable of 
forcing the government and management to bargain faithfully with the union.    
 
2. The Strategic Effectiveness of KRWU against the Restructuring and 
Privatization of KNR 
 
The privatization of KNR was first made public in May 1999, which immediately 
prompted KRWU’s opposition. Although KRWU was under conservative leadership at 
that time, the union broke out of its decade-long labor quiescence and staged militant 
collective action. As already seen in the previous chapter, the challenge of the 
dissident group (KDRL) grew so significantly that the leadership was forced to 
escalate its anti-privatization campaign in order to avoid replacement. Hence, while it 
continued to lobby government officials and politicians and to file petitions against 
railway privatization, it also organized “a number of mass rallies throughout 2000” 
(Kang, 2002: 244). Such militant action culminated in the declaration of a joint strike 
with KNEWU in November 2000. Yet the leadership suddenly cancelled the strike in 
December 2000 and made a union-management agreement as presented in the 
previous chapter. This increased membership discontent and ultimately brought about 
leadership change in May 2001. In this section, the analysis of KRWU’s strategies will 
                                            
65 These facts are drawn from past newspaper articles. Cf. “KT will be privatized this month” Hankook 
Ilbo May 6, 2002, “KT announces privatization” Dong-A Ilbo May 6, 2002. 
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be focused on the strategic formulation of the new leadership.   
       
2-1. The Strategic Responses of KRWU  
 
1) Union Strategies under Kim Jae Kil’s Leadership  
 
The new leadership radically transformed the repertoire of collective action and began 
to organize a series of mass protests against the proposed government plan. This 
marked a second round of struggles against Kim Dae Jung’s government, which began 
to push railway privatization ahead by pre-announcing the legislation of related bills in 
January 2001. In response to this, the new leadership mobilized an all-out campaign 
against the government plan and prepared for a joint strike with six other public sector 
unions. There were several distinctive elements in union strategies as formulated by 
the new leadership.  
 Firstly, it focused on strengthening the mobilization capacity of the union, which 
had few institutional resources given that it was the first time that militant leadership 
had come to office. To start with, the new leadership sought to vitalize their regional 
divisions. For this reason, the newly elected union president Kim Jae-Kil held tours of 
local sites in June 2001 and increased contacts with regional officers and lay members. 
Then the new leadership organized a series of membership education meetings at 
regional levels both for union officers and rank and file members. Through intensive 
educational activities, the leadership explained the negative effects of railway 
privatization and encouraged union members to participate in a variety of union 
collective actions against privatization. During July, August and September 2001 the 
leadership organized 40 educational sessions in five regional divisions (KRWU, 
2002a: 115). At the same time, the leadership organized a performance group to set up 
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a propaganda play named ‘The Journey on Railway Tracks (Cheoloyeokjung)’ at 
major regional stations. The play was aimed at informing both union members and the 
general public about the negative sides of the railway privatization policy and at 
mobilizing broad support for union claims. The play started at Seoul Train Station on 
September 10th and held 23 performances during 62 days before the February 25th 
strike of 2002. By organizing the performances, KRWU also sought to build coalition 
with local civil organizations and to strengthen the organizational basis of its regional 
divisions (KRWU, ibid). Then the leadership also launched a series of educational 
meetings on the 2002 Special Collective Bargaining to get members sufficiently 
informed about union demands and its bargaining strategies. These education meetings 
began in Busan on January 12th 2002 and went until February 1st with a total of 29 
sessions in five regional divisions (10 educational sessions in the Busan regional 
division, eight sessions in the Youngju regional division, three sessions in the Daejon 
regional division, two sessions in the Seoul regional division and six sessions in the 
Suncheon regional division (KRWU, ibid: 117). At the same time, the leadership 
escalated mass protests in preparation for the general strike. For this, KRWU 
organized a Central Action Team that recruited volunteer union members who were 
willing to actively engage in the anti-privatization campaign, and it also staged a 
number of mass demonstrations. On November 28th-29th 2001, it held a strike ballot, 
in which 72.23% of voters approved the strike action. It was followed by central mass 
rallies held on December 7th and on February 3rd in Seoul and by a series of rallies 
organized at each regional division on February 16th and 17th to demonstrate 
membership resoluteness to strike (KRWU, ibid: 93-94). In short, the new leadership 
attempted to mobilize members from the bottom by solidifying the regional/local basis 
of the union. Its aim was to build an internally well-organized union to increase the 
mobilizing power of membership. Based on this, KRWU threatened to strike to put 
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pressure on the government.  
 Secondly, KRWU built and expanded inter-union coalition to complement weak 
power resources. “The most and remarkable efforts were seen in the launch of the 
‘Joint Alliance of Public Sector Unions for Blocking Privatization of National Key 
Industries’ at the end of October 2001” (Kang, 2002: 249) to which KRWU 
participated with five other unions that were KGCU, PPIU, the Korea Electric 
Technology Union, the High Speed Rail Union and the District Heating Corp. Union. 
Individually, these public sector unions lacked sufficient power to force the 
government to bargain with them. Hence they tried to enhance labor solidarity to 
maximize their bargaining leverage built on collective efforts. Unlike KTTU, which 
was rather reluctant to become part of this alliance, KRWU actively sought to expand 
joint activities with other public sector unions that had a common interest at stake. 
Together with the other unions, KRWU demanded that the government review the 
privatization policy and bargain directly with the union on the privatization and 
restructuring issues. It also coordinated a joint strike ballot at the end of November 
and threatened to strike unless the government called off the legislation of 
privatization bills. Ultimately three unions of the Alliance, namely KRWU, KGCU 
and PPIU went on a joint strike on February 25th 2002 to prevent the Assembly from 
deliberating railway and gas privatization bills. Although the three unions could not 
stand together until they achieved the same outcomes66, KRWU benefited from the 
coordinated strike action as it enabled the union to exert leverage vis-à-vis the 
government.   
 Thirdly, KRWU also began to connect itself to broader social movement and civil 
organizations. In the past, KRWU had not forged strategic alliances with other forces 
                                            
66 KGCU ended the strike the next day by reaching an agreement and KRWU also ended the strike on 
February 27th leaving the PPIU to continue the strike by itself for six weeks.   
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of civil society, but it started to put considerable weight on coalition building when the 
new leadership took office. Hence it is noteworthy that KRWU established a joint 
research team (‘Research Team for Opposing Railway Privatization and for Building 
Public Railway’) with progressive academia to develop a strong counter argument and 
alternatives to government policy. The research team was constituted of union officers 
specialized in policy-making from KRWU, KCTU and the Korea Federation of Public 
Sector Unions, university professors and labor experts, and worked from July 16th 
2001 to January 15th 2002 (KRWU, 2002a: 119). The team published a research report 
whereby it criticized the finalized privatization bills and argued for the need to 
construct a public model of restructuring based on the studies of railway restructuring 
in other countries. Then KRWU used the research findings to persuade the government 
officials, the leaders of political parties and the members of the Committee of 
Construction and Transportation of National Assembly not to support the legislation of 
privatization bills (KRWU, 2002a: 124-125; KRWU, 2002b). Emphasis on strategic 
research in collaboration with academia was a new component of union activity in 
KRWU, which provided opportunities to develop a rationale for union claims and to 
reach out to broader constituents of civil society. At the same time, KRWU also sought 
to organize joint action with the National Joint Committee for Opposing Privatization 
and Overseas Sales of Public Industries, a coalition of 42 organizations that included 
labor confederations (FKTU and KCTU), KDLP, various labor movement 
organizations, religious organizations, and broad social movement organizations 
including organizations for civil movement and student movement. KRWU allied 
itself with these various political and social groups and attempted to mobilize public 
support by expanding the collaborative campaign. In doing this, it proposed to 
establish an institutional framework for social dialogue in which government, union 
and civil organizations participated and brainstormed for railway development 
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(KRWU, 2002a). Although such a demand was not accepted by the government, it 
provided the groundwork on which KRWU could further build and expand its social 
coalition.    
 In this process, KRWU framed the campaign as a defense for public good. It 
argued that railway privatization will sacrifice public interests for profitability and that 
the right to universal services for the socially-disadvantaged will be undermined by a 
profit-centered railway operation, which will eliminate deficit railway lines and 
increase transportation fares. It also called public attention to safety issues as the 
separation of infrastructure/operation and the split sales of railways will damage the 
integrative railway system and will create an ever-present risk for fatal accidents. 
Similarly, it argued that private ownership will also increase the danger of accidents by 
reducing the investment for railway facilities. As an alternative to the privatization 
model, it advocated a public railway model that turned attention to the need to 
recognize the strategic importance of the railway industry as an environmentally-
friendly, low energy-consuming industry and to increase PSO compensations to 
expand and develop railway infrastructure and services (KRWU, 2002a; KRWU, 
2002b; Personal interviews). Based on this principle, KRWU made its major claims in 
an appeal to defend and assert public needs against service cutbacks and assembled 
coalition around these publicly defined goals. In doing this, it used various means to 
draw public attention to the negative effects of privatization and to gain broad support 
for union claims: putting up posters at railway stations, advertising in newspapers, 
distributing leaflets on streets, holding joint press conferences, organizing public 
hearings and mass rallies in coalition with other public sector unions and civil 
organizations (KRWU, ibid). Such processes helped increase public support for the 
union by avoiding “appearing as simply defending narrow self-interest” (Kang, 2002: 
258) and by appearing instead as a promoter of public interests.    
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 Lastly, KRWU demanded for direct union-government bargaining while it 
threatened to strike, which constituted another conspicuous characteristic of union 
strategy. Past studies also paid attention to this element and defined the February 2002 
special bargaining period as one that constituted the formative stage of union-
government bargaining (Kang & Kwon, 2004; Bae K-S, 2004). The formation of such 
a relationship between KRWU and the government was all the more astonishing given 
that collective bargaining tradition had been missing on the scene of labor relations at 
KNR until the new leadership came to power. In the past, the conservative leadership 
had substituted labor management consultation for collective bargaining and KRWU 
lived for decades without established bargaining system (KDRL, 2001b; Kang, 2002). 
Moreover, KNR management refused to bargain with KRWU on the matter of 
privatization and reinstatement of laid-off workers, and confined the scope of 
bargaining to issues related to ‘working conditions’ alone (Kang, ibid). Despite all 
these institutional constraints, KRWU pushed the government to discuss the 
privatization and restructuring issues at the bargaining table. For this, it tried to 
complement its weak bargaining leverage by building on membership mobilization 
and social coalitions. In terms of the outcomes, the government acknowledged KRWU 
as a bargaining partner and included privatization/restructuring issues into the subjects 
of bargaining. The Special Collective Bargaining Agreement of February 27th 
evidenced that KRWU was able to bargain on equal terms with the government. This 
was not so much a product of a sympathetic government attitude to KRWU. Rather it 
was derived from the increase in the strategic capacity of the union to overcome its 
weak institutional resources by fortifying its internal organization and devising various 
mobilizing tactics.  
 The outcomes of February 25th strike were reflected in the February 27th 
agreement, which proved the partial success of union strategies (Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3 The agreement of February 27, 2001 
 
Issues The contents of agreement 
 
Privatization 
Both union and management will acknowledge that the railway is an important 
means of public transportation and will make collective efforts for public 
development of the railway.  
Workforce 
supplementation 
The workforce supplementation will be carried out step by step based on the 
results of an analysis by management of KNR.    
Reinstatement of 
Laid-off workers 
Both union and management will make the best efforts to implement the tripartite 
agreement agreed to in late 2000. 
 
Working 
conditions 
Day and night shifts will be changed to two shifts on three rosters without cuts in 
allowances (gradual implementation from 2003, accomplishment by 2004).  
Improvement in safety inspection; increase in fringe benefits and in employee 
welfare.   
 
Guaranteeing union 
security 
KNR will guarantee the right for union activity and will not practice unfair 
displacement of union members. 
KNR will make best efforts to minimize legal penalties on union officers and 
members who had been objects of lawsuit during the strike.  
Source: KRWU (2002a); 188-202; Kang & Kwon (2004) 
 
In terms of the privatization issues, the agreement remained superficial as it did not 
specify the withdrawal of railway privatization policy in accordance with union 
demands. The agreement presented an abstract statement that recognized the principle 
of a public railway, yet still left room for different interpretations for union and 
management. Despite this limit, KRWU succeeded in making KNR yield to union 
requests and to accept to discuss the privatization issues at the bargaining table 
although KNR had resisted this. As for workforce supplementation and reinstatement 
of discharged workers, union success also remained partial as KNR did not specify the 
amount of workforce increase or the date of reinstatement. Hence, although KNR 
granted concessions to union demands, the agreement was still too equivocal to ensure 
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management to take actual measures. Nevertheless, such an agreement prevented 
management from achieving its target employment reduction as planned in the mid-
1990s. Not only did it put the brakes on the expansion of employment cuts but it also 
forced management to admit the need to increase the number of workers, which could 
be considered a considerable gain for the union. Regarding working conditions, 
KRWU succeeded in changing the shift rosters and gained concessions that included 
the reduction of working hours and the increase in fringe benefits and employee 
welfare (KRWU, 2002a: 188-202).  
 Overall, the outcomes were more a success than a failure given the weak 
institutional basis of KRWU. And they contributed to union integrity as the agreement 
was approved by the majority of its members (70.3%) in the ballot held from March 
11th to March 13th 2002 (3/14/2002 KRWU breaking news leaflet in KRWU, 2002a, 
533). Yet they remained a half-success as some of the clauses left room for 
management to evade the agreements. Such was the case for the union protection 
clause as KNR launched a retaliatory disciplinary action after the strike, by which 
“eight union leaders including the president were imprisoned for leading an illegal 
strike, whilst as many as 57 unionists were prosecuted and 24 were dismissed. In 
addition to this, management even put union money under provisional attachment” for 
the loss of revenue caused by the strike (Kang, 2002: 251). Hence the union 
organization was once again destabilized by harsh management backlash and faced 
further possibilities of employer violation in the February 27th agreement. KRWU 
reacted by organizing a by-election to sustain membership commitment and to rebuild 
its internal organization as quickly as possible for tackling railway restructuring. 
Consequently, the president Kim Jae-Kil resigned from his office and Chun Hwan-
Kyu, a descendent of the democratic leadership, took control of KRWU after being 
elected in August 2002 (KRWU, 2003a: 377-379). Thus the task of protecting the 
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gains and enforcing the agreement was handed over to the 2nd democratic leadership.      
 
2) Union Strategies under Chun Hwan Kyu’s Leadership 
 
Upon taking office on August 8th 2002, the new leadership realigned the organization 
for contract struggle in the regular collective bargaining that started from November 
2002. At this time, KRWU concentrated all its resources on preparation for the 
contract struggle and held a series of membership rallies at its regional divisions 
during lunch time and at closing time. It also organized nationwide mass 
demonstrations both independently and in conjunction with the National Joint 
Committee for Opposing Privatization to escalate its pressures on KNR (KRWU, 
2003a). Hence as soon as the new leadership took control of union, it had to leave its 
day-to-day union activities and move quickly to prepare for the upcoming struggle. Its 
goal was to turn the half-success of the February 25th strike into full success by forcing 
management to adhere to the February 27th agreement and by achieving its major 
demands, which were: 1. to cancel the adoption of a single driver system and recruit 
new employees to supplement workforce shortage, 2. to cancel further contracting out, 
3. to reinstate the laid-off workers, 4. to cancel the lawsuits against the union and to 
guarantee union activity, and 5. to repeal the railway privatization bills and to develop 
public railway (KRWU, ibid). And as KNR and the government ignored the 2.27 
agreement by starting massive disciplinary actions, the new leadership primarily 
resorted to confrontational tactics to coerce the employer into faithful negotiation 
(KRWU, ibid).  
 As the new leadership had to quickly move on to contract struggle, it also tried to 
mobilize its members in a short period of time. For this reason, membership education 
was not organized as much as it had been before. The schedule for collective 
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bargaining was too tight to devote enough time to intensive education. Yet, the 
leadership sought to increase membership participation by other means. First, 
members were encouraged to attend union meetings and ballots. The leadership 
organized two ballots, one on November 4th for changing the national umbrella 
organization and the other one on February 17th-19th for strike action.67 It also set up 
an ‘unfair labor practice report center’ and urged members to file grievances against 
management offensives on union activities (KRWU, 2003a). Lastly, it mobilized 
members into a series of mass rallies and organized a week of ‘work to rule’ struggles 
(April 11-18) to draw public attention to safety issues and to gain public support for 
the strike (KRWU, ibid).    
 Yet the most distinctive characteristics of union strategies at the time were 
associated with building strategic alliances with various political/social groups. In this 
respect it is noteworthy that the contract struggle coincided with the presidential 
election, which provided greater opportunities for KRWU to increase political 
exchanges with politicians/political parties and use them for gaining support for union 
claims. As seen in the previous chapter, candidates of the major political parties 
became more responsive to union demands as they strove to win labor’s support 
during the electoral campaign. KRWU grasped these opportunities to make political 
allies and to acquire power resources through them. At first, KRWU’s leadership sent a 
questionnaire to the candidates and strongly requested them to revise railway 
privatization policies. Based on the findings of strategic researches it had continued to 
carry out with progressive academia, KRWU could not only denounce major problems 
linked to railway privatization but also provide convincing counterarguments to 
                                            
67 The vote for changing KRWU’s affiliation to a national confederation from FKTU to KCTU had a 
high rate of membership participation with 94.08% voter turnout. As a result of this vote (54.02% in 
support of the change), KRWU disaffiliated from FKTU and affiliated itself with KCTU (KRWU, 
2003a, 393). The strike vote ended up with 51.62% of votes in favor of strike action on 89.9% voter 
turnout (KRWU, ibid: 106).    
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persuade the candidates to abandon the policy and to ally themselves with the union to 
develop a public model of railway restructuring. At the same time, it expanded other 
political channels by contacting members of the National Assembly both formally and 
informally and by organizing public hearings on the railway restructuring bills 
(KRWU, 2003a). The efforts put on joint strategic research helped dispel the negative 
perception of the union as a secluded group that objected to government policy 
without any alternatives and made it possible for KRWU to lay out a logical basis of 
their criticisms and to speak convincingly to their counterparts and to the public at 
large. Positive answers from the major candidates were obtained through these 
persistent efforts that KRWU made to get the union’s opinion reflected in government 
policy. In response to these attempts, not only did the candidate of the Democratic 
Party but also the candidate of the right-wing Grand National Party promised that they 
would revise the railway privatization plan and that they would not enforce the plan 
without social consensus (KRWU, 2003b). This gave KRWU possible points of 
pressure for later on as KRWU could demand that they keep their election pledges. 
Hence, when the Democratic candidate, Roh Moo Hyun, was elected as president in 
December 2002, KRWU mounted its political pressure on the new government. 
KRWU conveyed a written opinion on railway restructuring to the presidential 
undertaking committee on January 10th 2003 and it had a discussion meeting with the 
committee on January 22nd (KRWU, 2003a: 133). Apart from these official contacts, it 
also met the committee members and government officials informally to persuade 
them to incorporate union demands into the final design of railway restructuring. 
Among the committee members, there were those who had labor movement 
backgrounds, which increased communicative channels for the union. KRWU 
leadership did not miss this opportunity and took advantage of the latter to increase its 
influence on policy-making (Personal interviews). KRWU also persisted in contacting 
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members of the Construction and Transportation Committee of National Assembly to 
gain their support for union cause (KRWU, ibid: 139). By using these channels, 
KRWU kept on criticizing the new government for not abandoning the privatization 
policy while having decided on the corporatization of railway operation. As an 
alternative to this, KRWU demanded the government discard the railway privatization 
bills first and come up with a railway development policy with new emphasis on the 
public needs.    
 Based on this principle, KRWU continued to ask Roh Moo Hyun’s government to 
adhere to his public pledge. This was done through a dual strategy that combined 
negotiation and confrontation. Indeed if the previous leadership experienced the 
formative period of union-government bargaining, this time the leadership contributed 
to the advancement of this bargaining relationship. The result of the latter was 
crystallized in the union-government agreement of April 20th 2003, by which KRWU 
obtained substantial concessions from the government including its clear statement on 
the retraction of the railway privatization plan. Apart from the decision on the vertical 
separation of infrastructure/operation, the rest of the agreement reflected all the 
demands of the union. Yet such outcomes could not automatically derive from a more 
compromising approach of the new government towards labor demands. It is 
undeniable that the government was willing to revise the privatization of network 
industries, but it could not yield to all the major demands of union unless KRWU 
exerted strong influence on the course of negotiations. Furthermore, there was no 
reason for the government to stipulate the withdrawal of the railway privatization 
policy as it could hold from pushing for gradual privatization of the railway industry 
in the future once the vertical split was accomplished. Yet the government 
accommodated almost all the union demands, which evidences the role of union 
strategies in leading successful outcomes. This was done through union efforts to 
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balance between negotiation and contestation. Indeed, the union-government 
negotiation was itself an outcome of the increased bargaining leverage of KRWU as 
the union envisaged to go beyond petition and to institutionalize union-government 
bargaining (KRWU, 2003a: 139). At the actual level, although KRWU failed to 
stabilize its bargaining relationship with the government and had to content itself with 
a provisional arrangement, it nonetheless succeeded in bringing the government to the 
bargaining table and gained concessions through the negotiated agreement. For this, 
KRWU also had to resort to militancy to mobilize mass opposition to the railway 
privatization plan in order to increase its bargaining power and to exert effective 
pressure on government. According to the KRWU leadership, “the bargaining with 
government cannot go beyond ritualized formal talks unless it is backed up with 
mobilizing power of union” (KRWU, ibid). Hence while it tried to engage in collective 
bargaining with the government, it also threatened to strike and used confrontational 
tactics to force the government to negotiate with the union. A flexible combination of 
negotiation with contract struggle was another conspicuous element of KRWU’s 
strategies that contributed to the relative success of the union. 
 Lastly, KRWU continued to connect itself with broader social constituencies by 
framing the campaign as a fight to defend public operation of the railway and by 
building social coalitions around these public needs. It tried to consolidate the strategic 
bond with other public sector unions, notably with PPIU, and it also sought to expand 
its alliance with other social movement organizations, one that it had developed since 
the previous leadership (KRWU, 2003a). Hence it actively participated in the coalition 
activities organized by the National Joint Committee for Opposing Privatization and 
sought to render the alliance more or less sustainable. The broad social coalition 
helped KRWU expand its claims and gain public support, which gave more power 
resources to the union. Strategic alliance was indispensable to conserve momentum for 
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the union campaign and to overcome the limit of relatively low membership support 
for the strike (57.42% of support). In order to complement the limit, KRWU had to 
demonstrate its mobilization capacity to escalate effective pressure on government. 
Social coalitions contributed to enhance such strategic ability.  
 
2-2. Assessing the Strategic Effectiveness of KRWU 
 
KRWU obtained considerable concessions from government. The substantial union 
gains can be evidenced by both the union-government agreement of April 20th 2003 
and by the final contents of the railway restructuring bills (The Basic Law on the 
Development of Railway Industry and the Railroad Infrastructure Authority Act) that 
were legislated on June 30th 2003.  
 To start with, the comparison between the initial union demands and the negotiated 
agreement of April 20th proves that KRWU succeeded in ensuring its interests as the 
government/KNR incorporated almost all the major demands of the union. As seen in 
Table 4.4, KRWU obtained milestone concessions from the agreement. First, it made 
the government abandon the railway privatization policy. Although Roh Moo Hyun’s 
Administration had publicly announced that it would revise the privatization policy 
and that it would at first push for railway restructuring based on the vertical separation 
between infrastructure and operation, it had never officially called off the railway 
privatization policy. Besides, as the previous government had made it clear that 
railway restructuring would be pursued as part of a gradual privatization process, 
vertical separation could be seen as a preliminary stage that laid the groundwork for 
privatization. As opposed to this, KRWU requested the government to withdraw the 
railway privatization bills and to officially announce the withdrawal of the railway 
privatization policy.  
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Table 4.4 Comparison of union demands and the contents of the 4.20 Agreement 
 
Issues Union Demands 4.20 Agreement 
Privatization 
The withdrawal of the railway 
privatization bill that had been 
pending in the National 
Assembly 
Withdrawal of the previous privatization plan 
and search for alternatives considering the 
public nature of the railway industry 
Railway 
Restructuring 
Annulment of the railway 
restructuring model based on 
the separation between 
infrastructure and operation; 
social consensus building for 
developing a public model of 
railway restructuring 
The search for an alternative such as 
integrating maintenance function into railway 
operation part; the pursuit of railway reform 
through consultation and consensus-building 
among interest parties. 
Workforce 
Increase 
The withdrawal of the proposed 
single-driver system; the 
supplementation of workforce 
shortages by recruiting new staff
The withdrawal of the single-driver system; 
the supplementation of workforce shortages 
by assuring 1,500 new staff quota by late 
June; gradual recruitment of 1,358 employees 
by late December to meet the required 
personnel by new businesses. 
Reinstatement of 
laid-off workers 
Reinstatement of laid-off 
workers 
New hire of 45 laid-off workers by late July. 
Lawsuit 
The withdrawal of lawsuits 
against union members 
The annulment of provisional seizure of union 
assets/ individual salaries; the annulment of 
damage suits 
Source: KRWU (2003a)  
  
 In the end, the government complied with union demands and stipulated the 
annulment of railway privatization in the agreement. The fourth clause of the 
agreement stated: 
 
• Railway reform will focus on the development of the railway industry, the 
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reinforcement of public interests and the improvement of universal services for the 
general public. 
• Considering the public nature of the railway, the previous privatization policy will be 
withdrawn in search for alternatives.     
• With regard to the separation of infrastructure and operation, alternatives will be 
sought such as the integration of the maintenance and repair work (which is closely 
related to train safety) into the service operation. 
• In the future, the railway reform will be pursued through sufficient discussion with 
stakeholders and through social consensus building such as public hearings. If, 
related bills will be drafted through such process, both management and union will 
put joint efforts for the passage of the bills at the Assembly (KRWU, 2003a: 196).        
 
 Hence the government fully embraced union demands to call off the privatization 
plan. For sure, KRWU could not assure the withdrawal of the government 
restructuring plan based on the split of infrastructure/operation. Yet by forcing the 
government to make the withdrawal of the former privatization policy official, it 
succeeded in obstructing the legislation of railway privatization bills and in 
demolishing the grounds for gradual privatization. Apparently, Roh Moo Hyun’s 
government’s finalized railway restructuring plan looked similar to Kim Dae Jung’s 
government’s plan as they both proposed to separate the railway infrastructure part 
from its operation part. Yet there lay a fundamental difference between the two as the 
former government’s plan clarified that the operation part would ultimately be sold to 
private investors while Roh Moo Hyun’s government annulled this plan and promised 
to stop pushing railway privatization forward.    
 Secondly, in regards to the issue of the maintenance and repair work, the 
government envisaged to revert it to the Korean Railroad Construction Authority while 
KRWU opposed this plan on the grounds that the separation of the maintenance and 
repair part from operations might cause safety problems. The compromise reached by 
the 4.20 Agreement supported union demands by admitting the need to put the 
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maintenance and repair work under the jurisdiction of railway operation as it stated, 
“alternatives will be sought such as the integration of the maintenance and repair work 
into service operations.” (KRWU, 2003a: 196)  
 KRWU also secured remarkable gains in other areas. The agreement clearly stated 
that “single-driver system will not be adopted for safe train operation and that it will 
hire new workforce for the shortage caused by such action” (KRWU, 2003a: 194). It 
also gained management agreement for ‘the reinstatement of laid off workers” and for 
“the annulment of lawsuits against union.” KRWU had continuously demanded the 
recruitment of new workers to supplement workforce shortages and for the 
reinstatement of dismissed workers (KRWU, ibid: 195). The 4.20 Agreement was 
fruitful enough to achieve these long-time union objectives.  
 The evaluation of the agreement also confirmed KRWU’s groundbreaking 
achievements. First, KRWU itself considered the agreement as “the victory of railway 
workers.” According to the union report, “railway workers obtained most of its five 
major demands by threatening to strike.” “The agreements on ‘the principle of public 
needs’, ‘the withdrawal of privatization plan’ and ‘the integration of maintenance and 
repair function with railway operation’ would place the union in an advantageous 
position to uphold its cause in its later struggle for defending the public railway 
(KRWU, 2003a: 206-207).” Hence, not only was the agreement itself fruitful but it 
also provided KRWU with greater possibilities to effectively pressure 
government/management in the near future. 
 The reaction of the conservative media also evidenced union success as they 
expressed strong dissatisfaction about the bargaining outcomes. Even before the 
agreement was reached, the media had stressed the need to push for railway 
privatization and argued that “as fundamental improvement of railway management 
could not be possible unless KNR breaks out of its public ownership, it is necessary at 
 162
least to fix the schedule and future plan for privatization after corporatization (Maeil 
Business Newspaper, January 29, 2003).” Based on this view, the conservative press 
criticized the Agreement in unison. Here are some excerpts from the newspaper 
editorials: 
 
• “The principle of dialogue and compromise that the government advocated 
degenerated into a lopsided grant of concessions by management…The government 
broke the principle itself and unilaterally empowered the union.” (Chosun Ilbo, April 
22, 2003)    
• “The government left a bad precedent by subordinating to union pressures and by 
proving that the government could be pushed down by force.” (JoongAng Ilbo 
Editorial, April 22, 2003) 
• “The government had announced that it will take a firm stand against excessive 
union demands. But the result was the accommodation of almost all of union 
demands.” (Segye Ilbo Editorial, April 22, 2003) 
 
In short, conservative forces expressed their deep frustrations about the bargaining 
outcomes. By doing this, they proved KRWU’s relative success vis-à-vis 
government/management.  Yet as seen in the case of KT, the written agreement itself 
cannot be proof of the strategic effectiveness of unions as employers can breach the 
agreement and go on implementing their decisions unilaterally. In fact KRWU also 
entered a strained relationship with the government after the 4.20 Agreement and went 
on strike just two months after the agreement had been reached. The strike was 
instantly mobilized on June 28th 2003 against the passage of railway restructuring bills 
when an Assembly member named Lee Ho-Ung introduced them in the Assembly on 
June 9th. KRWU considered this a violation of the agreement that promised to build 
the railway reform on social consensus. KRWU demanded to postpone the legislation 
of related bills until September on the grounds that it needed to go through an internal 
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fine-tuning process to come up with a reasonable restructuring plan based on 
membership consensus. Yet the government ignored the demand and took steps for the 
legislation. The June 28th strike was organized to protest against this move, but it 
failed in preventing the Assembly from passing the bills. In the end, the Basic Law on 
the Development of Railway Industry and the Railroad Infrastructure Act passed the 
Assembly plenary session on June 30th 2003. Nevertheless the final contents of the 
bills still contained major concessions that the government had granted before. It 
reflected union interests in many respects, which can be evidenced by comparing the 
contents of the railway privatization bill proposed by the MOCT in 2001 and the 
contents of final legislation of 2003 (Table 4.5). 
 
Table 4.5 Comparison between 2001 and 2003 railway restructuring 
 
 2001 bills (A) The finalized 2003 bills (B) 
 
General Direction 
Aiming for the establishment of an 
efficient private sector for railway 
operation based on the market 
economy   
The pursuit of both efficiency and 
public interests 
 
 
Form of Corporation 
Korean Railway Corporation. 
A stock company with 100% 
government share that will be 
regulated by the Act for Structural 
Reform and Privatization of Public 
Enterprises  
Public Corporation.  
A non-stock government invested 
company that will be regulated by the 
Government Invested Enterprise 
Regulation Act 
Privatization ‘Gradual sales to private investors’ 
(Article 18) 
Elimination of Article 18 
Contracting out to 
private sector 
The contracting out of operation and 
management of railway lines to 
private investors (Article 24) 
Elimination of Article 24 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Maintenance and repair work under 
the control of infrastructural part (KR) 
KR has the ownership of the 
maintenance and repair business but 
the operation company (KRC) 
actually runs the business  
Employment 
Protection 
Not specified  -Comprehensive employment transfer 
(Article 25).            
-Protective measures against the 
deterioration of working conditions 
and severance pay (Article 25).  
Source: MOCT (2001b, 2003b) 
 
 Firstly, in regards to the principle of railway operation, the past bill made it clear 
that it would aim at the establishment of a market economy by introducing competitive 
logic into railway industry while the finalized bill advocated both the efficiency and 
public interests. Secondly, in regards to the form of the operation company, the 2001 
bill proposed to establish a corporation with 100% government shares that would be 
subject to the ‘Act for Structural Reform and Privatization of Public Enterprises’ and 
that would thus be targeted for gradual privatization. By contrast, the Basic Law on 
the Development of Railway Industry clarified that the form of the company would be 
a public corporation that would not issue stocks and that would be governed by the 
‘Government Invested Enterprise Regulation Act’. Accordingly, with regards to 
railway privatization, the past bill contained articles that laid the groundwork for 
gradual privatization such as ‘gradual sales of government share to private investors 
(Article 18)’ and ‘contracting out some lines to private operators (Article 24).’ But the 
Basic Law deleted all these articles and eliminated the legal basis for gradual 
privatization. Thirdly, the new bill specified that the infrastructural part has the 
ultimate ownership of maintenance and repair work as opposed to the 4.20 agreement, 
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which advocated the integration of the maintenance and repair function into the 
railway operation part. But the bill still left space for negotiation as it stated that ‘[t]he 
Construction Authority owns the maintenance part but the Korean Railway 
Corporation will take charge of operating the maintenance and repair work’. It was a 
compromise between the two opposing views, which attempted to appease the union 
by assigning the responsibility of the operation of maintenance and repair work to the 
operation company. Lastly, the Basic Law clarified that the law will guarantee 
employment security by stipulating ‘100 % of employment transfer (Article 25)’ and 
that it would protect the transferred workers from deterioration of working conditions 
and severance pay (Article 25).  
 The changes from (A) to (B) as indicated in the Table 4.5 meant more than a mere 
modification of legal provisions. There was a fundamental difference between the two. 
While the bill (A) was drafted to lay the foundation for privatization of railway 
operations, the bill (B) eliminated the very groundwork. It also reflected the 
incorporation of union interests related to the protection of employment security and 
working conditions, which were also beneficial to labor. In short, the transition from 
(A) to (B) indicates the labor-mediated character of railway restructuring as well as 
union success in guaranteeing their interests during the restructuring process. In the 
end, KRWU utterly derailed the privatization plan. When the MOCT finalized its 
railway restructuring plan, it envisaged to achieve the privatization of the railway 
operation company by 2010 by incrementally selling government shares starting in 
2005. But the schedule for this itinerary was delayed and neither the gradual sales nor 
contracting out to private investors has been carried out since then. In this sense, 
KRWU contributed to change the pace and shape of restructuring. Consequently, the 
Korea Railway Corporation has remained a public corporation up to present.     
 Besides, KRWU also succeeded in preventing compulsory employment reduction. 
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As already seen, it made the employer drop the single-driver system out and to hire 
new employees for supplementing workforce shortage. In this process, KRWU 
convincingly appealed to the need to sustain sufficient staff levels for the safety of 
train operations. It also succeeded in reinstating laid-off workers as KNR management 
followed the negotiated agreement. Hence, although the MPB intended to carry out 
employment cuts from 1999, this process was held back by union efforts to 
supplement workforce shortages and to prevent compulsory reduction. The result was 
a very modest reduction from 1999 to 2001 of 487 jobs, which was accomplished 
through natural decrease by retirement (see Table 4.7). This was far below the targeted 
number of reduction as set by KNR in 1999, which was 1,506 jobs for 1999, 2,346 in 
2000 and 341 in 2001(see Table 4.6) 
 
Table 4.6 Employment reduction target set by the Management Reform Plan 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Reduction target  by 1996 plan 1,236 1,370 1,156 1,054 1,551 7,307 
Reduction target  by 1999 plan 1,236 1,370 1,506 2,346 341 7,739 
  Source: KNR (2000c); Kang (2002)  
 
Table 4.7 The changes in employment at KNR from 1997 to 2001 
  Source: KNR (2001) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total 34,266 
31,608 
(-2,658) 
31,960  
(+352) 
31,707 
(-253) 
31,447 
(-260) 
Manual 26,835 
24,628 
(-2,207) 
25,096 
 (+468) 
24,120 
(-976) 
24,238  
(+118) 
Clerical 7,384 
6,959 
(-425) 
6,837 
(-122) 
7,301 
 (+467) 
7,209 
(-92) 
 
In the mid 1990s, KNR implemented its employment reduction plan through a massive 
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compulsory retirement of senior workers. Hence more than 2,500 compulsory 
redundancies occurred in 1998 when KNR shortened retirement age of manual 
workers by one year. Yet from 1999 onward KNR failed to meet the targeted reduction 
as demonstrated in the table. The main reason for this failure was effective union 
opposition to the proposed employment cuts from 1999 (Kang, 2002: 207). This 
contrasts with KT’s case where massive employment reduction was implemented by 
management from 1999 to 2001 without being significantly challenged by the union. 
 
3. Comparative Remarks 
 
The comparison between the strategic effectiveness of KTTU and KRWU 
demonstrated differences in the unions’ abilities to obtain concessions. While KTTU 
could not prevent the government from implementing unilateral restructuring, KRWU 
succeeded in obstructing the passage of privatization bills under Kim Dae Jung’s 
government and in reflecting its demands on the final bills under Roh Moo Hyun’s 
government. As a consequence, the privatization of KT was achieved within a 
compressed time horizon; one that was shorter than the original schedule set by the 
government. The employment cut was also more drastic and exceeded the number of 
targeted reductions proposed by the government’s plan. By contrast, railway 
restructuring undertook a much slower pace and incorporated major demands by 
KRWU in the process of its implementation. Not only did KRWU succeed in making 
the government retract the legislation of privatization bills and in abolishing the 
ground for gradual privatization, but it also was capable of inserting protective 
measures into the final design of the restructuring bills that would prevent the 
deterioration of both employment relations and working conditions.  
 In this respect, this chapter shed light on the differences in strategic formulation of 
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the two unions. Drawing upon four central strategic abilities that were identified in the 
first chapter, these differences between KTTU and KRWU can be summarized as 
follows.  
 
The ability to educate and mobilize members:  
Both unions tried to strengthen membership commitment and encourage membership 
participation in union activities in order to organize effective opposition. Yet union 
efforts for member education and mobilization were rather short-term at KTTU. 
Although the leadership organized site-visits and membership education, these were 
not done on a consistent basis and tended to be one-off events. Membership 
mobilization for mass rallies was also one key element of union strategies during the 
first and second democratic leadership. Yet the mobilization was not accompanied 
with a sustained effort to strengthen the lay organizations. Thus, when leadership 
considered the mobilization capacity was too low to stage mass protests, it often 
replaced membership mobilization with lead struggles by union officers. The 
substitution of sit-in protests or hunger strikes by union officers for grassroots 
mobilization exhausted the source of mobilizing power. Moreover, the communication 
between leadership and rank-and-file members was often too weak to gain 
membership support for leadership decision (Personal interviews). Hence, when the 
leadership unilaterally called off the strikes, it not only increased membership defiance 
towards the leadership but also intensified the internal division. Together these factors 
further eroded the mobilizing power of membership.  
  KRWU was also constrained by the weak institutional and organizational bases as 
it was the first time that the militant leadership took office. Yet compared to KTTU, 
the new leadership put more emphasis on realigning the lay organization from the 
beginning and put more efforts on fortifying the regional and local bases of the union. 
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This led to a series of thorough membership education sessions held at regional offices 
and through a variety of activities such as a performance tour held at major railway 
stations. For sure, the urgent task of tackling privatization and other restructuring 
issues often required instant membership mobilization that hindered to establish day-
to-day organizational activities on a more long-term basis. Despite these limits, 
KRWU demonstrated a relatively strong mobilization capacity. Besides, unlike the 
KTTU case in which the union-management agreement aroused membership criticism 
and aggravated the internal split, KRWU’s leadership could assert its authority by 
organizing ratification votes that resulted in winning the majority of membership votes. 
This contributed to increased membership commitment to union leadership. KRWU 
also organized a by-election when the strategic capacity of leadership was undermined 
by disciplinary action, which also helped sustain the mobilizing power of union.    
                                                                                   
The ability to flexibly combine negotiation and confrontation: 
Unions often lack the ability to balance negotiation and confrontation and reside in 
one-sided strategies. KTTU leadership also oscillated between concessionary 
bargaining and militant collective action. When it organized mass protests and 
disruptive actions, it could not effectively use them to increase its bargaining leverage. 
Militant collective action merely remained symbolic and did not bring about fruitful 
bargaining outcomes. Lack of ability to use the mobilizing power of members to 
increase bargaining leverage placed the union in a defensive position during the 
bargaining session. Hence, rather than combining collective bargaining with 
confrontational tactics, KTTU went from one extreme to the other, from sporadic 
protests to concession bargaining. In the face of a government/management hard-line 
policy, it often threatened to strike to gain better bargaining outcomes, but it soon 
called off the strikes without guaranteed concessions from government.   
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 KRWU’s leadership proved to be more effective in balancing negotiation and 
confrontation. It considered that it was necessary to build upon its mobilizing power in 
order to bargain on equal terms with government/management. Hence while it saw the 
importance of reaching compromises and negotiating agreements through collective 
bargaining, it tried to mobilize various confrontational tactics to gain leverage to exert 
pressure on the government. When it organized mass rallies, sit-in protests, strike 
actions or threatened to strike and work-to-rule struggles, it used them to force the 
government to bargain with the union and to make more concessions. Both the 2.27 
Agreement and the 4.20 Agreement were reached by such a successful combination of 
negotiation and confrontation.  
 
The ability to create multiple political channels:  
Both unions demanded the government accept to bargain with them. Yet only KRWU 
succeeded in persuading the government to directly negotiate with the union. For sure, 
the increased political opportunities linked to the presidential election and to 
government change provided KRWU with a more advantageous position to multiply 
communicative channels within the polity and to voice its opinion through them. Yet it 
is also true that there were still possibilities for KTTU to engage in political exchanges 
with various political actors by using established institutions such as the Tripartite 
Commission and by increasing its contacts with pro-labor government officials or 
politicians. Efforts to multiply the points of political access would have helped the 
union influence government decisions. Such was not the case of KTTU. Although it 
occasionally organized petitions, lobbied Assembly members and politicians and held 
discussion meetings with them to try to gain their support for union claims, it could 
not forge strategic alliances with these political actors.  
 KRWU was more tenacious in its attempts to find political allies within the polity 
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and use them to advance their claims. Even under Kim Dae Jung’s government, it 
could use institutionalized channels such as the SCPSR within the Tripartite 
Commission to impact upon government decision and could also succeed in making 
the government accept KRWU as a bargaining partner. And when the presidential 
election opened a new political space, KRWU did not miss the political opportunities 
to find political allies within the polity and to multiply political access. Apart from 
organizing petitions and public hearings, it thoroughly contacted Assembly members, 
political parties and members of the Presidential Undertaking Committee and tried to 
gain their support (Personal interviews). If KRWU lacked the ability to take advantage 
of political opportunities, it could not have succeeded in increasing its bargaining 
leverage vis-à-vis the government and in obtaining major concessions.      
 
The ability to build broad social coalition:  
Both KTTU and KRWU participated in the Joint Alliance of Public Sector Unions for 
Blocking Privatization of National Key Industries and in the National Joint Committee 
for Opposing Privatization, which included social movement organizations and civil 
organizations. Yet KTTU became less enthusiastic in coalition-building over the 
restructuring process and distanced itself from the Joint Alliance during Lee Dong 
Gul’s leadership. The retreat from the Joint Alliance coincided with union moderation. 
The union leadership began to weigh more on negotiating practical gains than 
advocating the principle of public interests. Therefore, although it tried to appeal to 
public interests by demanding the government adopt the People’s Share plan in the 
early stage of its campaign, it became more and more reluctant to build alliances with 
other forces in civil society around the defense of public interests. The appeal to public 
needs remained merely symbolic and efforts to build social coalitions were rather 
weak. They were not persistent and remained ad-hoc and sporadic. Yet by neglecting 
 172
to forge sustainable social alliances, it missed the opportunity to gain power resources 
to increase its bargaining power.   
 By contrast, KRWU viewed social coalition-building as an important source of 
bargaining power and constantly tried to expand social coalitions. The coalition-
building efforts were pursued in three areas. First, it sought to carry out joint research 
with progressive academia and labor policy practitioners. The joint research helped the 
union in framing its campaign in a more effective way and to develop alternatives to 
the railway privatization policy. This in turn contributed to finding political allies 
within the polity as well as the public agency, as the research findings provided 
KRWU with firmer logical ground that it could use to convince them. It also helped to 
expand public support by dissipating the negative public image of the union as a 
narrow interest group that fought for its own sake without any alternatives or 
justifiable cause. Second, it continued to actively forge inter-union alliances with other 
public sector unions. The joint strike with allied unions increased the bargaining 
power of KRWU. Lastly, KRWU also sought to organize various joint actions with the 
National Joint Committee for Opposing Privatization. Built upon broad social 
mobilization, it could effectively exert pressure on the government as the latter 
widened the range of power resources it could mobilize while bargaining with the 
government. The broad coalition also helped KRWU draw public attention to its 
campaign and expand the basis of public support for the latter.  
 If we classify union capabilities in these four areas based on the ratings presented 
in chapter one, the results appear as below:  
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Table 4.8 Ratings of strategic capabilities of KTTU and KRWU 
 
 KTTU KRWU 
The ability to educate and mobilize members 0 (+) 
The ability to balance negotiation and confrontation (-) (+) 
The ability to create political channels (-) (+) 
The ability to build broad social coalitions 0 (+) 
Overall -2   <  +4 
 
Here, I rate (+), 0, (-) for each category of the four areas: (-) is rated when the union 
has lacked such capacity (no strategic capacity). (+) is rated when the union has 
shown high capacity for the category (full strategic capacity). 0 is rated when the 
union has shown some ability but not fully developed such capacity (partial strategic 
capacity). In sum, KRWU demonstrated strong strategic capabilities in all four areas 
while KTTU lacked abilities in balancing negotiation and confrontation and in 
expanding political channels. It had shown some abilities to mobilize members and 
build social coalitions, but they were short-lived. In fact it did not effectively sustain 
the mobilization long enough to increase both membership and social resources. 
Overall, KTTU’s strategic ability was lower (-2) that KRWU’s ability (+4).  
 This chapter analyzes these differences in the strategic capacities to explain 
variation in the outcomes. While the high strategic capacity of KRWU resulted in 
union success in obtaining concessions and guaranteeing its collective interests, the 
relatively low strategic ability of KTTU brought about its failure in impacting on the 
pace and shape of restructuring.  
 Yet it is still questionable whether union strategies can be seen as a determinant 
variable to explain different degrees of success. The limited cases of this study make it 
hard to assert the decisive role played by the strategic choices of unions. As the 
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changes in the political contingency provided different condition for the two unions, 
the differences in political opportunities can also be considered critical in creating 
divergent outcomes. In this respect, this study argued that although political 
opportunities were greater for KRWU, they could not result in union successes unless 
KRWU was able to take advantage of them by formulating effective strategies. In fact, 
the MOCT and the economic bureaucrats continued to pressure President Roh Moo 
Hyun to adhere to railway privatization and to come up with a concrete plan for 
gradual privatization once corporatization was decided as an immediate option. The 
MOCT confirmed the need to gradually push railway privatization forward in its 
meeting at the Blue House and announced its intention to push for the policy from 
early 2003 (MOCT, 2003a). For this reason, although there existed contention over 
railway restructuring strategies within Roh Moo Hyun’s government, it ended up 
granting major concessions to KRWU, which partly evidenced the strategic 
effectiveness of the union. Also, the remarkable concessions regarding the protection 
of employment security and working conditions as well as management approval for 
the withdrawal of the single-driver system and supplementation of workforce 
shortages could not be obtained without effective strategies that contributed to 
increase bargaining leverage for the union. This occurred despite the weak 
organizational bases and institutional resources for KRWU, which also confirms the 
central role played by union strategies.  
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4. Further Comparative Evidences 
 
4-1. The Korean Power Plant Industry Union (PPIU)’s Campaign against 
Privatization 
 
The central argument of this study may be criticized on the ground that it is the 
difference in industry conditions and not the strategic capacity of unions that 
accounted for the relative success of KRWU. As the competitive pressures are greater 
for some industries than others, public corporations can be classified into more 
market-prone corporations and less market-prone corporations (Cho et al., 2009). For 
this reason, when Kim Dae Jung’s government began to push its privatization policy, it 
first targeted public corporations that operated in more competitive market 
environments. For others that were less marketized, it aimed at first at creating a 
competitive environment prior to the adoption of a privatization program. Hence, 
while KT was included on the list of targeted public corporations for privatization of 
1998, KNR was not part of it until 1999. In the previous chapters, I argued that such a 
difference cannot explain the relative success or failure of respective unions on the 
ground that their strategic effectiveness should not be valued by the withdrawal of the 
privatization plan but by the scope of union influence on the pace and patterns of 
privatization. In this respect, the PPIU case provides further evidences to support the 
key argument of this study. The case study demonstrates that union strategies are far 
more important than the industry condition in determining divergent restructuring 
outcomes.  
 The PPIU was established in mid-2001 to represent workers at five Korean power 
plants. These power plants became subsidiaries of the Korea Electric Power 
Corporation (KEPCO) in April 2001 as a result of the legislation of the electricity 
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privatization law in December 2000, which aimed at selling power plants one after 
another from mid-2002. Thereafter PPIU became an independent union from KNEWU 
and was affiliated with KCTU. As for the privatization policy, it is noteworthy that 
KEPCO was included in the list of targeted public corporations for privatization along 
with KT when the government announced its first and second privatization plans in 
1998. Therefore from the government’s view, there were not so many differences 
between the telecommunication and electricity industries in terms of their readiness 
for privatization. Neither were there differences in the degree of market exposure 
between the two industries. Same as for KT, the previous government had already sold 
its shares before Kim Dae Jung’s government decided to privatize the industry. Hence, 
the Roh Tae Woo government sold 21% of its shares in 1989. KEPCO even preceded 
KT in the sense that it was listed on the New Work Stock Exchange in October 1994 
whereas KT was listed on the same stock market in May 1999 (Lim W., 2003, 46). 
 Yet it is noteworthy that although power plants became subsidiaries of KEPCO as 
part of the privatization plan, government attempts to further implement the 
privatization of electricity industry came to a halt through the PPIU’s fierce opposition. 
Against the gradual sales of power plants, PPIU mobilized its membership and aligned 
with other public sector unions to obstruct the government privatization plan (PPIU, 
2002). Not only did it actively participate in the Joint Alliance of Public Sector Unions 
but it also built broad social coalitions with other forces in civil society to advocate a 
publicly owned industry (Korea Center for City & Environment Research, 2002). This 
culminated in the formation of the National Joint Committee for Opposing 
Privatization and Overseas Sales of Public Industries that demanded the government 
stop the unilateral implementation of its privatization plan and to come up with an 
alternative policy through social dialogue. In alliance with the Committee, the PPIU 
advocated a public model of restructuring (Kim J-W, 2003), which helped mobilize 
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civil opposition to the government-led restructuring program. In this sense, the 
coalition provided PPIU with social resources that increased the union’s bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the government and management. Later on, the PPIU continued its 
efforts to reach out to various civil movement organizations, notably environmental 
movement organizations, which contributed to the formation of the ‘blue-green 
coalition’. Built on this labor-environmental alliance, the PPIU demanded the 
government withdraw its privatization policy and find a pro-environmental 
restructuring plan for the energy industry in order to develop renewable energy. Such a 
claim gathered broad support from environmental and social movement organizations 
and contributed to the formation of the Energy Labor Society Network that further 
mobilized social opposition to government policy.68  
 In the end, the PPIU succeeded in obstructing further implementation of the 
privatization plan and in preventing the government from selling power plants to 
private investors. Hence the PPIU case provides a counter-example to KTTU and 
proves that unions can be strategically effective even when market pressures constrain 
their abilities.                 
  
4-2. Union Campaign against the Privatization of the British Water Industry 
 
The case of the trade union campaign against British water privatization offers 
additional evidences to verify that the pace and the shape of privatization can vary 
subnationally in accordance with differences in the strategic capabilities of labor 
unions. In fact, past studies considered Britain as representing a typical national model 
of liberal market economies (LMEs) that are common to Anglo-Saxon countries. In 
                                            
68 The evidences of the blue-green coalition are drawn from internet media articles. Cf. Chung, Young 
Il ,“The Transformation of Energy Industry by Red-Green Coalition” Ngotimes, June 23, 2005; Lee, 
Phil Yeol, “Towards the Success of Red-Green Coalition”, Pressian, June 23, 2005.   
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their view, LMEs have developed distinctive institutional characteristics that rely on 
market modes of coordination as opposed to coordinated market economies (CMEs) 
that have higher levels of non-market coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 
2001; Bohle & Greskovits, 2009). Based on this distinction, a number of studies 
highlighted the persistent cross-national differences between CMEs and LMEs. 
According to them, in LMEs such as Britain and the U.S, there were widespread 
attempts to impose unilateral management control while labor was unable to put up 
significant resistance due to the lack of institutional resources. By contrast, in CMEs 
such as in continental Europe and Japan, the continued coordination between unions 
and employers allowed unions to exert continued influence on market restructuring by 
constraining management authority (Turner, 1991; Ferner, 1994; Katz, 1997; Thelen, 
2001; Bohle & Greskovits, 2009). For this reason, Ferner also distinguished Britain as 
representing one extreme of the spectrum in terms of public sector reform. While 
Britain has shown “a thorough dismantling of the old ways of doing things in 
industrial relations and such comprehensive of privatization of state”, other European 
countries have taken “a more consensual and cautious approach to reform” (Ferner, 
1994: 65).  
 Yet although unilateral restructuring was more common in LMEs, Anglo-Saxon 
countries had not experienced uniform curtailment of union power. For sure, unions in 
LMEs had more obstacles in influencing restructuring decisions than unions in CMEs 
due to labor’s weak institutional categorization. But it is all the more important to note 
that unions, as strategic actors, drew upon different strategic capabilities to shape 
restructuring decisions. For this reason, the British union campaign against water 
privatization is of interest as it evidences a subnational variation related to the strategic 
effectiveness of labor unions within an LME. It shows “how unions facing almost 
certain defeat on the fact of privatization, nevertheless were able to articulate a 
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coherent campaign of opposition that was in many ways more effective than those 
which preceded it” (Ogden, 1991: 20). 
 The conspicuous elements of such a successful campaign built upon union ability 
to reach out to broad social constituencies. Similar to KRWU and PPIU, the British 
unions in the water industry69 attempted to frame their demands as public needs and 
tried to recruit other interest groups into the campaign against privatization. They also 
displayed commonness in their efforts to shed off the negative image of unions as 
organizations that ‘oppose for opposition’s sake’. Instead they “positively argued the 
case for a publicly owned industry and outlined a programme for improving the 
current level of service” (Ogden, 1991: 20). This contributed to the increase in public 
sympathy towards union campaign. In this process, the British water unions built 
strategic alliance with other environmental and social movements by linking the 
privatization issue to pollution and public health concerns. Such environmental issue-
framing enabled the union to mobilize broad social groups and to secure their support. 
This in turn contributed to the increase in the power resources that unions could 
exploit to leverage their bargaining power.   
 In the end, the British union campaigns could not obstruct the passage of the water 
privatization bill. Yet they should not be judged in terms of their inability to prevent 
privatization from taking place. In fact, most of their activities were geared to 
influencing public opinion by emphasizing the health and pollution problems, and by 
appealing to the need for high investment in the water industry. In this respect, the 
Water Joint Trade Unions Industry Committee (WJTUIC) demonstrated greater 
                                            
69 The main unions in the industry are the National Association of Local Government Officers 
(NALGO), the General Municipal and Boilermakers (GMB), the National Union of Public Employees 
(NUPE) and the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). The unions set up the Water Joint 
Trade Unions Industry Committee and organized a steering group In order to promote a coordinated 
campaign against water privatization. The steering group consisted of representatives from the major 
unions in the industry, but was very prepared to consult outside experts on matters such as publicity, 
health and safety, and legal matters (Ogden, 1991: 25-26).  
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effectiveness in mobilizing public support than the preceding union campaigns in 
British gas and telecommunication industries. Built upon the coalition with 
environmental groups and consumer groups, the WJTUIC played an influential role in 
the Government’s decision making (Ogden, 1991; Cho et al., 2009). Firstly, the 
government was compelled to consider the issues raised by the WJTUIC regarding the 
side-effects of privatization, and it had to postpone the proposals for water 
privatization in 1986. Given that the government began to push water privatization 
with the foundation of the Water Act in 1983, such a decision shows the delayed 
process of policy implementation. Secondly, the government incorporated 
environmental and public concerns when it came up with new proposals in 1987. It 
decided to set up a National Rivers Authority, which was assigned regulatory powers 
over water resources, pollution control, land drainage and flood protection. Such a 
decision was made to meet some of the concerns raised by the environmental lobby 
(Ogden, 1991: 30). In the end, water privatization was marked by low share price and 
the establishment of regulatory bodies to control pollution and to sustain high levels of 
investment for improving the level of service. The incorporation of social and 
environmental standards into the water privatization reflects the influence of the 
WJTUIC campaign.  
 In sum, the WJTUIC succeeded in delaying and in mediating the privatization 
process. This was made possible by the mobilizing capacity of the WJTUIC built on 
broad civil coalition. Thanks to the latter, the WJTUIC was capable of appealing to 
public sentiment, which was proven by the Gallup poll that reported 65% opposition 
to water privatization in November 1987, 81% opposition in August 1989 and 83% 
opposition in October 1989 (Ogden, 1991: 32). The rise in public opposition against 
water privatization constrained the government to incorporate union demands 
regarding the public and environmental issues. In sum, the strategic capability of 
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British water unions was central in shaping the privatization policy. Thus the case 
analysis offers a counter-argument to the theories of a national model of capitalism. 
Unlike their theoretical claims, the British water unions proved that unions in LMEs 
can still influence the privatization outcomes by deploying effective strategies.   
 
4.3 The Japanese Railway and Telecommunication Unions and Their Responses 
to Privatization 
 
The brief comparative analysis of the Japanese railway and telecommunication 
privatization supports the findings of this study regarding the varied degrees of union 
influence on the restructuring outcomes. It does so by showing that there is no 
apparent national or sector-level explanation regarding the outcomes: the greater union 
influence at Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) compared to the unions at Japan 
National Railway (JNR) that had little influence on the restructuring decisions.    
 The ‘varieties of capitalism’ theory has classified Japan as a CME by emphasizing 
its mechanism of non-market coordination (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2001). In 
its view, although Japan lacks corporatist regulations characteristic to European CMEs, 
it has a stronger capacity of coordination than LMEs. Japan’s lifetime employment 
tradition associated with long-term financing arrangements contrasts with frequent 
layoffs practiced by Anglo-Saxon employers who operate on a shorter financial leash 
(Thelen, 2001). Likewise, high levels of workforce cooperation have also provided the 
workforce with a voice in the affairs of the Japanese firms (Hall & Soskice, 2001). For 
this reason, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature has placed the Japanese political 
economy with other CMEs.  
 Yet this approach oversimplifies the politics of strategic choices that shape the 
dynamics of change within a CME. In fact, the differences in union responses to the 
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privatization of the Japanese telecommunication and railway industries precisely rebut 
the clear-cut image of a CME that conflates significant within-country variations into 
the uniform category of ‘coordination’. According to the varieties of capitalism 
framework, Japanese public sector privatization would be expected to be driven by a 
consensual process based upon labor-management cooperation. In this view, while 
Japanese employers would avoid reneging on lifetime employment guarantees, 
company unions would also cooperate with management initiatives in a rather 
subordinated manner. Yet in the actual situation, there was as much conflict as 
cooperation during the privatization, and the political process of negotiation differed 
across the telecommunication and railway industries in Japan. Apparently unions in 
both industries became less militant and labor-management relations more cooperative. 
But “despite these similarities, the two public enterprises differed regarding the role 
that unions played in shaping the reform process, the attitudes and policies of unions 
toward reform process, and the reform outcomes in both the configuration of labor 
organization and the character of labor-management relations” (Mochizuki, 1993).  
 The divergent paths of restructuring can be explained by differences in the political 
dynamics of negotiation that were also connected to the variation in the strategic 
choices of unions. At NTT, the Japan Telecommunication Workers Union (JTWU, 
Zendentsu) had been the only union, and it represented more than 99 percent of non-
managerial telecommunication workers (Mochizuki, 1993; Nakamura & Hiraki, 1997). 
When the Second Committee on Administrative Reform (Rincho) proposed the 
privatization and the breakup of NTT in 198270, the union leadership abandoned its 
                                            
70 The Japanese government established the Committee on 16 March 1980 to examine proposals for 
fundamental administrative reforms. The committee’s third report concerned the telecommunications 
industry and was presented to the prime minister on 30 July 1982. This report included a draft outlining 
NTT reform including privatization and the establishment of a competitive telecommunication market. 
The report fueled NTT’s full-scale restructuring which resulted in the privatization of the company in 
1985 (Nakamura & Hiraki, 199: 240-241).   
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previous oppositional stance and chose to positively engage in the negotiation with 
management to reach a compromise. Indeed, the leadership viewed the privatization of 
NTT as unavoidable and considered that intransigent opposition to the latter would put 
the union and their members in peril. Instead it chose to minimize the potential threat 
of privatization such as massive involuntary layoffs and the deterioration of wages and 
working conditions. The ‘strategic engagement’ approach was also backed up by 
membership support, which was made possible by the maintenance of leadership 
authority over its members (Mochizuki, 1993; Personal interview). Besides, the union 
also tried to increase its influence over policy decision by multiplying political 
channels. In its search for widening political allies, it went beyond its traditional links 
with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). “Recognizing the limits of JSP, the president of 
Zendentsu (JTWU) approached Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders such as 
Kanemaru Shin (then chairman of the LDP Executive Council) and Tanaka Rokusuke 
(then LDP secretary general) directly. In the end, Kanemaru worked to amend the NTT 
reform legislation so as to put off the plan to divide the company. To apply pressure on 
the LDP, Zendentsu launched a petition campaign and succeeded in collecting more 
than ten million signatures (Mochizuki, 1993: 193). The mobilization of vast social 
support contributed to the increase in union influence over the decision-making 
process. Finally, when the reform bill passed in 1985, it had many imprints of union 
influence. The bill included provisions regarding privatization and free entrance to the 
market, but the break-up of NTT was withdrawn. And many other union claims were 
included such as: prevention of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) 
from intervening in collective bargaining, abolition of the system of MPT’s official 
approval on management planning, and the elimination of the restriction on the 
union’s right to strike in three years (Nakamura & Hiraki, 1997: 243).  
 The JTWU’s increased political influence also helped the union gain leverage 
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while negotiating with NTT management. During the transitional period, the JTWU 
succeeded in negotiating union-management, which included “a number of core 
principles, one of them being the continuation of employment security” (Katz, 1997: 
12), and it also secured its participation in managerial decision making. After the 
passage of reform bills, the JTWU bargained with management to establish a union-
management consultation system, the purpose of which was “to discuss all major 
management plans before they are formally considered by NTT directors and 
Zendentsu officers” (Mochizuki, 1993: 194). These principles were asserted in the 
basic agreement reached on April 1st 1985 between the two parties. Article 3 of the 
agreement “stipulates the establishment of a prior consultation system to discuss the 
various business issues that affect employment and working conditions as well as 
basic managerial policies”, and Article 4 confirms that employment security will be 
maintained (Nakamura & Hiraki, 1997: 244).  
 In the end, the outcomes were shaped in accordance with the agreement. Firstly, 
the workforce reduction at NTT was carried out without any involuntary dismissals. 
Internal workforce transfers to subsidiaries were also used to avoid layoffs, and 
transferred workers were guaranteed maintenance of their pay level and many other 
employment conditions (Nakamura and Hiraki, 1997; Personal interviews). Secondly, 
the union secured other substantial gains such as shorter working hours and higher 
wages. It also obtained the right to strike on the condition that they give prior warning 
of more than 10 days (Mochizuki, 1993: 194). Lastly, it succeeded in establishing 
participatory pattern of labor relations through the Management Council.  
 The reform process took a totally different shape at JNR. As Mochizuki states in 
his work, “union involvement in the deliberative stage was minimal and perfunctory” 
(Mochizuki, 1993: 183), and the privatization of JNR was accompanied by the 
dramatic decline of Kokuro, which had been the biggest union at JNR until 
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privatization was pushed forward in the mid-1980s. The diminished union influence 
over the process of privatization along with its inability to negotiate an agreement with 
JNR management contrasted with the changes in labor relations at NTT, which 
resulted in the consolidation of union power and the establishment of labor-integrative 
consultative arrangements.        
 To begin with, unlike the JTWU, which had a union monopoly for the 
representation of all NTT non-managerial workers, JNR unions were divided along the 
pro-management union Tetsuro, the militant locomotive engineers’ union Doro, and 
the largest militant union, Kokuro71. At first, Tetsuro was the only union which 
supported the privatization plan, but when JNR reform began to be implemented in 
mid-1980s, Doro radically changed its oppositional militant approach and decided to 
cooperate with management by embracing the privatization plan.72 With this, Kokuro 
was left alone in the struggle against privatization and remained ineffective in 
preventing management’s offensive (Mochizuki, 1993; Suzuki, 1997).  
 The fact that JNR unions were divided along competing organizations made it 
difficult for them to coordinate cohesive union strategies to the proposed reform. By 
contrast, management could take advantage of union competition to formulate a 
whipsaw strategy that pitted unions against each other. Indeed, one of objective of 
railway privatization in Japan was to put an end to labor disputes at JNR by restoring 
labor discipline. For this, government/management particularly concentrated on 
debilitating militant unions at JNR (Mochizuki, 1993; Suzuki, 1997; Yomono, 2002; 
                                            
71 In the past, large public corporations were strongholds of militant trade unionism in Japan. The 
unions were heavily influenced by the Communist Party and the left-wing Socialist Party, and JNR 
unions were at the forefront of this left-oriented militant unionism. Hence labor-management relations 
at JNR were never peaceful, and its unions, Kokuro and Doro, frequently resorted to work-to-rule 
struggles and strikes to oppose management (Watanabe, 1994: 92-93).   
72 The leadership of Doro considered it would be faced with detrimental massive layoffs of its 
members if it continued to oppose privatization. Thus, the leadership decided to trade off employment 
security in its cooperation with management initiatives (Mochizuki, 1993; Suzuki, 1997).  
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Personal Interviews). As Suzuki analyzed in his study, “the government treated the 
reform of union-management relations as [an] indispensable part of the JNR reform, 
and some political elites openly stated that [the] crushing of Kokuro and Doro was one 
of the important purposes of the restructuring of JNR” (Suzuki, 1997: 307).73 Thus, 
when Doro retreated from its opposition and decided to cooperate with the reform, the 
government and JNR management seized the opportunity to exploit union division and 
to further undermine the Kokuro leadership. In late 1985, JNR management refused to 
sign the Employment Stability Agreement with Kokuro while it signed the agreement 
with Tetsuro and Doro, and it took another measure to further isolate Kokuro in 
January 1986 when if drafted the Labor-Management Joint Declaration.74 While 
Tetsuro and Doro subordinated themselves to management initiatives and signed the 
declaration to support the breakup and privatization of JNR, Kokuro refused to join 
the declaration. To this, JNR management responded with hard line oppression and 
declined to make any accommodations to Kokuro’s demands. This meant that JNR 
management granted employment security to Doro and Tetsuro in exchange for their 
cooperative attitudes while continuing its oppression on Kokuro. From July 1986 to 
March 1987, JNR established 1,440 ‘human resource centers’ and about 21,000 
redundant workers were sent to them. Those who were sent to the human resource 
centers would not be hired by the privatized railway companies. Among the 21,000 
workers sent to the human resource centers, more than 80% of them were members of 
Kokuro (Suzuki, 1997: 283).  
 This discriminatory management action contributed to the further erosion of 
                                            
73 For example, Kamei Masao, the chairman of JNR Reconstruction Supervisory Committee stated in 
1985 that the division and privatization of JNR aimed to ‘demolish’ Kokuro and Doro, and to put an end 
to the history of the postwar labor movement’ (cf. footnote 16 in Suzuki, 1997: 307). 
74 According to the declaration of January 1986, the unions agreed to cooperate with management to 
encourage transfers and voluntary retirements, to forego illegal strikes, and to secure employment. In 
August 1986, they signed another declaration supporting the JNR breakup and privatization (Mochizuki, 
1993: 187). 
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Kokuro. With the refusal of management to sign an employment stability agreement 
with Kokuro, its members were no longer protected from dismissal, and anxiety about 
employment security began to spread among members (Suzuki, 1997: 281). After 
January 1986, the number of membership withdrawals from Kokuro increased rapidly, 
which was further accelerated by the union’s internal split when some former 
members of Kukuro broke from the union and formed Shin Kokuro. In the end, 71,000 
members withdrew from Kokuro from April 1986 to 1987, and its membership 
dropped form about 187,000 in June 1985 to approximately 44,000 in April 1987 
(Mochizuki, 1993:188). In this way, JNR management succeeded in marginalizing the 
anti-reformist Kokuro, which degenerated from its status of the most influential and 
largest union at JNR to a powerless minority union.    
 In the end, JNR was privatized and divided into six passenger companies and one 
freight company in April 1987(Suzuki, 1997: 277). Unlike the NTT, the unions at JNR 
were not able to prevent the break-up of JNR. The drastic decline of Kokuro lay 
behind this failure. Overall, it was increasingly on the defensive as criticisms against 
their militant policy orientation mounted among the main actors of the political 
process (Suzuki, 1997: 278). Not only were the government and JNR management 
determined to ‘demolish’ the union, but the public attitude to Kokuro’s militancy 
became increasingly hostile during the restructuring process (Mochizuki, 1993; Suzuki, 
1997; Personal interviews). Yet the Kukuro leadership failed in appealing to public 
sentiment and in recruiting broad support for union claims. Other than maintaining its 
oppositional approach, it could not develop a coherent strategy to counterweigh the 
government/management offensive. The union also suffered from chronic internal 
disputes, which further undermined the leadership’s capacity. And it could not prevent 
the drastic membership withdrawal from the union as it was incapable of protecting its 
members against management’s backlash. While Kukuro was helplessly hit by 
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management’s discriminatory actions, the other unions - Tetsuro and Doro - were 
granted employment security. Yet, they also failed in establishing a participatory 
pattern of labor relations at JNR comparable to the one the JTWU was able to 
institutionalize at NTT (Mochizuki, 1993; Personal interviews). Whereas the JTWU 
secured its participation in the strategic decision-making of the firm, JNR unions were 
not capable of establishing the integrative bargaining arrangements at the privatized 
Japan Railway. Their relationship with management was based on the compliance of 
unions to management prerogatives rather than the ‘co-determination’ model that the 
JTWU was able to establish at NTT.          
 In sum, the Japanese case study illustrates two different trajectories of 
restructuring. NTT restructuring had been marked by its labor-mediated character, 
which resulted from the JTWU’s strategic effectiveness. On the contrary, JNR 
restructuring had been characterized by the drastic disempowerment of unions that 
were unable to modify the proposed restructuring plan. Paralyzed with intense internal 
divisions, the unions failed to develop a unified strategy to impact upon the 
restructuring outcomes. The findings from the Japanese case study contradict both the 
arguments of national model theories and the analysis based on industry differences in 
the market condition. Firstly, the Japanese cases do not fit the CME categorization. 
While NTT restructuring is close to this model in that it demonstrated the negotiated 
process of change, the JNR restructuring eschews the CME-based explanation. Rather 
JNR restructuring was marked by management hostility and conflicts, which is 
inconsistent with the conventional CME model. Instead, the extended comparative 
analysis asserts the need to examine the political process of negotiation and the 
difference in union strategic abilities to access bargaining leverage.  
 Similarly, the difference in market condition does not explain the outcomes. The 
Japanese telecommunication and railway restructuring turned out to be the opposite of 
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Korean restructuring in terms of union strategic effectiveness. Greater exposure to 
market competition made the privatization of telecommunications unavoidable in both 
countries. Yet the effective strategic formulation of the JTWU guaranteed its relative 
success in protecting the terms of employment and working conditions at NTT while 
KTTU failed to obtain comparable gains. Moreover, the JTWU gained greater 
concessions than the JNR unions, and the JTWU was much more influential in 
decision-making than the JNR unions. Yet the comparison with Korean railways 
proves that the strategic failure of JNR unions do not derive from the difference in 
industry condition. Although both KNR and JNR suffered from chronic deficit, 
KRWU succeeded in derailing the proposed restructuring plan while JNR unions were 
incapable of obstructing the unilateral implementation of the reform plan. KRWU was 
able to influence the restructuring decisions as opposed to JNR unions, which had 
been marginalized during the railway privatization process. Hence, the comparative 
analysis evidences the central place of union strategies in explaining the variation in 
the restructuring outcomes.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study illuminates public sector restructuring in the Korean telecommunication 
and railway industries by highlighting the differences in union abilities to influence 
the outcomes of restructuring. Although privatization came to be a global trend, the 
shape and the pace of privatization differed not only across countries but also within 
the same national entity. Past studies often focused their analysis on the differences in 
national institutional framework to explain the divergent outcomes. Yet although it is 
true that institutionally embedded labor relation systems have different bearings on 
restructuring by providing variable extents of resources, the coherence of national 
institutions has been eroded over the decades. Such destabilization of industrial 
relations institutions makes it less likely that restructuring outcomes converge within 
the same national units. In this respect, this study is in line with contemporary 
researches that argue that “an important outcome of current restructuring trends is 
increasingly fragmented institutions and the growing importance of strategic choices” 
(Katz & Darbishire, 2000; Doellgast, 2006). Especially in Korea, where the 
participatory pattern of labor relations had never been institutionalized, the variation 
of outcomes has been far more dependent on the strategic choices made by key 
industrial actors. Based on this perspective, this study particularly highlighted the role 
of union strategies in determining the divergent outcomes. In regards to the two cases 
of this study, KTTU and KRWU had different degrees of success in their influence on 
the outcomes. KRWU succeeded in mobilizing countervailing power while KTTU 
failed to do so. KRWU had the ability to input labor interests into the reform plan and 
was able to change government policy. Hence, railway restructuring came to be labor-
mediated by incorporating union demands. By contrast, KTTU had little influence on 
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the government/management restructuring strategy and could not halt the coercive 
implementation of the restructuring plan. In sum, differences in the strategic abilities 
of unions played a central role in creating divergent policy outcomes. The findings of 
the case study also demonstrated the way union strategies contributed to within-
country variation.    
 
1. Summary of Findings  
 
This study selected the Korean telecommunication and railway industries for its 
comparative analysis. Although Kim Dae Jung’s government decided to privatize both 
industries, only KT’s privatization was fully accomplished during his term. 
Furthermore. the two industries displayed different patterns of restructuring as KT’s 
privatization was achieved in a more radicalized form than the original government 
plan while KNR’s privatization was delayed to the point of utter derailment. To 
explain this variation, this study turned its attention to the changes in the political 
contingency and in the strategic capacities of unions in taking advantages of political 
opportunities provided by these changes.  
 For sure, there were also differences in their industry-specific conditions. As seen 
in the chapter 2, the competitive market pressures were greater in telecommunications 
than in the railway industry. While technological advancement coupled with service 
diversification intensified competition in telecommunications, a state monopoly still 
dominated the railway industry. Consequently, a competitive market was already in 
place in telecommunications and made it possible for the government to push its full 
privatization policy for KT. By contrast, for KNR, the creation of a competitive 
environment had to precede the implementation of a full privatization policy. These 
differences underlay the variation in the restructuring strategies of the two industries. 
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The government included KT in the targeted corporations for privatization in the 1998 
announcement of its privatization plan and took precipitated steps towards its 
immediate implementation. For KNR, Kim Dae Jung’s government decided to split the 
infrastructural part from the operational part and to privatize the latter. But as 
conditions were not mature for immediate privatization, it decided to achieve the 
vertical separation first and lay the groundwork for gradual privatization.  
 Yet the industry differences did not directly impinge on the outcomes. It is true 
that the more an industry is exposed to the market, the more it is faced with greater 
pressures to adopt ‘policies and organization congruent with their competitors’ 
(Crompton & Gubbay, 1977 cited in Batstone et al., 1984: 9). Yet the pressures for 
change for former public monopolies were forced by government intervention and its 
policy implementation. In this respect, it is noteworthy that in the public sector, “even 
where the state firm is exposed to the market, the extent of its exposure is dictated by 
political decision” (Batstone et al., 1984: 9). Especially, public enterprises in Korea 
have been heavily regulated by tight government control, and managerial decisions 
have been made in compliance with government policy. Hence, restructuring strategy 
in the public sector is not dictated by market condition alone; it is rather politically 
determined and involves the strategic interaction of government, management and 
unions. Besides, the bargaining power of public sector unions depends not so much on 
their market position as their political-organizational resources. The distinctively 
political nature of public sector labor relations asserts the importance of the changes in 
the political contingency and the way they increase or reduce the opportunities for 
labor unions. 
  Drawing upon this premise, chapter 3 examined how changing characteristics of 
the political contingency conditioned divergent union responses. In this respect, 
although both KTTU and KRWU were institutionally excluded from a participatory 
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form of decision making, KRWU was provided with greater possibilities for political 
access. Faced with increasing political resources while deprived of institutional 
incorporation, KRWU escalated its militancy to pressure the government. By contrast, 
KTTU was constrained to take a defensive position as it was provided neither with 
institutional access nor with political opportunities. Furthermore, the internal 
dynamics of its leadership competition helped to sustain these patterns; the 
replacement threat of a more militant leftist faction increased the incentives for 
militancy for KRWU leadership. On the contrary, the replacement threat of militant 
dissidents substantially diminished over time at KTTU, which reduced the incentives 
for militancy for KTTU. Thus, militancy was sustained throughout KRWU’s anti-
privatization campaign whereas KTTU’s militancy sudsided over the restructuring 
period and was ultimately replaced by restraint. In sum, the findings support the 
hypotheses presented in chapter 1:  
 
• In the polity where labor is denied institutional access, the increase in political 
opportunities tended to increase labor militancy (KRWU).   
• The decrease in political opportunities within the same exclusionary polity tended 
to reduce labor militancy and put the union on its defensive (KTTU). 
• The persistent replacement threat by a more militant faction continued to motivate 
union leadership to sustain militancy (KRWU). 
• The waning of such a replacement threat reduced the incentives for militancy 
(KTTU).    
 
 Chapter 4 attempted to analyze the factors that explain the differences in the 
strategic effectiveness of KRWU and KTTU. In chapter 3, the argument was made that 
changes in the political contingency can raise the likelihood of union success if they 
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are provided with greater political resources for unions. Yet the opportunities can 
contribute to successful union action only when they are perceived as such by union 
leadership. “No opportunity will invite mobilization unless it is visible to potential 
challengers and perceived as an opportunity” (Mc Adam et al., 2001: 43). In this sense, 
although the political opportunities provided KRWU with more favorable conditions, 
it did not automatically guarantee its success. Similarly, the contracting political 
opportunities could have been overcome by KTTU if it could gain leverage by 
formulating effective strategies. For this reason, this study pointed to the centrality of 
strategic capacity of unions for explaining the variation in outcomes. The strategic 
effectiveness was not measured on the criteria of whether the unions succeeded in 
obstructing full privatization plans or not. Competitive pressures grew much higher in 
telecommunications ensuring the withdrawal of the privatization policy was beyond 
the union’s capacity. Yet it was still possible that unions could impact on the pace and 
patterns of privatization. Thus this study compared the original union goals and the 
extent to which they were reflected in the final outcomes of restructuring to assess the 
degree of union success. In this respect, this dissertation found that none of KTTU’s 
objectives were achieved except obtaining the allocation of approximately 6% of 
employee-owned stocks. By contrast, KRWU succeeded in inserting most of its 
demands into the final design of restructuring. Not only could it assure the withdrawal 
of the railway privatization policy, but it could also guarantee employment security as 
well as prevent deterioration in working conditions. In sum, the restructuring of 
Korean telecommunications was prompted by technological and market changes and 
led by the state. The restructuring decisions were made by a unilateral, top-down 
process in contrast to the Korean railway restructuring, which was labor-mediated. 
The variation in union strategic effectiveness lay between these two forms of 
restructuring. While KRWU proved its strategic ability in all four areas (the ability to 
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educate and mobilize members; the ability to flexibly combine negotiation and 
confrontation; the ability to multiply political channels; the ability to build social 
coalition), KTTU was strategically less capable in these areas. This finding supports 
hypothesis 5 presented in Chapter 1: 
 
• The extent of political resources provided by the changes in the political 
contingency shaped the strategic condition of unions. Yet it is the variation in the 
strategic ability of unions that determined the outcomes. The greater strategic 
abilities of KRWU ensured the reflection of its interests on the final design of 
restructuring while lack of such strategic abilities reduced the strategic 
effectiveness of KTTU.     
 
If applied to the classification of union-government interactions presented in Chapter 1, 
KRWU falls into the category of ‘opposition’ (effective militancy) while KTTU 
moved from the category of ‘resistance’ (ineffective militancy) to the category of 
‘subordination’ (ineffective restraint) (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Patterns of Union-Government Interaction 
 
 Militancy Restraint 
Effective Opposition (KRWU) Cooperation 
Ineffective Resistance (KTTU) Subordination (KTTU) 
 
2. The Evidence Revisited                                                            
 
This dissertation emphasizes the importance of union strategy in explaining different 
patterns of union-government interactions. The four categories of patterns – opposition, 
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cooperation, resistance, and subordination - not only capture the differences in union 
responses but also the variation in their strategic effectiveness that ultimately account 
for divergent restructuring outcomes. This approach contends with other explanations 
to set out different arguments.  
  First, it refutes economic explanations that link the differentials in union 
bargaining leverage to business cycles. According to the economic approach, unions 
gain leverage during upswings in business cycles and lose it during economic 
downturns. For example, Commons associates the rise and fall of union membership 
with business cycles and argues that workers become more aggressive in pursuing 
their goals while employers become less resistant to collective efforts by their 
employees during an upturn in the economy (Commons, 1911 cited in Katz & Kochan, 
1992: 125). Yet economic conditions do not affect union bargaining leverage in a 
deterministic way. It is true that the privatization of KT was announced in 1998 during 
an economic recession when the unemployment rate was at its highest (Table 5.2.) and 
that such economic stringency put KTTU on the defensive. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Changes in Unemployment Rate in Korea from 1998-2004 (%)  
  Source: Korean Statistical Information Service 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
6.95 6.58 4.42 4.02 3.28 3.57 3.68 
 
Yet union leverage was not directly tuned to economic fluctuations. Hence, although 
the macro-economic condition began to improve from 2000 with the decrease in the 
unemployment rate, KTTU’s bargaining leverage did not increase nor did it become 
more aggressive in pursuing its goals. On the contrary, it moderated its demands and 
retreated further into concession bargaining. There are also no clear evidences that the 
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increase in bargaining power and escalating collective action of KRWU fell in sync 
with an economic upswing. It is true that KRWU’s campaign stretched into Roh Moo 
Hyun’s Administration after he won the 2002 presidential election and that it was 
faced with better economic conditions. But even in 1999 when the Korean economy 
had not recovered yet, KRWU took a more aggressive approach than before and 
mounted its opposition to railway privatization policy. Thus, economic factors alone 
do not account for the differences in union responses. Similarly, there was not a direct 
causal relationship between the economic fluctuations and the strategic effectiveness 
of unions. In fact, the macro-economic explanation may trace national trends in the 
changes in total bargaining power of unions as the latter tend to be reduced during 
economic recessions. But it becomes irrelevant in explaining subnational variations.  
 The micro-economic explanation also fails to explain the variation. According to 
this view, firms with greater profits will grant more concessions to union demands as 
they have more resources to divide (Katz & Kochan, 2004: 73). This runs counter to 
the evidence shown in this study. Although the railway industry had chronic deficits, 
KRWU could obtain substantial concessions from management/government. The 
opposite was true for the telecommunication industry. While KT’s profits had been 
robust until privatization was achieved in 2002, KTTU was far less successful in 
gaining concessions.75 This meant that union ability to obtain concessions was not 
dependent on micro-economic conditions of individual firms and that there were other 
important factors to examine to explain the variation.  
 Others may emphasize the discrepancies in the market condition of the 
telecommunication and railway industries to explain the variation as the latter made 
the government fix a different timeline for the privatization of the two industries. The 
                                            
75 The net profits of KT from 1999 to 2002 were: 3,833 billion won in 1999; 4,388 billion won in 
2000; 10,872 billion in 2001 and 19,638 billion won in 2002 (KT Annual Report 1999-2001). 
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government envisaged to take actual steps for the immediate privatization of KT as 
soon as it announced the plan. But for KNR, it first aimed at achieving vertical 
separation of the railway infrastructure and its service operation to lay the groundwork 
for privatization. Hence, it was not plausible for KTTU to reverse the privatization that 
was already in process while KNR could still lobby for the withdrawal of the railway 
privatization plan. Yet this study does not consider that such differences determine the 
relative success of KRWU as its strategic effectiveness is not judged by whether or not 
the union was able to halt the privatization or not. The evaluation of strategic 
outcomes is made by comparing the original restructuring plans and the actual 
outcomes regarding the inclusiveness of union demands in the final results. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that the government proposal for full-scale railway 
restructuring including the sales of some railway lines to private investors and massive 
workforce reduction could not be carried out as planned. Union opposition contributed 
to this blockage. By contrast, the government privatization plan for KT took a more 
radical form in terms of the scale of employment reduction and the speed of 
privatization. These outcomes cannot be explained by market conditions as the 
modification of government plans was not made in accordance with the latter. In other 
words, government objectives for railway restructuring were achievable under the 
conditions the industry encountered at the time. But the government had to publicize 
the abandonment of the privatization plan and it also had to accommodate major union 
demands. Similarly the radicalization of KT reform cannot be understood in terms of 
strict market logic. The bulk of the adjustment was likely to have occured depending 
on the political process of negotiation. In this process, the strategic ability of unions 
proved to be central in creating divergent paths of restructuring. The postponement 
and the modification of the railway restructuring plan reflected KRWU’s strong 
strategic capability whereas the fast-paced and unilateral telecommunication 
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restructuring revealed KTTU’s strategic limits.   
   Such assessment is also supported by the extended comparative analysis in 
Chapter 4. First, the effective obstruction of the Korean PPIU in the sales of power 
plants to private investors evidences the centrality of union strategies in determining 
the restructuring outcomes. Indeed unlike the railway, KEPCO was classified as one of 
the public corporations that were more market-prone than others and hence that were 
objects for immediate privatization (PBC July 3, 1998; PBC August 4, 1998).  
Consequently, the market exposure of the industry was as high as the 
telecommunication industry, and the privatization policy of the government was also 
similar in its intention to privatize the industry as fast as possible. For this, the 
government tried to divide up the electricity industry into power generation and power 
transmission/ power distribution, and to gradually sell the power plants to private 
investors. Yet it is noteworthy that once the power plants were spun off into 
subsidiaries of KEPCO, further implementation of the privatization plan was blocked. 
The delayed process of its privatization clearly contrasts with the case of KT. The 
differences in the market condition cannot explain this divergence. In fact, they can be 
held constant as there was not much difference in the degree of market exposure 
between the two industries. The comparative analysis evidences that the variation 
results from the stronger strategic capacity of PPIU which complemented its weak 
bargaining power by mobilizing social resources. The persistent union-civil opposition 
was one of the important elements that reduced the incentives of private companies to 
acquire the power plants. This accounts for the obstruction of the original government 
plan. Secondly, the comparison with the Japanese privatization of railway and 
telecommunications adds more evidences to support the argument of this study. If the 
market condition of an industry is central in explaining the variation in the 
restructuring outcomes, the telecommunication union would be expected to be less 
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successful than the railway union as it would have been faced with greater market 
pressures. Yet unlike the Korean case, the JTWU was far more successful in 
guaranteeing labor rights than the Japanese railway unions during the turbulent 
privatization period. The strategic choices of unions were critical in creating such 
outcomes. The cooperative strategy combined with the multiplication of political 
channels and the mobilization of public support helped the union gain bargaining 
leverage. By contrast, the internal splits of railway unions and their reduced strategic 
capacity constrained the unions and placed them on the defensive. 
 Due to the limits of explanation based on economic and market condition, this 
dissertation proposes to take the political dynamics of restructuring into consideration 
by examining the interactive mechanism between the changes in the political 
contingency and the strategic choices of key industrial actors, especially those made 
by labor unions. Yet while recognizing the importance of political variables, it 
considers that national institutional variables are insufficient to explain the diversity of 
union-government interactions. The findings of this study evidence the fact that 
notwithstanding the similarity in the institutional settings of labor relations at KT and 
KNR, the two unions showed different patterns of union responses. Hence, this 
dissertation questions the relevancy of analysis based on the uniformity of national 
institutions. The literature that builds its analysis on national models would expect to 
find that the lack of corporatist arrangements would encourage union militancy, but 
that such militancy would turn out to be ineffective as the absence of labor 
incorporation would marginalize union influence during the restructuring process. Yet 
union responses to government initiatives were not uniform although they both went 
through union democratization movements and leadership changes. KTTU began to 
take a more cooperative approach by restraining militancy while KRWU heightened 
its opposition and mobilized collective action.  
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 For sure, Korea has been characterized as a strike-prone country. As past studies 
show, strikes are widely used in countries where labor is denied access to political 
power. Labor-exclusive political systems have had a radicalizing effect on labor 
unions, and they encourage labor militancy as unions lack institutional resources to 
negotiate labor-protective agreements with government/management (Marks, 1989; 
Shorter & Tilly, 1974). By contrast in the countries where labor is integrated into the 
polity, strikes diminish as workers don’t have to use strikes as a means of pressing 
political demands (Shorter and Tilly, 1974). Hence, it is true that there exist cross-
national differences in the level of militancy. Countries where corporatist bargaining 
arrangements grant labor with the right to participate in decision-making reduce the 
frequency of strikes as labor unions have many other political/organizational means to 
pursue their interests. On the contrary, in countries where unions are not integrated 
into the polity, labor-management relations tend to be more adversarial as lack of 
institutional resources coerce unions to resort to militant protests to advance their 
claims.  
 Yet such an explanation only holds relevancy to capture broad national patterns. 
The case analysis of this study demonstrates that KTTU and KRWU diverged in their 
responses despite the common institutional framework. Thus, as far as the focus of the 
study is on explaining the diversity of union responses within the same nation, the 
national institutional variables cannot fully account for such variation. The evidences 
drawn from the responses of the JTWU and the Japanese railway unions also question 
the convergence of union behavior within the same institutional framework. Unlike 
the expectation that a cooperative labor-management relationship would dominate the 
privatization process, there was a substantial variation in union responses not only 
between the JTWU and the railway unions, but also among the different unions at JNR. 
The JTWU chose to negotiate an agreement with management and tried to mobilize 
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the socio-political resources for this purpose. By contrast, JNR unions were divided in 
their responses as Tetsuro complied with management initiatives while Kokuro 
continued its opposition to privatization and Doro suddenly shifted its attitude by 
replacing militant opposition with cooperation. Thus, this study proposes “to 
recognize the diversity in the same national context without denying the importance of 
political institutions” (Murillo, 2001, 193). This led to a closer examination of the 
changes in political opportunities and the micro-political dynamics of unions. Despite 
the common institutional framework, there existed differences in these variables, 
which produced varied union responses to privatization.    
 Moreover, it is also not valid to establish a direct causal relationship between 
union performances and the national institutional endowments. KTTU and KRWU 
differed in their strategic effectiveness although they both suffered from lack of 
institutional access. In this respect, this study departs from a set of hypotheses that the 
varieties of capitalism framework proposed to understand the persistent divergence in 
union influences. According to them, unions in CMEs have been capable of retaining 
their influence on market restructuring thanks to the embedded institutional 
arrangements that have accommodated a high level of labor participation in decision-
making. By contrast, unions in LMEs have been faced with declining union power as 
they have lacked institutional resources to curb management discretion (Turner, 1991; 
Ferner, 1994; Thelen, 2001). Yet the findings of this study are at odds with this 
generalization. Firstly, there was a significant difference in the degree of union success 
under the non-coordinated institutional framework of Korea. KRWU’s relative success 
illustrates that labor unions are capable of complementing their institutional 
weaknesses by formulating innovative strategies.  
 Additional comparative cases also support the argument of this study. First, 
Britain has always been characterized as a distinct LME, which had undergone a 
 203
radical, market-driven restructuring under Thatcherism (Ferner, 1994; Thelen, 2001). 
Yet the water privatization case evidences that although British unions had mostly 
failed to play an active role in shaping the restructuring outcomes, unions could still 
make a difference in the patterns of restructuring. As Ogden demonstrated in his study, 
the WJTUIC was able to force the British government to slow down the privatization 
process and to encompass social and environmental concerns (Ogden, 1991). The 
strategic capacity of the WJTUIC underlay this kind of detour in British water 
privatization as the unions were effective in articulating a coherent campaign. The 
Japanese cases also refute the varieties of capitalism approach. According to the 
conventional wisdom of the varieties of capitalism theory, the restructuring in Japan 
was expected to be labor-mediated as management would ensure a high level of 
coordination with unions in order to protect the principle of lifetime employment 
(Thelen, 2001). The privatization of the Japanese telecommunications seems to fit into 
this categorization. Yet the Japanese railway privatization eludes such conjecture as its 
process was colored by as much discord and conflict as the Korean railway 
privatization. In fact, the adversarial relationships between the Kokuro and the JNR 
during the restructuring period betrayed the conventional conception of Japanese 
labor-management relationships based on mutual trust. The JNR employer enforced a 
hard-line policy towards the militant Kokuro, and used whipsawing strategies in order 
to isolate the union from other railway unions. Despite the oppressive employer 
strategy, Kokuro was not able to confront the management offensive. The failure of 
the railway unions in establishing a participatory pattern of labor-management 
relations during the transition contradicts the prediction built upon the varieties of 
capitalism framework. In no sense was the railway privatization labor-mediated. And 
the Japanese railway case is too important to be treated as a minor deviation from the 
CME-based national model. The railway privatization and the re-establishment of 
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labor discipline at JNR was one of the most critical tasks of Japanese neo-conservative 
reformers at the time (Mochizuki, 1993; Watanabe, 1994; Suzuki, 1997). Therefore, 
the significance of conflicted labor-management relations during the JNR privatization 
process should not be downplayed.  
 In the end, the findings of this study assert the explanatory power of union 
strategic choices in explaining the divergent outcomes. The strategies of KRWU 
contributed to its relative success even within a non-participatory institutional 
arrangement. By contrast, the lack of innovative strategies rendered the Japanese 
railway unions passive and ineffective against management initiative. They were far 
from being integrated into the decision-making process, and their influence drastically 
plummeted during the privatization. Hence, the CME-based explanation becomes 
irrelevant to understand the dynamics of change in labor-management relationship 
during the Japanese railway restructuring.          
 
3. Theoretical Contributions  
 
The research strategy of this study is geared towards finding significant variations 
within nations. By departing from the framework that assumes stable national 
institutions shaping similar national patterns of union behavior, it develops an 
approach focusing on the politics of strategic choice. The alternative approach has 
several theoretical implications that compete with other perspectives.  
 Firstly, it shares the criticism of the contemporary studies towards the convergence 
theory. The convergence claim highlights how globalization fosters a general 
downward convergence of working condition and union power. According to this view, 
“the decline in strength of unions raises the specter of a new convergence to a world of 
employment relations where management gains unilateral authority” (Katz & 
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Darbishire, 2000: 5), and where capital mobility leads to a “race to the bottom” of 
wages, working conditions and social standards (Ohmae, 1994; Brecher, 1994/95; 
Martin & Ross, 1998). Against the “race to the bottom” thesis, this study argues that 
although competitive pressures lead to worldwide cost-cutting efforts on the part of 
management, there exist significant variations in employers’ strategies. Likewise, 
although unions have difficulties in maintaining their bargaining power everywhere, 
they have different degrees of success in their defense of labor interests.   
 In this respect, this study appears to be in line with comparative political economy 
literature that underlines the persistent divergence in national economies. As 
previously seen, the “varieties of capitalism” framework attributes the cause of such 
variation to the distinct sets of complementary national institutions. According to the 
framework, coordination occurs primarily through competitive market mechanisms in 
the LMEs as opposed to the CMEs where non-market coordination prevails and where 
employers rely more on longer time horizons based on collaborative relationships 
among firms and other stakeholders (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancke et al., 2007; Bohle 
& Greskovits, 2009) In terms of labor relations, LMEs are characterized by unilateral 
managerial authority over weak labor whereas CMEs are viewed to have corporatist 
bargaining systems that have allowed unions to enjoy extensive participatory right 
(Thelen, 2001; Bohle & Greskovits, 2009). Based on this distinction, the “varieties of 
capitalism” research has emphasized institutional stability over time. In its view, 
labor’s continued strength in the CMEs has helped sustain the non-market 
coordination as well as the employers’ dependence on labor cooperation unlike the 
LMEs where union decline has been more conspicuous along with widespread 
employer unilateralism (Thelen, 2001; Bohle & Greskovits, 2009). This dissertation 
shares the criticism towards the convergence claim that points to the uniform 
curtailment of union power in the face of market liberalization.  
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 Yet the empirical findings of this study also raise critiques of the varieties of 
capitalism premises. To begin with, it questions the coherence and stability of national 
models. Indeed recent studies have increasingly questioned the solidity of national 
institutions as a causal factor for explaining varied restructuring outcomes. For 
example, some researchers from the historical institutional tradition have criticized the 
static notion of national models that have overemphasized the sources of institutional 
stability. Instead of relying on the punctuated equilibrium model that assumes a long 
period of institutional stasis, they shed light on the dynamics of institutional change 
within the CMEs (Yamamura & Streeck, 2003; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Streeck, 
2009; Doellgast, 2006, 2007; Turner, 2009). Their studies find that some of the 
traditional CME institutions such as coordinated-industry bargaining have weakened 
and have widened differences in their effects across firms and workplaces within 
countries (Doellgast, 2006). Other industrial scholars have paid more attention to the 
substantial variation that simultaneously appears within, and not simply across 
countries (Locke, 1992; Frost, 2000; Katz & Darbishire, 2000; Murillo, 2001). They 
have criticized that the idea of stable national models lacks the analytical tools to 
understand the current process of market restructuring. By doing this, they also have 
commonly relied on the strategic choice approach. Drawing upon the framework, they 
have argued that union strategies have played a central role in widening variation 
within countries. This dissertation extends their claims by examining the extent of 
subnational variation that appeared in Korea. 
 The alternative approach of this study enriches the strategic choice framework by 
providing empirical evidences. At first, unlike contemporary national models or 
varieties of capitalism theories that downplay the political dynamics of change, this 
study has highlighted the “uncertainty of the transition created by political and 
economic changes” (Murillo, 2001: 25). Instead of emphasizing the structural 
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constraints and institutional stability, this study turns attention to conjectural changes 
that shape the dynamics of strategic interaction. Hence, it considers that political 
opportunities/constraints are not solely structured by the embedded institutional 
characteristics, but are also shaped by the shifting features of the political environment 
that involves continuous political realignment and renegotiation. For this reason, it 
emphasizes the changes in the political contingency brought by the transition from 
Kim Dae Jung’s government to Roh Moo Hyun’s government although the embedded 
institutional characteristics had not changed. As seen in chapter 3, the hegemony of 
economic bureaucrats began to be undermined and opened more space for policy 
contenders to raise objections. Besides, the electoral break created new political 
channels for KRWU through which it could exert political pressures. KRWU was 
aware of the increase in political opportunities and took a more aggressive approach to 
further advance its claims. By examining this process, this study demonstrates that the 
extent of political resources is not pre-determined by institutional endowments but is 
rather variable according to the changes in the political contingency.  
 Secondly, the alternative approach of this study makes it possible to identify the 
central role played by labor unions. Precisely the dynamics of contention model is 
appropriate to understand the interactive mechanism between the political changes and 
mobilization process. In line with the dynamics of contention model, this study calls 
attention to ‘the active appropriation of sites for mobilization’ instead of pointing to 
pre-existing political resources (Mc Adam et al., 2001). It is in this perspective that the 
strategic capacity of unions takes the central stage. Thus, in line with contemporary 
literature that emphasizes the role of strategies, this study places significant weight on 
union abilities to mobilize resources and to formulate effective strategies (Turner & 
Hurd, 2001; Hurd et al., 2003; Frege & Kelly, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; Turner, 2005, 
2009). If KRWU was not capable of developing effective mobilizing strategies, the 
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increased political resources provided by the changes in the political contingency 
would not have been translated into actual gains. Similarly, the unilateral restructuring 
of KT largely resulted from the failure of KTTU in overcoming the political and 
institutional constraints by increasing their strategic capabilities. In the case of railway 
restructuring, government policy was rather challenged and modified by union 
intervention. By contrast, the strategic ineffectiveness of KTTU was responsible for 
unilateral implementation of the government plan. The additional case analyses of the 
PPIU, the British water unions and JTWU also prove that it was their greater strategic 
capabilities to mobilize both their membership and social coalitions that contributed to 
their success. Likewise, the lesser strategic capabilities of JNR unions led to unilateral 
restructuring of the Japanese railway. Similar to KTTU, they could not influence the 
restructuring process by failing to mobilize countervailing bargaining power. In sum, 
the cases studies of this dissertation show that unions proved to be key actors in 
creating differences in the pace and patterns of restructuring. By doing this, it enriches 
the insights of recent union strategy literature and complements the firm-centric bias 
of “varieties of capitalism” literature, which privileges the role of employer while 
relegating the largely reactive role to unions (Turner, 2005). Against this approach, the 
findings of this study have proved the active and independent role played by union 
strategies.  
 Eventually, the alternative approach of this study contributes to the contemporary 
debate on convergence versus divergence of industrial relations. The findings of this 
study refute both the convergence of industrial relations and the cross-national 
divergences of industrial relations based on the stability of national institutions. 
Although it is true that divergent institutional arrangements have continued to produce 
variation in broad national patterns of industrial relations, they should not obscure the 
growing subnational diversity linked to the increasing fragmentation of national 
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institutions. In fact, the case studies of this dissertation demonstrate how the 
differences in union strategies have reinforced the within-country variation by shaping 
varied effects on the restructuring decisions. While KRWU had policy input in the 
restructuring design, KTTU failed to do so. As a result, the Korean railway 
restructuring was labor-mediated whereas the telecommunication restructuring was 
state-led and non-coordinated by other stakeholders. Additional comparative analysis 
reaffirms the central argument of this study. The Japanese case is particularly 
illustrative as it permits to control both national and sector-specific variables. The 
relative success of the JTWU in establishing a participatory pattern of labor relations 
as opposed to the declining labor influence at JNR appropriately portrays the 
contrasting subnatonal variation in Japan. Contrary to the Korean case, it was the 
telecommunications restructuring that was labor-mediated. The fact that the JTWU 
was far more influential than the railway unions proves that union strategies weigh 
much more on the varied outcomes than the national institutions or the industry 
conditions do.  
 
4. Implications for Future Research and Practice 
 
This dissertation evidences the growing subnational variation in the restructuring 
outcomes by giving detailed account of two representative cases: the unilateral 
restructuring at KT versus the negotiated restructuring at KNR. This is done through a 
paired comparison that offers an in-depth qualitative analysis on the causal process of 
the restructuring. Built upon the analysis, this dissertation contributes to contemporary 
labor research by demonstrating the diverse union effects on the within-country 
variation. Yet the lack of multi-level comparisons could question the generalizability 
of the findings of this study. To complement this weakness, this study has extended the 
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comparative analysis to the Korean power plant industry, the British water industry, 
and the Japanese telecommunications and railway industries. The additional multi-
level comparison offers further evidences to support the central argument of this study: 
the differences in union strategic abilities account for the different patterns of 
restructuring. Yet although additional comparisons proved that the findings of this 
study are applicable outside the selected two cases, the comparative analysis is still too 
brief to provide sufficient evidences to generalize the findings to other countries, 
industries and workplaces. To overcome this weakness, it will be necessary to do 
follow-up research based on more systematic multi-level comparisons. Findings of 
similar causal mechanisms will strengthen the argument of this study by proving its 
broad applicability.        
 Yet despite the limit, this study contributes to the contemporary theoretical debate 
by broadening the comparative scope of the strategic choice theory and by providing 
meaningful substantiation to prove the centrality of union strategies. Besides, by 
emphasizing the role of labor unions in influencing the restructuring outcomes, the 
findings from this study also offer practical implications for union policy. It is true that 
labor unions are faced with substantial challenges in the face of growing market 
competition and deregulation. Yet this study shows that unions are still able to mediate 
the influence of market pressures by increasing their strategic capabilities. In this 
respect, the findings of this dissertation suggest that although the strategic avenues are 
becoming narrower for unions, their role is more important than ever in avoiding 
employer unilateralism and in promoting labor and social interests.   
 Among the findings, the strategic importance of coalition-building provides a 
particularly useful reference for union practice. Indeed, labor unions that have 
restricted participatory rights are less likely to succeed when they solely rely on their 
traditional bargaining tactics and do not put in significant efforts to reach out to broad 
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social constituencies. The mobilization of society-wide support provides labor unions 
with power resources that help complement their weak bargaining power. For this, 
they have to demonstrate a greater capacity in framing their demands as appeals to 
public interests or to citizenship rights. Indeed a number of labor researchers have 
already connected the strategic innovations of unions to social mobilization. For them 
coalition building is an effective way of expanding available resources in order to 
break through exiting constraints, and labor unions are more able to revitalize 
themselves when they adopt social mobilization approach (Johnston, 2001; Hurd et al., 
2003; Frege et al., 2004b; Turner & Cornfield, 2007). More recently, Gentile and 
Tarrow have argued that union success is associated with the use of a ‘citizenship 
rights protest repertoire’ in countries where labor’s political and institutional 
categorization is weak. According to them, unions have to rely on alliances with other 
citizens to defend their interests in countries where labor right domains are weak. 
Same is true for unions in countries that are in transition from a corporatist to a neo-
liberal regime: unions that have survived the transition have done so by adapting their 
strategies to the citizenship rights domain. Those that have failed to shift to a ‘citizen 
rights repertoire’ have been weakened (Gentile & Tarrow, 2009). The findings of this 
study also support the arguments of these contemporary researches. Successful union 
campaigns by Korean unions (KRWU, PPIU) and the British water unions drew upon 
their strategic abilities to frame their campaigns as a defense of citizenship rights to 
meet the public needs. They all avoided being identified as pursuing narrow economic 
interest and they all strived to encompass broad social concerns to recruit public 
opinion. Coalition-building was central in mobilizing social support, which eventually 
contributed to the increase in their bargaining power. By contrast, KTTU and the 
Japanese railway unions proved to be ineffective in attaining their objectives by failing 
to grasp the opportunities to join and mobilize social coalition.    
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 The success and failures of contemporary union movements are instructive of 
union strategic choice. It suggests that a union movement “achieves its full potential 
only when it aligns itself and even merges with other democratic social movements” 
(Johnston, 2001: 36). If unions choose to remain in their traditional repertoire of 
opposition without connecting themselves with other forces in civil society, they will 
be isolated in their protests. This will only result in the weakening of their power. By 
contrast, unions can compensate for their institutional disadvantages by adopting 
tactical innovations. Where unions confront an already weak or weakening instance of 
institutional incorporation of labor, they have to mobilize social coalition for the 
pursuit of public interests. Union efforts for coalition-building appear necessary not 
only for retaining and increasing union influence but also for the broader expansion of 
citizenship rights within the promise of democratic societies. 
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